Studies in Judaism 26

Studies in Judaism 26

The last Spanish writer on our subject is R. Isaac Abarbanel. His treatise

on the subject is known under the title _Top of Amanah_,(136) and was

finished in the year 1495. The greatest part of this treatise forms a

defence of Maimonides, many points in which are taken from Bibago. But, in

spite of this fact, Abarbanel must not be considered a Maimonist. It is

only a feeling of piety towards Maimonides, or perhaps rather a fondness

for argument, that made him defend Maimonides against Chasdai and others.

His own view is that it is a mistake to formulate dogmas of Judaism, since

every word in the Torah has to be considered as a dogma for itself. It was

only, says Abarbanel, by following the example of non-Jewish scholars that

Maimonides and others were induced to lay down dogmas. The non-Jewish

philosophers are in the habit of accepting in every science certain

indisputable axioms from which they deduce the propositions which are less

evident. The Jewish philosophers in a similar way sought for first

principles in religion from which the whole of the Torah ought to be

considered as a deduction. But, thinks Abarbanel, the Torah as a revealed

code is under no necessity of deducing things from each other, for all the

commands came from the same divine authority, and, therefore, all are

alike evident, and have the same certainty. On this and similar grounds

Abarbanel refused to accept dogmatic articles for Judaism, and he thus

became the head of the school that forms a class by itself among the Anti-

Maimonists to which many of the greatest Cabbalists also belong. But it is

idle talk to cite this school in aid of the modern theory that Judaism has

no dogmas. As we have seen, it was rather an _embarras de richesse_ that

prevented Abarbanel from accepting the Thirteen Articles of Maimonides. To

him and to the Cabbalists the Torah consists of at least 613 Articles.

 

Abarbanel wrote his book with which we have just dealt, at Naples. And it

is Italy to which, after the expulsion of the Jews from Spain, we have to

look chiefly for religious speculation. But the philosophers of Italy are

still less independent of Maimonides than their predecessors in Spain.

Thus we find that R. David Messer Leon, R. David Vital, and others were

Maimonists. Even the otherwise refined and original thinker, R. Elijah

Delmedigo (who died about the end of the fifteenth century) becomes almost

impolite when he speaks of the adversaries of Maimonides in respect to

dogmas. "It was only," he says, "the would-be philosopher that dared to

question the articles of Maimonides. Our people have always the bad habit

of thinking themselves competent to attack the greatest authorities as

soon as they have got some knowledge of the subject. Genuine thinkers,

however, attach very little importance to their objections."(137)

 

Indeed, it seems as if the energetic protests of Delmedigo scared away the

Anti-Maimonists for more than a century. Even in the following seventeenth

century we have to notice only two Anti-Maimonists. The one is R. Tobijah,

the Priest (1652), who was of Polish descent, studied in Italy, and lived

as a medical man in France. He seems to refuse to accept the belief in the

Immutability of the Torah, and in the coming of the Messiah, as

fundamental teachings of Judaism.(138) The other, at the end of the

seventeenth century (1695), is R. Abraham Chayim Viterbo, of Italy. He

accepts only six articles: 1. Existence of God; 2. Unity; 3.

Incorporeality; 4. That God was revealed to Moses on Mount Sinai, and that

the prophecy of Moses is true; 5. Revelation (including the historical

parts of the Torah); 6. Reward and Punishment. As to the other articles of

Maimonides, Viterbo, in opposition to other half-hearted Anti-Maimonists,

declares that the man who denies them is _not_ to be considered as a

heretic; though he ought to believe them.(139)

 

I have now arrived at the limit I set to myself at the beginning of this

essay. For, between the times of Viterbo and those of Mendelssohn, there

is hardly to be found any serious opposition to Maimonides worth noticing

here. Still I must mention the name of R. Saul Berlin (died 1794); there

is much in his opinions on dogmas which will help us the better to

understand the Thirteen Articles of Maimonides. As the reader has seen, I

have refrained so far from reproducing here the apologies which were made

by many Maimonists in behalf of the Thirteen Articles. For, after all

their elaborate pleas, none of them was able to clear Maimonides of the

charge of having confounded dogmas or fundamental teachings with

doctrines. It is also true that the Fifth Article--that prayer and worship

must only be offered to God--cannot be considered even as a doctrine, but

as a simple precept. And there are other difficulties which all the

distinctions of the Maimonists will never be able to solve. The only

possible justification is, I think, that suggested by a remark of R. Saul.

