SOCRATES: Now I think, Gorgias, that you have very accurately
explained what you conceive to be the art of rhetoric; and you mean to say,
if I am not mistaken, that rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion,
having this and no other business, and that this is her crown and end.
Do you know any other effect of rhetoric over and above that of
producing persuasion?
GORGIAS: No: the definition seems to me very
fair, Socrates; for persuasion is the chief end of rhetoric.
SOCRATES:
Then hear me, Gorgias, for I am quite sure that if there ever was a man who
entered on the discussion of a matter from a pure love of knowing the truth,
I am such a one, and I should say the same of you.
GORGIAS: What is
coming, Socrates?
SOCRATES: I will tell you: I am very well aware that I
do not know what, according to you, is the exact nature, or what are the
topics of that persuasion of which you speak, and which is given by rhetoric;
although I have a suspicion about both the one and the other. And I am going
to ask--what is this power of persuasion which is given by rhetoric,
and about what? But why, if I have a suspicion, do I ask instead of
telling you? Not for your sake, but in order that the argument may proceed
in such a manner as is most likely to set forth the truth. And I
would have you observe, that I am right in asking this further question: If
I asked, 'What sort of a painter is Zeuxis?' and you said, 'The painter of
figures,' should I not be right in asking, 'What kind of figures, and where
do you find them?'
GORGIAS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And the reason
for asking this second question would be, that there are other painters
besides, who paint many other figures?
GORGIAS: True.
SOCRATES:
But if there had been no one but Zeuxis who painted them, then you would have
answered very well?
GORGIAS: Quite so.
SOCRATES: Now I want to
know about rhetoric in the same way;--is rhetoric the only art which brings
persuasion, or do other arts have the same effect? I mean to say--Does he who
teaches anything persuade men of that which he teaches or
not?
GORGIAS: He persuades, Socrates,--there can be no mistake about
that.
SOCRATES: Again, if we take the arts of which we were just
now speaking:--do not arithmetic and the arithmeticians teach us
the properties of number?
GORGIAS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And
therefore persuade us of them?
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then
arithmetic as well as rhetoric is an artificer of persuasion?
GORGIAS:
Clearly.
SOCRATES: And if any one asks us what sort of persuasion, and
about what,--we shall answer, persuasion which teaches the quantity of odd
and even; and we shall be able to show that all the other arts of which
we were just now speaking are artificers of persuasion, and of what
sort, and about what.
GORGIAS: Very true.
SOCRATES: Then
rhetoric is not the only artificer of persuasion?
GORGIAS:
True.
SOCRATES: Seeing, then, that not only rhetoric works by persuasion,
but that other arts do the same, as in the case of the painter, a
question has arisen which is a very fair one: Of what persuasion is
rhetoric the artificer, and about what?--is not that a fair way of putting
the question?
GORGIAS: I think so.
SOCRATES: Then, if you
approve the question, Gorgias, what is the answer?
GORGIAS: I answer,
Socrates, that rhetoric is the art of persuasion in courts of law and other
assemblies, as I was just now saying, and about the just and
unjust.
SOCRATES: And that, Gorgias, was what I was suspecting to be
your notion; yet I would not have you wonder if by-and-by I am
found repeating a seemingly plain question; for I ask not in order to
confute you, but as I was saying that the argument may proceed
consecutively, and that we may not get the habit of anticipating and
suspecting the meaning of one another's words; I would have you develope your
own views in your own way, whatever may be your hypothesis.
GORGIAS: I
think that you are quite right, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Then let me raise
another question; there is such a thing as 'having learned'?
GORGIAS:
Yes.
SOCRATES: And there is also 'having believed'?
GORGIAS:
Yes.
SOCRATES: And is the 'having learned' the same as 'having believed,'
and are learning and belief the same things?
GORGIAS: In my judgment,
Socrates, they are not the same.
SOCRATES: And your judgment is right, as
you may ascertain in this way:--If a person were to say to you, 'Is there,
Gorgias, a false belief as well as a true?'--you would reply, if I am not
mistaken, that there is.
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Well, but is
there a false knowledge as well as a true?
GORGIAS: No.
SOCRATES:
No, indeed; and this again proves that knowledge and
belief differ.
GORGIAS: Very true.
SOCRATES: And yet those who
have learned as well as those who have believed are
persuaded?
GORGIAS: Just so.
