Euth. By heaven! of course we are to include these, for what would
happiness be without these?
Soc. By heaven! yes; only then we shall be including the commonest
sources of mischief which befall mankind. How many are ruined by their
fair faces at the hand of admirers driven to distraction (54) by the
sight of beauty in its bloom! how many, tempted by their strength to
essay deeds beyond their power, are involved in no small evils! how
many, rendered effeminate by reason of their wealth, have been plotted
against and destroyed! (55) how many through fame and political power
have suffered a world of woe!
(54) Cf. Plat. "Rep." vii. 517 D; "Phaedr." 249 D.
(55) e.g. Alcibiades.
Well (the youth replied) if I am not even right in praising happiness,
I must confess I know not for what one ought to supplicate the gods in
prayer. (56)
(56) See above for Socrates' own form of supplication.
Nay, these are matters (proceeded Socrates) which perhaps, through
excessive confidence in your knowledge of them, you have failed to
examine into; but since the state, which you are preparing yourself to
direct, is democratically constituted, (57) of course you know what a
democracy is.
(57) Or, "popularly governed."
Euth. I presume I do, decidedly.
Soc. Well, now, is it possible to know what a popular state is without
knowing who the people are?
Euth. Certainly not.
Soc. And whom do you consider to be the people?
Euth. The poor citizens, I should say.
Soc. Then you know who the poor are, of course?
Euth. Of course I do.
Soc. I presume you also know who the rich are?
Euth. As certainly as I know who are the poor.
Soc. Whom do you understand by poor and rich?
Euth. By poor I mean those who have not enough to pay for their
necessaries, (58) and by rich those who have more means than sufficient
for all their needs.
(58) Al. "who cannot contribute their necessary quota to the taxes
(according to the census)."
Soc. Have you noticed that some who possess a mere pittance not only
find this sufficient, but actually succeed in getting a surplus out of
it; while others do not find a large fortune large enough?
I have, most certainly; and I thank you for the reminder (replied
Euthydemus). One has heard of crowned heads and despotic rulers being
driven by want to commit misdeeds like the veriest paupers.
Then, if that is how matters stand (continued Socrates), we must class
these same crowned heads with the commonalty; and some possessors of
scant fortunes, provided they are good economists, with the wealthy?
Then Euthydemus: It is the poverty of my own wit which forces me to this
admission. I bethink me it is high time to keep silence altogether; a
little more, and I shall be proved to know absolutely nothing. And so he
went away crestfallen, in an agony of self-contempt, persuaded that he
was verily and indeed no better than a slave.
Amongst those who were reduced to a like condition by Socrates, many
refused to come near him again, whom he for his part looked upon as
dolts and dullards. (59) But Euthydemus had the wit to understand that,
in order to become worthy of account, his best plan was to associate
as much as possible with Socrates; and from that moment, save for some
necessity, he never left him--in some points even imitating him in his
habits and pursuits. Socrates, on his side, seeing that this was the
young man's disposition, disturbed him as little as possible, but in the
simplest and plainest manner initiated him into everything which he held
to be needful to know or important to practise.
(59) Or, "as people of dull intelligence and sluggish temperament."
Cf. Plat. "Gorg." 488 A.
III
It may be inferred that Socrates was in no hurry for those who were
with him to discover capacities for speech and action or as
inventive geniuses, (1) without at any rate a well-laid foundation of
self-control. (2) For those who possessed such abilities without these
same saving virtues would, he believed, only become worse men with
greater power for mischief. His first object was to instil into those
who were with him a wise spirit in their relation to the gods. (3) That
such was the tenor of his conversation in dealing with men may be
seen from the narratives of others who were present on some particular
occasion. (4) I confine myself to a particular discussion with
Euthydemus at which I was present.
(1) Or, "as speakers" (see ch. vi. below), "and men of action" (see
ch. v. below), "or as masters of invention" (see ch. vii. below).
(2) Or, "but as prior to those excellences must be engrafted in them
{sophrosune} (the virtues of temperance and sanity of soul)."