This author, who was himself--like his friend and older contemporary

Mendelssohn--a strong Anti-Maimonist, among other remarks, maintains that

dogmas must never be laid down but with regard to the necessities of the

time.(140)

 

Now R. Saul certainly did not doubt that Judaism is based on eternal

truths which can in no way be shaken by new modes of thinking or changed

circumstances. What he meant was that there are in every age certain

beliefs which ought to be asserted more emphatically than others, without

regard to their theological or rather logical importance. It is by this

maxim that we shall be able to explain the articles of Maimonides. He

asserted them, because they were necessary for his time.

 

We know, for instance, from a letter of his son and from other

contemporaries, that it was just at his time that the belief in the

incorporeality of God was, in the opinion of Maimonides, a little relaxed.

Maimonides, who thought such low notions of the Deity dangerous to

Judaism, therefore laid down an article against them. He tells us in his

_Guide_ that it was far from him to condemn any one who was not able to

demonstrate the Incorporeality of God, but he stigmatised as a heretic one

who refused to believe it. This position might be paralleled by that of a

modern astronomer who, while considering it unreasonable to expect a

mathematical demonstration of the movements of the earth from an ordinary

unscientific man, would yet regard the person who refused to believe in

such movements as an ignorant faddist.

 

Again, Maimonides undoubtedly knew that there may be found in the

Talmud--that bottomless sea with its innumerable undercurrents--passages

that are not quite in harmony with his articles; for instance, the well-

known dictum of R. Hillel, who said, there is no Messiah for Israel--a

passage which has already been quoted _ad nauseam_ by every opponent of

Maimonides from the earliest times down to the year of grace 1896.

Maimonides was well aware of the existence of this and similar passages.

But, being deeply convinced of the necessity of the belief in a future

redemption of _Israel_--in opposition to other creeds which claim this

redemption exclusively for their own adherents--Maimonides simply ignored

the saying of R. Hillel, as an isolated opinion which contradicts all the

consciousness and traditions of the Jew as expressed in thousands of other

passages, and especially in the liturgy. Most interesting is Maimonides'

view about such isolated opinions in a letter to the wise men of

Marseilles. He deals there with the question of free will and other

theological subjects. After having stated his own view he goes on to say:

"I know that it is possible to find in the Talmud or in the Midrash this

or that saying in contradiction to the views you have heard from me. But

you must not be troubled by them. One must not refuse to accept a

doctrine, the truth of which has been proved, on account of its being in

opposition to some isolated opinion held by this or that great authority.

Is it not possible that he overlooked some important considerations when

he uttered this strange opinion? It is also possible that his words must

not be taken literally, and have to be explained in an allegorical way. We

can also think that his words were only to be applied with regard to

certain circumstances of his time, but never intended as permanent

truths.... No man must surrender his private judgment. The eyes are not

directed backwards but forwards." In another place Maimonides calls the

suppression of one's own opinions--for the reason of their being

irreconcilable with the isolated views of some great authority--a moral

suicide.