SOCRATES: Shall we then assume two
sorts of persuasion,--one which is the source of belief without knowledge, as
the other is of knowledge?
GORGIAS: By all means.
SOCRATES: And
which sort of persuasion does rhetoric create in courts of law and other
assemblies about the just and unjust, the sort of persuasion which gives
belief without knowledge, or that which gives knowledge?
GORGIAS:
Clearly, Socrates, that which only gives belief.
SOCRATES: Then rhetoric,
as would appear, is the artificer of a persuasion which creates belief about
the just and unjust, but gives no instruction about them?
GORGIAS:
True.
SOCRATES: And the rhetorician does not instruct the courts of law
or other assemblies about things just and unjust, but he creates
belief about them; for no one can be supposed to instruct such a vast
multitude about such high matters in a short time?
GORGIAS: Certainly
not.
SOCRATES: Come, then, and let us see what we really mean about
rhetoric; for I do not know what my own meaning is as yet. When the assembly
meets to elect a physician or a shipwright or any other craftsman, will
the rhetorician be taken into counsel? Surely not. For at every election
he ought to be chosen who is most skilled; and, again, when walls have
to be built or harbours or docks to be constructed, not the rhetorician
but the master workman will advise; or when generals have to be chosen
and an order of battle arranged, or a position taken, then the military
will advise and not the rhetoricians: what do you say, Gorgias? Since
you profess to be a rhetorician and a maker of rhetoricians, I cannot
do better than learn the nature of your art from you. And here let
me assure you that I have your interest in view as well as my own.
For likely enough some one or other of the young men present might desire
to become your pupil, and in fact I see some, and a good many too, who
have this wish, but they would be too modest to question you. And
therefore when you are interrogated by me, I would have you imagine that you
are interrogated by them. 'What is the use of coming to you, Gorgias?'
they will say--'about what will you teach us to advise the state?--about
the just and unjust only, or about those other things also which
Socrates has just mentioned?' How will you answer them?
GORGIAS: I
like your way of leading us on, Socrates, and I will endeavour to reveal to
you the whole nature of rhetoric. You must have heard, I think, that the
docks and the walls of the Athenians and the plan of the harbour were devised
in accordance with the counsels, partly of Themistocles, and partly of
Pericles, and not at the suggestion of the builders.
SOCRATES: Such is
the tradition, Gorgias, about Themistocles; and I myself heard the speech of
Pericles when he advised us about the middle wall.
GORGIAS: And you
will observe, Socrates, that when a decision has to be given in such matters
the rhetoricians are the advisers; they are the men who win their
point.
SOCRATES: I had that in my admiring mind, Gorgias, when I asked
what is the nature of rhetoric, which always appears to me, when I look at
the matter in this way, to be a marvel of greatness.
GORGIAS: A
marvel, indeed, Socrates, if you only knew how rhetoric comprehends and holds
under her sway all the inferior arts. Let me offer you a striking example of
this. On several occasions I have been with my brother Herodicus or some
other physician to see one of his patients, who would not allow the physician
to give him medicine, or apply the knife or hot iron to him; and I have
persuaded him to do for me what he would not do for the physician just by the
use of rhetoric. And I say that if a rhetorician and a physician were to go
to any city, and had there to argue in the Ecclesia or any other assembly as
to which of them should be elected state-physician, the physician would have
no chance; but he who could speak would be chosen if he wished; and in a
contest with a man of any other profession the rhetorician more than any
one would have the power of getting himself chosen, for he can speak
more persuasively to the multitude than any of them, and on any
subject. Such is the nature and power of the art of rhetoric! And yet,
Socrates, rhetoric should be used like any other competitive art, not
against everybody,--the rhetorician ought not to abuse his strength any
more than a pugilist or pancratiast or other master of fence;--because he
has powers which are more than a match either for friend or enemy, he
ought not therefore to strike, stab, or slay his friends. Suppose a man
to have been trained in the palestra and to be a skilful boxer,--he in
the fulness of his strength goes and strikes his father or mother or
one of his familiars or friends; but that is no reason why the trainers or
fencing-masters should be held in detestation or banished from
the city;--surely not. For they taught their art for a good purpose, to
be used against enemies and evil-doers, in self-defence not in
aggression, and others have perverted their instructions, and turned to a bad
use their own strength and skill. But not on this account are the
teachers bad, neither is the art in fault, or bad in itself; I should
rather say that those who make a bad use of the art are to blame. And the
same argument holds good of rhetoric; for the rhetorician can speak
against all men and upon any subject,--in short, he can persuade the
multitude better than any other man of anything which he pleases, but he
should not therefore seek to defraud the physician or any other artist of
his reputation merely because he has the power; he ought to use
rhetoric fairly, as he would also use his athletic powers. And if after
having become a rhetorician he makes a bad use of his strength and skill,
his instructor surely ought not on that account to be held in detestation
or banished. For he was intended by his teacher to make a good use of
his instructions, but he abuses them. And therefore he is the person
who ought to be held in detestation, banished, and put to death, and not
his instructor.