(3) Lit. "His first object and endeavour was to make those who were
with him {sophronas} (sound of soul) as regards the gods."
(4) Reading after Herbst, Cobet, etc., {diegountai}, or if vulg.
{diegounto}, translate, "from the current accounts penned during
his lifetime by the other witnesses." For {alloi} see K. Joel, op.
cit. pp. 15, 23; above, "Mem." I. iv. 1.
Socrates said: (5) Tell me, Euthydemus, has it ever struck you to
observe what tender pains the gods have taken to furnish man with all
his needs?
(5) For the subject matter of this "teleological" chapter, see above,
I. iv.; K. Joel, op. cit. Appendix, p. 547 foll. in ref. to
Dummler's views.
Euth. No indeed, I cannot say that it has ever struck me.
Well (Socrates continued), you do not need to be reminded that, in the
first place, we need light, and with light the gods supply us.
Euth. Most true, and if we had not got it we should, as far as our own
eyes could help us, be like men born blind.
Soc. And then, again, seeing that we stand in need of rest and
relaxation, they bestow upon us "the blessed balm of silent night." (6)
(6) {kalliston anapauterion}. The diction throughout is "poetical."
Yes (he answered), we are much beholden for that boon.
Soc. Then, forasmuch as the sun in his splendour makes manifest to us
the hours of the day and bathes all things in brightness, but anon night
in her darkness obliterates distinctions, have they not displayed aloft
the starry orbs, which inform us of the watches of the night, whereby we
can accomplish many of our needs? (7)
(7) e.g. for temple orientation see Dr. Penrose quoted by Norman
Lockyer, "Nature," August 31. 1893.
It is so (he answered).
Soc. And let us not forget that the moon herself not only makes clear to
us the quarters of the night, but of the month also?
Certainly (he answered).
Soc. And what of this: that whereas we need nutriment, this too the
heavenly powers yield us? Out of earth's bosom they cause good to spring
up (8) for our benefit; and for our benefit provide appropriate seasons
to furnish us in turn not only with the many and diverse objects of
need, but with the sources also of our joy and gladness? (9)
(8) Cf. Plat. "Laws," 747 D.
(9) Or, "pleasure."
Yes (he answered eagerly), these things bear token truly to a love for
man. (10)
(10) Cf. Plat. "Laws," 713 D; "Symp." 189 D. "These things are signs
of a beneficient regard for man."
Soc. Well, and what of another priceless gift, that of water, which
conspires with earth and the seasons to give both birth and increase to
all things useful to us; nay, which helps to nurture our very selves,
and commingling with all that feeds us, renders it more digestible, more
wholesome, and more pleasant to the taste; and mark you in proportion to
the abundance of our need the superabundance of its supply. What say you
concerning such a boon?
Euth. In this again I see a sign of providential care.
Soc. And then the fact that the same heavenly power has provided us with
fire (11)--our assistant against cold, our auxiliary in darkness, our
fellow-workman in every art and every instrument which for the sake of
its utility mortal man may invent or furnish himself withal. What of
this, since, to put it compendiously, there is nothing serviceable to
the life of man worth speaking of but owes its fabrication to fire? (12)
(11) Lit. "and then the fact that they made provision for us of even
fire"; the credit of this boon, according to Hesiod, being due to
Prometheus.
(12) Or, "no life-aiding appliance worthy of the name."
Euth. Yes, a transcendent instance of benevolent design. (13)
(13) Or, "Yes, that may be called an extreme instance of the divine
'philanthropy.'" Cf. Cic. "de N. D." ii. 62.
Soc. Again, consider the motions of the Sun, (14) how when he has
turned him about in winter (15) he again draws nigh to us, ripening some
fruits, and causing others whose time is past to dry up; how when he has
fulfilled his work he comes no closer, but turns away as if in fear to
scorch us to our hurt unduly; and again, when he has reached a point
where if he should prolong his retreat we should plainly be frozen to
death with cold, note how he turns him about and resumes his approach,
traversing that region of the heavens where he may shed his genial
influence best upon us.
(14) A single MS. inserts a passage {to de kai era...