 

By such motives Maimonides was guided when he left certain views hazarded

in the Rabbinic literature unheeded, and followed what we may perhaps call

the religious instinct, trusting to his own conscience. We may again be

certain that Maimonides was clear-headed enough to see that the words of

the Torah: "And there arose no prophet since in Israel like unto Moses"

(Deut. xxxiv. 10), were as little intended to imply a doctrine as the

passage relating to the king Josiah, "And like unto him was there no king

before him that turned to the Lord with all his heart ... neither after

him arose there any like him" (2 Kings xxiii. 25). And none would think of

declaring the man a heretic who should believe another king to be as pious

as Josiah. But living among followers of the "imitating creeds" (as he

calls Christianity and Mohammedism), who claimed that their religion had

superseded the law of Moses, Maimonides, consciously or unconsciously,

felt himself compelled to assert the superiority of the prophecy of Moses.

And so we may guess that every article of Maimonides which seems to offer

difficulties to us contains an assertion of some relaxed belief, or a

protest against the pretensions of other creeds, though we are not always

able to discover the exact necessity for them. On the other hand,

Maimonides did not assert the belief in free will, for which he argued so

earnestly in his _Guide_. The common "man," with his simple unspeculative

mind, for whom these Thirteen Articles were intended, "never dreamed that

the will was not free," and there was no necessity of impressing on his

mind things which he had never doubted.(141)

 

So much about Maimonides. As to the Anti-Maimonists, it could hardly

escape the reader that in some of the quoted systems the difference from

the view of Maimonides is only a logical one, not a theological. Of some

authors again, especially those of the thirteenth and fourteenth

centuries, it is not at all certain whether they intended to oppose

Maimonides. Others again, as for instance R. Abba Mari, R. Lipman, and R.

Joseph Jabez, acted on the same principle as Maimonides, urging only those

teachings of Judaism which they thought endangered. One could now, indeed,

animated by the praiseworthy example given to us by Maimonides, also

propose some articles of faith which are suggested to us by the

necessities of our own time. One might, for instance, insert the article,

"I believe that Judaism is, in the first instance, a divine religion,

_not_ a mere complex of racial peculiarities and tribal customs." One

might again propose an article to the effect that Judaism is a

proselytising religion, having the mission to bring about God's kingdom on

earth, and to include in that kingdom all mankind. One might also submit

for consideration whether it would not be advisable to urge a little more

the principle that religion means chiefly a _Weltanschauung_ and worship

of God by means of holiness both in thought and in action. One would even

not object to accept the article laid down by R. Saul, that we have to

look upon ourselves as sinners. Morbid as such a belief may be, it would,

if properly impressed on our mind, have perhaps the wholesome effect of

cooling down a little our self-importance and our mutual admiration that

makes all progress among us almost impossible.

 

But it was not my purpose to ventilate here the question whether

Maimonides' articles are sufficient for us, or whether we ought not to add

new ones to them. Nor do I attempt to decide what system we ought to

prefer for recitation in the Synagogue--that of Maimonides or that of

Chasdai, or of any other writer. I do not think that such a recital is of

much use. My object in this sketch has been rather to make the reader

_think_ about Judaism, by proving that it regulates not only our actions,

but also our thoughts. We usually urge that in Judaism religion means

life; but we forget that a life without guiding principles and thoughts is

a life not worth living. At least it was so considered by the greatest

Jewish thinkers, and hence their efforts to formulate the creed of

Judaism, so that men should not only be able to do the right thing, but

also to think the right thing. Whether they succeeded in their attempts

towards formulating the creed of Judaism or not will always remain a

question. This concerns the logician more than the theologian. But surely

Maimonides and his successors _did_ succeed in having a religion depending

directly on God, with the most ideal and lofty aspirations for the future;

whilst the Judaism of a great part of our modern theologians reminds one

very much of the words with which the author of _Marius the Epicurean_

characterises the Roman religion in the days of her decline: a religion

which had been always something to be done rather than something to be

thought, or believed, or loved.

 

Political economy, hygiene, statistics, are very fine things. But no sane

man would for them make those sacrifices which Judaism requires from us.

It is only for God's sake, to fulfil His commands and to accomplish His purpose, that religion becomes worth living and dying for. And this can only be possible with a religion which possesses dogmas.