SOCRATES: You, Gorgias, like myself, have had great
experience of disputations, and you must have observed, I think, that they do
not always terminate in mutual edification, or in the definition by
either party of the subjects which they are discussing; but
disagreements are apt to arise--somebody says that another has not spoken
truly or clearly; and then they get into a passion and begin to quarrel,
both parties conceiving that their opponents are arguing from
personal feeling only and jealousy of themselves, not from any interest in
the question at issue. And sometimes they will go on abusing one
another until the company at last are quite vexed at themselves for
ever listening to such fellows. Why do I say this? Why, because I
cannot help feeling that you are now saying what is not quite consistent
or accordant with what you were saying at first about rhetoric. And I
am afraid to point this out to you, lest you should think that I have
some animosity against you, and that I speak, not for the sake of
discovering the truth, but from jealousy of you. Now if you are one of my
sort, I should like to cross-examine you, but if not I will let you alone.
And what is my sort? you will ask. I am one of those who are very
willing to be refuted if I say anything which is not true, and very willing
to refute any one else who says what is not true, and quite as ready to
be refuted as to refute; for I hold that this is the greater gain of
the two, just as the gain is greater of being cured of a very great
evil than of curing another. For I imagine that there is no evil which a
man can endure so great as an erroneous opinion about the matters of
which we are speaking; and if you claim to be one of my sort, let us have
the discussion out, but if you would rather have done, no matter;--let
us make an end of it.
GORGIAS: I should say, Socrates, that I am quite
the man whom you indicate; but, perhaps, we ought to consider the audience,
for, before you came, I had already given a long exhibition, and if we
proceed the argument may run on to a great length. And therefore I think that
we should consider whether we may not be detaining some part of the
company when they are wanting to do something else.
CHAEREPHON: You
hear the audience cheering, Gorgias and Socrates, which shows their desire to
listen to you; and for myself, Heaven forbid that I should have any business
on hand which would take me away from a discussion so interesting and so ably
maintained.
CALLICLES: By the gods, Chaerephon, although I have been
present at many discussions, I doubt whether I was ever so much delighted
before, and therefore if you go on discoursing all day I shall be the
better pleased.
SOCRATES: I may truly say, Callicles, that I am
willing, if Gorgias is.
GORGIAS: After all this, Socrates, I should be
disgraced if I refused, especially as I have promised to answer all comers;
in accordance with the wishes of the company, then, do you begin, and ask of
me any question which you like.
SOCRATES: Let me tell you then,
Gorgias, what surprises me in your words; though I dare say that you may be
right, and I may have misunderstood your meaning. You say that you can make
any man, who will learn of you, a rhetorician?
GORGIAS:
Yes.
SOCRATES: Do you mean that you will teach him to gain the ears of
the multitude on any subject, and this not by instruction but by
persuasion?
GORGIAS: Quite so.
SOCRATES: You were saying, in fact,
that the rhetorician will have greater powers of persuasion than the
physician even in a matter of health?
GORGIAS: Yes, with the
multitude,--that is.
SOCRATES: You mean to say, with the ignorant; for
with those who know he cannot be supposed to have greater powers of
persuasion.
GORGIAS: Very true.
SOCRATES: But if he is to have
more power of persuasion than the physician, he will have greater power than
he who knows?
GORGIAS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Although he is not a
physician:--is he?
GORGIAS: No.
SOCRATES: And he who is not a
physician must, obviously, be ignorant of what the physician
knows.
GORGIAS: Clearly.
SOCRATES: Then, when the rhetorician is
more persuasive than the physician, the ignorant is more persuasive with the
ignorant than he who has knowledge?--is not that the
inference?
GORGIAS: In the case supposed:--yes.