'Anekphraston}.
(15) i.e. as we say, "after the winter solstice."
Yes, upon my word (he answered), these occurrences bear the impress of
being so ordered for the sake of man.
Soc. And then, again, it being manifest that we could not endure either
scorching heat or freezing cold if they came suddenly upon us, note how
gradually the sun approaches, and how gradually recedes, so that we fail
to notice how we come at last to either extreme. (16)
(16) Or, "note the gradual approach and gradual recession of the sun-
god, so gradual that we reach either extreme in a manner
imperceptibly, and before we are aware of its severity."
For my part (he replied), the question forces itself upon my mind,
whether the gods have any other occupation save only to minister to man;
and I am only hindered from saying so, because the rest of animals would
seem to share these benefits along with man.
Soc. Why, to be sure; and is it not plain that these animals themselves
are born and bred for the sake of man? At any rate, no living creature
save man derives so many of his enjoyments from sheep and goats, horses
and cattle and asses, and other animals. He is more dependent, I should
suppose, on these than even on plants and vegetables. At any rate,
equally with these latter they serve him as means of subsistence or
articles of commerce; indeed, a large portion of the human family do not
use the products of the soil as food at all, but live on the milk and
cheese and flesh of their flocks and herds, whilst all men everywhere
tame and domesticate the more useful kinds of animals, and turn them to
account as fellow-workers in war and for other purposes.
Yes, I cannot but agree with what you say (he answered), when I see that
animals so much stronger than man become so subservient to his hand that
he can use them as he lists.
Soc. And as we reflect on the infinite beauty and utility and the
variety of nature, what are we to say of the fact that man has been
endowed with sensibilities which correspond with this diversity, whereby
we take our fill of every blessing; (17) or, again, this implanted
faculty of reasoning, which enables us to draw inferences concerning the
things which we perceive, and by aid of memory to understand how
each set of things may be turned to our good, and to devise countless
contrivances with a view to enjoying the good and repelling the evil; or
lastly, when we consider the faculty bestowed upon us of interpretative
speech, by which we are enabled to instruct one another, and to
participate in all the blessings fore-named: to form societies, to
establish laws, and to enter upon a civilised existence (18)--what are
we to think?
(17) Or, "Again, when we consider how many beautiful objects there are
serviceable to man, and yet how unlike they are to one another,
the fact that man has been endowed with senses adapted to each
class of things, and so has access to a world of happiness."
(18) Cf. Aristot. "Pol." III. ix. 5.
Euth. Yes, Socrates, decidedly it would appear that the gods do manifest
a great regard, nay, a tender care, towards mankind.
Soc. Well, and what do you make of the fact that where we are powerless
to take advantageous forethought for our future, at this stage they
themselves lend us their co-operation, imparting to the inquirer through
divination knowledge of events about to happen, and instructing him by
what means they may best be turned to good account?
Euth. Ay, and you, Socrates, they would seem to treat in a more friendly
manner still than the rest of men, if, without waiting even to be
inquired of by you, they show you by signs beforehand what you must, and
what you must not do. (19)
(19) See above, I. iv. 14, for a parallel to the train of thought on
the part of Aristodemus "the little," and of Euthydemus; and for
Socrates' {daimonion}, see above; Grote, "Plato," i. 400.
Soc. Yes, and you will discover for yourself the truth of what I say, if,
without waiting to behold the outward and visible forms (20) of the gods
themselves, you will be content to behold their works; and with these
before you, to worship and honour the Divine authors of them. (21)
I would have you reflect that the very gods themselves suggest this
teaching. (22) Not one of these but gives us freely of his blessings;
yet they do not step from behind their veil in order to grant one
single boon. (23) And pre-eminently He who orders and holds together
the universe, (24) in which are all things beautiful and good; (25) who
fashions and refashions it to never-ending use unworn, keeping it free
from sickness or decay, (26) so that swifter than thought it ministers
to his will unerringly--this God is seen to perform the mightiest
operations, but in the actual administration of the same abides himself
invisible to mortal ken. Reflect further, this Sun above our heads, so
visible to all--as we suppose--will not suffer man to regard him too
narrowly, but should any essay to watch him with a shameless stare he
will snatch away their power of vision. And if the gods themselves are
thus unseen, so too shall you find their ministers to be hidden also;
from the height of heaven above the thunderbolt is plainly hurled, and
triumphs over all that it encounters, yet it is all-invisible, no eye
may detect its coming or its going at the moment of its swoop. The winds
also are themselves unseen, though their works are manifest, and through
their approach we are aware of them. And let us not forget, the soul
of man himself, which if aught else human shares in the divine--however
manifestly enthroned within our bosom, is as wholly as the rest hidden
from our gaze. These things you should lay to mind, and not despise
the invisible ones, but learn to recognise their power, as revealed in
outward things, and to know the divine influence. (27)
(20) Cf. Cic. "de N. D." I. xii. 31; Lactantius, "de Ira," xi. 13.
(21) See L. Dindorf ad loc. (ed. Ox. 1862), {theous}; G. Sauppe, vol.
iii. "An. crit." p. xxix; R. Kuhner; C. Schenkl.
(22) i.e. "that man must walk by faith." For {upodeiknunai} cf.
"Econ." xii. 18.
(23) Schneid. cf. Plat. "Crat." 396.
(24) Or, "the co-ordinator and container of the universe."
(25) Or, "in whom all beauty and goodness is."
(26) Cf. "Cyrop." VIII. vii. 22; above, I. iv. 13.
(27) {to daimonion}, the divinity.
Nay, Socrates (replied Euthydemus), there is no danger I shall turn a
deaf ear to the divine influence even a little; of that I am not afraid,
but I am out of heart to think that no soul of man may ever requite the
kindness of the gods with fitting gratitude.
Be not out of heart because of that (he said); you know what answer the
god at Delphi makes to each one who comes asking "how shall I return
thanks to heaven?"--"According to the law and custom of your city"; and
this, I presume, is law and custom everywhere that a man should please
the gods with offerings according to the ability which is in him. (28)
How then should a man honour the gods with more beautiful or holier
honour than by doing what they bid him? but he must in no wise slacken
or fall short of his ability, for when a man so does, it is manifest, I
presume, that at the moment he is not honouring the gods. You must then
honour the gods, not with shortcoming but according to your ability;
and having so done, be of good cheer and hope to receive the greatest
blessings. For where else should a man of sober sense look to receive
great blessings if not from those who are able to help him most, and how
else should he hope to obtain them save by seeking to please his helper,
and how may he hope to please his helper better than by yielding him the
amplest obedience?
(28) Or, "and that law, I presume, is universal which says, Let a
man," etc.; and for the maxim see above; "Anab." III. ii. 9.
By such words--and conduct corresponding to his words--did Socrates
mould and fashion the hearts of his companions, making them at once more
devout and more virtuous. (29)
(29) Or, "sounder of soul and more temperate as well as more pious."
IV
But indeed (1) with respect to justice and uprightness he not only made
no secret of the opinion he held, but gave practical demonstration of
it, both in private by his law-abiding and helpful behaviour to all, (2)
and in public by obeying the magistrates in all that the laws enjoined,
whether in the life of the city or in military service, so that he was
a pattern of loyalty to the rest of the world, and on three several
occasions in particular: first, when as president (Epistates) of
the assembly he would not suffer the sovereign people to take an
unconstitutional vote, (3) but ventured, on the side of the laws, to
resist a current of popular feeling strong enough, I think, to have
daunted any other man. Again, when the Thirty tried to lay some
injunction on him contrary to the laws, he refused to obey, as for
instance when they forbade his conversing with the young; (4) or again,
when they ordered him and certain other citizens to arrest a man to
be put to death, (5) he stood out single-handed on the ground that the
injunctions laid upon him were contrary to the laws. And lastly, when
he appeared as defendant in the suit instituted by Meletus, (6)
notwithstanding that it was customary for litigants in the law courts
to humour the judges in the conduct of their arguments by flattery
and supplications contrary to the laws, (7) notwithstanding also that
defendants owed their acquittal by the court to the employment of such
methods, he refused to do a single thing however habitual in a court of
law which was not strictly legal; and though by only a slight deflection
from the strict path he might easily have been acquitted by his judges,
(8) he preferred to abide by the laws and die rather than transgress
them and live.