SOCRATES: And the
same holds of the relation of rhetoric to all the other arts; the rhetorician
need not know the truth about things; he has only to discover some way of
persuading the ignorant that he has more knowledge than those who
know?
GORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, and is not this a great comfort?--not to
have learned the other arts, but the art of rhetoric only, and yet to be
in no way inferior to the professors of them?
SOCRATES: Whether the
rhetorician is or not inferior on this account is a question which we will
hereafter examine if the enquiry is likely to be of any service to us; but I
would rather begin by asking, whether he is or is not as ignorant of the just
and unjust, base and honourable, good and evil, as he is of medicine and the
other arts; I mean to say, does he really know anything of what is good and
evil, base or honourable, just or unjust in them; or has he only a way with
the ignorant of persuading them that he not knowing is to be esteemed
to know more about these things than some one else who knows? Or must the
pupil know these things and come to you knowing them before he can acquire
the art of rhetoric? If he is ignorant, you who are the teacher of rhetoric
will not teach him--it is not your business; but you will make him seem to
the multitude to know them, when he does not know them; and seem to be a good
man, when he is not. Or will you be unable to teach him rhetoric at all,
unless he knows the truth of these things first? What is to be said about all
this? By heavens, Gorgias, I wish that you would reveal to me the power of
rhetoric, as you were saying that you would.
GORGIAS: Well, Socrates,
I suppose that if the pupil does chance not to know them, he will have to
learn of me these things as well.
SOCRATES: Say no more, for there you
are right; and so he whom you make a rhetorician must either know the nature
of the just and unjust already, or he must be taught by you.
GORGIAS:
Certainly.
SOCRATES: Well, and is not he who has learned carpentering a
carpenter?
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And he who has learned music a
musician?
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And he who has learned medicine
is a physician, in like manner? He who has learned anything whatever is that
which his knowledge makes him.
GORGIAS: Certainly.
SOCRATES:
And in the same way, he who has learned what is just is just?
GORGIAS: To
be sure.
SOCRATES: And he who is just may be supposed to do what is
just?
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And must not the just man always
desire to do what is just?
GORGIAS: That is clearly the
inference.
SOCRATES: Surely, then, the just man will never consent to do
injustice?
GORGIAS: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: And according to the
argument the rhetorician must be a just man?
GORGIAS:
Yes.
SOCRATES: And will therefore never be willing to do
injustice?
GORGIAS: Clearly not.
SOCRATES: But do you remember
saying just now that the trainer is not to be accused or banished if the
pugilist makes a wrong use of his pugilistic art; and in like manner, if the
rhetorician makes a bad and unjust use of his rhetoric, that is not to be
laid to the charge of his teacher, who is not to be banished, but the
wrong-doer himself who made a bad use of his rhetoric--he is to be
banished--was not that said?
GORGIAS: Yes, it was.
SOCRATES: But
now we are affirming that the aforesaid rhetorician will never have done
injustice at all?
GORGIAS: True.
SOCRATES: And at the very outset,
Gorgias, it was said that rhetoric treated of discourse, not (like
arithmetic) about odd and even, but about just and unjust? Was not this
said?
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: I was thinking at the time, when I
heard you saying so, that rhetoric, which is always discoursing about
justice, could not possibly be an unjust thing. But when you added, shortly
afterwards, that the rhetorician might make a bad use of rhetoric I noted
with surprise the inconsistency into which you had fallen; and I said, that
if you thought, as I did, that there was a gain in being refuted, there
would be an advantage in going on with the question, but if not, I would
leave off. And in the course of our investigations, as you will see
yourself, the rhetorician has been acknowledged to be incapable of making
an unjust use of rhetoric, or of willingness to do injustice. By the
dog, Gorgias, there will be a great deal of discussion, before we get at
the truth of all this.
POLUS: And do even you, Socrates, seriously
believe what you are now saying about rhetoric? What! because Gorgias was
ashamed to deny that the rhetorician knew the just and the honourable and the
good, and admitted that to any one who came to him ignorant of them he could
teach them, and then out of this admission there arose a
contradiction--the thing which you dearly love, and to which not he, but you,
brought the argument by your captious questions--(do you seriously believe
that there is any truth in all this?) For will any one ever acknowledge
that he does not know, or cannot teach, the nature of justice? The truth
is, that there is great want of manners in bringing the argument to such
a pass.