(1) L. Dindorf suspects (SS. 1-6, {'Alla men... pollakis}), ed.
Lips. 1872. See also Praef. to Ox. ed. p. viii.
(2) Or, "by his conduct to all, which was not merely innocent in the
eye of law and custom but positively helpful."
(3) See above, I. i. 18; "Hell." I. vii. 14, 15; Grote, "H. G." viii.
272.
(4) See above, I. ii. 35.
(5) Leon of Salamis. See "Hell." II. iii. 39; Plat. "Apol." 32 C;
Andoc. "de Myst." 46.
(6) See above, I. i. 1; Plat. "Apol." 19 C.
(7) Kuhner cf. Quintil. VI. i. 7: "Athenis affectus movere etiam per
praeconem prohibatur orator"; "Apol." 4; Plat. "Apol." 38 D, E.
(8) See Grote, "H. G." viii. p. 663 foll.
These views he frequently maintained in conversation, now with one and
now with another, and one particular discussion with Hippias of Elis (9)
on the topic of justice and uprightness has come to my knowledge. (10)
(9) For this famous person see Cob. "Pros. Xen." s.n.; Plat. "Hipp.
maj." 148; Quint. xii. 11, 21; Grote, "H. G." viii. 524.
(10) Or, "I can personally vouch for."
Hippias had just arrived at Athens after a long absence, and chanced to
be present when Socrates was telling some listeners how astonishing
it was that if a man wanted to get another taught to be a shoemaker or
carpenter or coppersmith or horseman, he would have no doubt where to
send him for the purpose: "People say," (11) he added, "that if a man
wants to get his horse or his ox taught in the right way, (12) the world
is full of instructors; but if he would learn himself, or have his son
or his slave taught in the way of right, he cannot tell where to find
such instruction."
(11) L. Dindorf, after Ruhnken and Valckenar, omits this sentence
{phasi de tines... didaxonton}. See Kuhner ad loc. For the
sentiment see Plat. "Apol." 20 A.
(12) Cf. "Cyrop." II. ii. 26; VIII. iii. 38; also "Horsem." iii. 5;
"Hunting," vii. 4.
Hippias, catching the words, exclaimed in a bantering tone: What! still
repeating the same old talk, (13) Socrates, which I used to hear from
you long ago?
(13) This tale is repeated by Dio Chrys. "Or." III. i. 109. Cf. Plat.
"Gorg." 490 E.
Yes (answered Socrates), and what is still more strange, Hippias, it is
not only the same old talk but about the same old subjects. Now you, I
daresay, through versatility of knowledge, (14) never say the same thing
twice over on the same subject?
(14) Or, "such is the breadth of your learning," {polumathes}. Cf.
Plat. "Hipp. maj."
To be sure (he answered), my endeavour is to say something new on all
occasions.
What (he asked) about things which you know, as for instance in a case
of spelling, if any one asks you, "How many letters in Socrates, and
what is their order?" (15) I suppose you try to run off one string of
letters to-day and to-morrow another? or to a question of arithmetic,
"Does twice five make ten?" your answer to-day will differ from that of
yesterday?
(15) Cf. "Econ." viii. 14; Plat. "Alc." i. 113 A.
Hipp. No; on these topics, Socrates, I do as you do and repeat myself.
However, to revert to justice (and uprightness), (16) I flatter myself
I can at present furnish you with some remarks which neither you nor any
one else will be able to controvert.
(16) Or, "on the topic of the just I have something to say at present
which," etc.
By Hera! (17) (he exclaimed), what a blessing to have discovered! (18)
Now we shall have no more divisions of opinion on points of right and
wrong; judges will vote unanimously; citizens will cease wrangling;
there will be no more litigation, no more party faction, states will
reconcile their differences, and wars are ended. For my part I do not
know how I can tear myself away from you, until I have heard from your
own lips all about the grand discovery you have made.
(17) See above, I. v. 5.
(18) Or, "what a panacea are you the inventor of"; lit. "By Hera, you
have indeed discovered a mighty blessing, if juries are to cease
recording their verdicts 'aye' and 'no'; if citizens are to cease
their wranglings on points of justice, their litigations, and
their party strifes; if states are to cease differing on matters
of right and wrong and appealing to the arbitrament of war."
You shall hear all in good time (Hippias answered), but not until you
make a plain statement of your own belief. What is justice? We have had
enough of your ridiculing all the rest of the world, questioning and
cross-examining first one and then the other, but never a bit will you
render an account to any one yourself or state a plain opinion upon a
single topic. (19)
(19) See Plat. "Gorg." 465 A.
What, Hippias (Socrates retorted), have you not observed that I am in a
chronic condition of proclaiming what I regard as just and upright?
Hipp. And pray what is this theory (20) of yours on the subject? Let us
have it in words.
(20) {o logos}.
Soc. If I fail to proclaim it in words, at any rate I do so in deed and
in fact. Or do you not think that a fact is worth more as evidence than
a word? (21)
(21) Or, "is of greater evidential value," "ubi res adsunt, quid opus
est verbis?"
Worth far more, I should say (Hippias answered), for many a man with
justice and right on his lips commits injustice and wrong, but no doer
of right ever was a misdoer or could possibly be.
Soc. I ask then, have you ever heard or seen or otherwise perceived me
bearing false witness or lodging malicious information, or stirring up
strife among friends or political dissension in the city, or committing
any other unjust and wrongful act?
No, I cannot say that I have (he answered).
Soc. And do you not regard it as right and just to abstain from wrong?
(22)
(22) Or, "is not abstinence from wrongdoing synonymous with righteous
behaviour?"
Hipp. Now you are caught, Socrates, plainly trying to escape from a
plain statement. When asked what you believe justice to be, you keep
telling us not what the just man does, but what he does not do.
Why, I thought for my part (answered Socrates) that the refusal to do
wrong and injustice was a sufficient warrent in itself of righteousness
and justice, but if you do not agree, see if this pleases you better: I
assert that what is "lawful" is "just and righteous."
Do you mean to assert (he asked) that lawful and just are synonymous
terms?
Soc. I do.
I ask (Hippias added), for I do not perceive what you mean by lawful,
nor what you mean by just. (23)
(23) Lit. "what sort of lawful or what sort of just is spoken of."
Soc. You understand what is meant by laws of a city or state?
Yes (he answered).
Soc. What do you take them to be?
Hipp. The several enactments drawn up by the citizens or members of a
state in agreement as to what things should be done or left undone.
Then I presume (Socrates continued) that a member of a state who
regulates his life in accordance with these enactments will be
law-abiding, while the transgressor of the same will be law-less?
Certainly (he answered).
Soc. And I presume the law-loving citizen will do what is just and
right, while the lawless man will do what is unjust and wrong?
Hipp. Certainly.
Soc. And I presume that he who does what is just is just, and he who
does what is unjust is unjust?
Hipp. Of course.
Soc. It would appear, then, that the law-loving man is just, and the
lawless unjust?
Then Hippias: Well, but laws, Socrates, how should any one regard as a
serious matter either the laws themselves, or obedience to them,
which laws the very people who made them are perpetually rejecting and
altering?
Which is also true of war (Socrates replied); cities are perpetually
undertaking war and then making peace again.
Most true (he answered).
Soc. If so, what is the difference between depreciating obedience to law
because laws will be repealed, and depreciating good discipline in war
because peace will one day be made? But perhaps you object to enthusiasm
displayed in defence of one's home and fatherland in war?
No, indeed I do not! I heartily approve of it (he answered).
Soc. Then have you laid to heart the lesson taught by Lycurgus to the
Lacedaemonians, (24) and do you understand that if he succeeded
in giving Sparta a distinction above other states, it was only by
instilling into her, beyond all else, a spirit of obedience to the laws?