SOCRATES: Illustrious Polus, the reason why we provide
ourselves with friends and children is, that when we get old and stumble, a
younger generation may be at hand to set us on our legs again in our words
and in our actions: and now, if I and Gorgias are stumbling, here are
you who should raise us up; and I for my part engage to retract any
error into which you may think that I have fallen-upon one
condition:
POLUS: What condition?
SOCRATES: That you contract,
Polus, the prolixity of speech in which you indulged at first.
POLUS:
What! do you mean that I may not use as many words as I please?
SOCRATES:
Only to think, my friend, that having come on a visit to Athens, which is the
most free-spoken state in Hellas, you when you got there, and you alone,
should be deprived of the power of speech--that would be hard indeed. But
then consider my case:--shall not I be very hardly used, if, when you are
making a long oration, and refusing to answer what you are asked, I am
compelled to stay and listen to you, and may not go away? I say rather, if
you have a real interest in the argument, or, to repeat my former expression,
have any desire to set it on its legs, take back any statement which you
please; and in your turn ask and answer, like myself and Gorgias--refute and
be refuted: for I suppose that you would claim to know what Gorgias
knows--would you not?
POLUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And you, like him,
invite any one to ask you about anything which he pleases, and you will know
how to answer him?
POLUS: To be sure.
SOCRATES: And now, which
will you do, ask or answer?
POLUS: I will ask; and do you answer me,
Socrates, the same question which Gorgias, as you suppose, is unable to
answer: What is rhetoric?
SOCRATES: Do you mean what sort of an
art?
POLUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: To say the truth, Polus, it is not an
art at all, in my opinion.
POLUS: Then what, in your opinion, is
rhetoric?
SOCRATES: A thing which, as I was lately reading in a book of
yours, you say that you have made an art.
POLUS: What
thing?
SOCRATES: I should say a sort of experience.
POLUS: Does
rhetoric seem to you to be an experience?
SOCRATES: That is my view, but
you may be of another mind.
POLUS: An experience in
what?
SOCRATES: An experience in producing a sort of delight
and gratification.
POLUS: And if able to gratify others, must not
rhetoric be a fine thing?
SOCRATES: What are you saying, Polus? Why do
you ask me whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, when I have not as yet
told you what rhetoric is?
POLUS: Did I not hear you say that rhetoric
was a sort of experience?
SOCRATES: Will you, who are so desirous to
gratify others, afford a slight gratification to me?
POLUS: I
will.
SOCRATES: Will you ask me, what sort of an art is
cookery?
POLUS: What sort of an art is cookery?
SOCRATES: Not an
art at all, Polus.
POLUS: What then?
SOCRATES: I should say an
experience.
POLUS: In what? I wish that you would explain to
me.
SOCRATES: An experience in producing a sort of delight
and gratification, Polus.
POLUS: Then are cookery and rhetoric the
same?
SOCRATES: No, they are only different parts of the same
profession.
POLUS: Of what profession?
SOCRATES: I am afraid that
the truth may seem discourteous; and I hesitate to answer, lest Gorgias
should imagine that I am making fun of his own profession. For whether or no
this is that art of rhetoric which Gorgias practises I really cannot
tell:--from what he was just now saying, nothing appeared of what he thought
of his art, but the rhetoric which I mean is a part of a not very creditable
whole.
GORGIAS: A part of what, Socrates? Say what you mean, and never
mind me.
SOCRATES: In my opinion then, Gorgias, the whole of which
rhetoric is a part is not an art at all, but the habit of a bold and ready
wit, which knows how to manage mankind: this habit I sum up under the
word 'flattery'; and it appears to me to have many other parts, one of
which is cookery, which may seem to be an art, but, as I maintain, is only
an experience or routine and not an art:--another part is rhetoric,
and the art of attiring and sophistry are two others: thus there are
four branches, and four different things answering to them. And Polus
may ask, if he likes, for he has not as yet been informed, what part
of flattery is rhetoric: he did not see that I had not yet answered
him when he proceeded to ask a further question: Whether I do not
think rhetoric a fine thing? But I shall not tell him whether rhetoric is
a fine thing or not, until I have first answered, 'What is rhetoric?'
For that would not be right, Polus; but I shall be happy to answer, if
you will ask me, What part of flattery is rhetoric?
POLUS: I will ask
and do you answer? What part of flattery is rhetoric?
SOCRATES: Will you
understand my answer? Rhetoric, according to my view, is the ghost or
counterfeit of a part of politics.