And among magistrates and rulers in the different states, you would
scarcely refuse the palm of superiority to those who best contribute
to make their fellow-citizens obedient to the laws? And you would
admit that any particular state in which obedience to the laws is the
paramount distinction of the citizens flourishes most in peace time, and
in time of war is irresistible? But, indeed, of all the blessings which
a state may enjoy, none stands higher than the blessing of unanimity.
"Concord among citizens"--that is the constant theme of exhortation
emphasised by the councils of elders (25) and by the choice spirits of
the community; (26) at all times and everywhere through the length and
breadth of all Hellas it is an established law that the citizens be
bound together by an oath of concord; (27) everywhere they do actually
swear this oath; not of course as implying that citizens shall all vote
for the same choruses, or give their plaudits to the same flute-players,
or choose the same poets, or limit themselves to the same pleasures, but
simply that they shall pay obedience to the laws, since in the end that
state will prove most powerful and most prosperous in which the
citizens abide by these; but without concord neither can a state be well
administered nor a household well organised.
(24) Cf. "Pol. Lac." viii. See Newman, op. cit. i. 396.
(25) Lit. "the Gerousiai." {S} or {X S} uses the Spartan phraseology.
(26) Lit. "the best men." {S} or {X S} speaks as an "aristocrat."
(27) Cf. "Hell." II. iv. 43; Lys. xxv. 21 foll.; Schneid. cf. Lycurg.
"u Leocr." 189.
And if we turn to private life, what better protection can a man
have than obedience to the laws? This shall be his safeguard against
penalties, his guarantee of honours at the hands of the community; it
shall be a clue to thread his way through the mazes of the law courts
unbewildered, secure against defeat, assured of victory. (28) It is
to him, the law-loving citizen, that men will turn in confidence when
seeking a guardian of the most sacred deposits, be it of money or be it
their sons or daughters. He, in the eyes of the state collectively, is
trustworthy--he and no other; who alone may be depended on to render to
all alike their dues--to parents and kinsmen and servants, to friends
and fellow-citizens and foreigners. This is he whom the enemy will
soonest trust to arrange an armistice, or a truce, or a treaty of peace.
They would like to become the allies of this man, and to fight on
his side. This is he to whom the allies (29) of his country will most
confidently entrust the command of their forces, or of a garrison, or
their states themselves. This, again, is he who may be counted on to
recompense kindness with gratitude, and who, therefore, is more sure of
kindly treatment than another whose sense of gratitude is fuller. (30)
The most desirable among friends, the enemy of all others to be avoided,
clearly he is not the person whom a foreign state would choose to go
to war with; encompassed by a host of friends and exempt from foes, his
very character has a charm to compel friendship and alliance, and before
him hatred and hostility melt away.
(28) Or, "ignorant of hostile, assured of favourable verdict."
(29) Lit. "the Allies," e.g. of Sparta or of Athens, etc.
(30) Lit. "From whom may the doer of a deed of kindness more
confidently expect the recompense of gratitude than from your
lover of the law? and whom would one select as the recipient of
kindness rather than a man susceptible of gratitude?"
And now, Hippias, I have done my part; that is my proof and
demonstration that the "lawful" and "law-observant" are synonymous
with the "upright" and the "just"; do you, if you hold a contrary view,
instruct us. (31)
(31) For the style of this enconium (of the {nomimos}) cf. "Ages." i.
36; and for the "Socratic" reverence for law cf. Plat. "Crito."
Then Hippias: Nay, upon my soul, Socrates, I am not aware of holding any
contrary opinion to what you have uttered on the theme of justice. (32)
(32) Lit. "the just and upright," {tou dikaiou}.
Soc. But now, are you aware, Hippias, of certain unwritten laws? (33)
(33) See Soph. "Antig." "Oed. T." 865, and Prof. Jebb ad loc.; Dem.
"de Cor." 317, 23; Aristot. "Rhet." I. xiii.
Yes (he answered), those held in every part of the world, and in the
same sense.
Can you then assert (asked Socrates) of these unwritten laws that men
made them?
Nay, how (he answered) should that be, for how could they all have come
together from the ends of the earth? and even if they had so done, men
are not all of one speech? (34)
(34) Or, "there would be difficulty of understanding each other, and a
babel of tongues."
Soc. Whom then do you believe to have been the makers of these laws.
Hipp. For my part, I think that the gods must have made these laws for
men, and I take it as proof that first and foremost it is a law and
custom everywhere to worship and reverence the gods.
Soc. And, I presume, to honour parents is also customary everywhere?
Yes, that too (he answered).
Soc. And, I presume, also the prohibition of intermarriage between
parents and children?
Hipp. No; at that point I stop, Socrates. That does not seem to me to be
a law of God.
Now, why? (he asked).
Because I perceive it is not infrequently transgressed (he answered).
(35)
(35) Or, "as I perceive, it is not of universal application, some
transgress it."
Soc. Well, but there are a good many other things which people
do contrary to law; only the penalty, I take it, affixed to the
transgression of the divine code is certain; there is no escape for the
offender after the manner in which a man may transgress the laws of man
with impunity, slipping through the fingers of justice by stealth, or
avoiding it by violence.
Hipp. And what is the inevitable penalty paid by those who, being
related as parents and children, intermingle in marriage?
Soc. The greatest of all penalties; for what worse calamity can human
beings suffer in the production of offspring than to misbeget? (36)
(36) Or, "in the propagation of the species than to produce
misbegotten children."
Hipp. But how or why should they breed them ill where nothing hinders
them, being of a good stock themselves and producing from stock as good?
Soc. Because, forsooth, in order to produce good children, it is not
simply necessary that the parents should be good and of a good stock,
but that both should be equally in the prime and vigour of their bodies.
(37) Do you suppose that the seed of those who are at their prime is
like theirs who either have not yet reached their prime, or whose prime
has passed?
(37) Cf. Plat. "Laws," viii. 839 A; Herbst, etc., cf. Grotius, "de
Jure," ii. 5, xii. 4.
Hipp. No, it is reasonable to expect that the seed will differ.
Soc. And for the better--which?
Hipp. Theirs clearly who are at their prime.
Soc. It would seem that the seed of those who are not yet in their prime
or have passed their prime is not good?
Hipp. It seems most improbable it should be.
Soc. Then the right way to produce children is not that way?
Hipp. No, that is not the right way.
Soc. Then children who are so produced are produced not as they ought to
be?
Hipp. So it appears to me.
What offspring then (he asked) will be ill produced, ill begotten, and
ill born, if not these?
I subscribe to that opinion also (replied Hippias).
Soc. Well, it is a custom universally respected, is it not, to return
good for good, and kindness with kindness?
Hipp. Yes, a custom, but one which again is apt to be transgressed.
Soc. Then he that so transgresses it pays penalty in finding himself
isolated; bereft of friends who are good, and driven to seek after those
who love him not. Or is it not so that he who does me kindness in
my intercourse with him is my good friend, but if I requite not this
kindness to my benefactor, I am hated by him for my ingratitude, and yet
I must needs pursue after him and cling to him because of the great gain
to me of his society?
Hipp. Yes, Socrates. In all these cases, I admit, there is an
implication of divine authority; (38) that a law should in itself be
loaded with the penalty of its transgression does suggest to my mind a
higher than human type of legislator.
(38) Lit. "Yes, upon my word, Socrates, all these cases look very like
(would seem to point to) the gods."
Soc. And in your opinion, Hippias, is the legislation of the gods just
and righteous, or the reverse of what is just and righteous?
Hipp. Not the reverse of what is just and righteous, Socrates, God
forbid! for scarcely could any other legislate aright, of not God
himself.
Soc. It would seem then, Hippias, the gods themselves are well pleased
that "the lawful" and "the just" should be synonymous? (39)
(39) Or, "it is well pleasing also to the gods that what is lawful is
just and what is just is lawful."
By such language and by such conduct, through example and precept alike,
he helped to make those who approached him more upright and more just. |
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