POLUS: And noble or
ignoble?
SOCRATES: Ignoble, I should say, if I am compelled to answer,
for I call what is bad ignoble: though I doubt whether you understand what I
was saying before.
GORGIAS: Indeed, Socrates, I cannot say that I
understand myself.
SOCRATES: I do not wonder, Gorgias; for I have not as
yet explained myself, and our friend Polus, colt by name and colt by nature,
is apt to run away. (This is an untranslatable play on the name 'Polus,'
which means 'a colt.')
GORGIAS: Never mind him, but explain to me what
you mean by saying that rhetoric is the counterfeit of a part of
politics.
SOCRATES: I will try, then, to explain my notion of rhetoric,
and if I am mistaken, my friend Polus shall refute me. We may assume
the existence of bodies and of souls?
GORGIAS: Of
course.
SOCRATES: You would further admit that there is a good condition
of either of them?
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Which condition may
not be really good, but good only in appearance? I mean to say, that there
are many persons who appear to be in good health, and whom only a physician
or trainer will discern at first sight not to be in good
health.
GORGIAS: True.
SOCRATES: And this applies not only to the
body, but also to the soul: in either there may be that which gives the
appearance of health and not the reality?
GORGIAS: Yes,
certainly.
SOCRATES: And now I will endeavour to explain to you more
clearly what I mean: The soul and body being two, have two arts corresponding
to them: there is the art of politics attending on the soul; and another
art attending on the body, of which I know no single name, but which may
be described as having two divisions, one of them gymnastic, and the
other medicine. And in politics there is a legislative part, which answers
to gymnastic, as justice does to medicine; and the two parts run into
one another, justice having to do with the same subject as legislation,
and medicine with the same subject as gymnastic, but with a difference.
Now, seeing that there are these four arts, two attending on the body and
two on the soul for their highest good; flattery knowing, or rather
guessing their natures, has distributed herself into four shams or
simulations of them; she puts on the likeness of some one or other of them,
and pretends to be that which she simulates, and having no regard for
men's highest interests, is ever making pleasure the bait of the unwary,
and deceiving them into the belief that she is of the highest value to
them. Cookery simulates the disguise of medicine, and pretends to know
what food is the best for the body; and if the physician and the cook had
to enter into a competition in which children were the judges, or men
who had no more sense than children, as to which of them best
understands the goodness or badness of food, the physician would be starved
to death. A flattery I deem this to be and of an ignoble sort, Polus,
for to you I am now addressing myself, because it aims at pleasure without
any thought of the best. An art I do not call it, but only an experience,
because it is unable to explain or to give a reason of the nature of its own
applications. And I do not call any irrational thing an art; but if you
dispute my words, I am prepared to argue in defence of them.
Cookery,
then, I maintain to be a flattery which takes the form of medicine; and
tiring, in like manner, is a flattery which takes the form of gymnastic, and
is knavish, false, ignoble, illiberal, working deceitfully by the help of
lines, and colours, and enamels, and garments, and making men affect a
spurious beauty to the neglect of the true beauty which is given by
gymnastic.
I would rather not be tedious, and therefore I will only say,
after the manner of the geometricians (for I think that by this time you will
be able to follow)
as tiring: gymnastic:: cookery: medicine;
or
rather,
as tiring: gymnastic:: sophistry:
legislation;
and
as cookery: medicine:: rhetoric:
justice.
And this, I say, is the natural difference between the
rhetorician and the sophist, but by reason of their near connection, they are
apt to be jumbled up together; neither do they know what to make of
themselves, nor do other men know what to make of them. For if the body
presided over itself, and were not under the guidance of the soul, and the
soul did not discern and discriminate between cookery and medicine, but
the body was made the judge of them, and the rule of judgment was the
bodily delight which was given by them, then the word of Anaxagoras, that
word with which you, friend Polus, are so well acquainted, would prevail
far and wide: 'Chaos' would come again, and cookery, health, and
medicine would mingle in an indiscriminate mass. And now I have told you
my notion of rhetoric, which is, in relation to the soul, what cookery
is to the body. I may have been inconsistent in making a long speech,
when I would not allow you to discourse at length. But I think that I may
be excused, because you did not understand me, and could make no use of my
answer when I spoke shortly, and therefore I had to enter into
an explanation. And if I show an equal inability to make use of yours,
I hope that you will speak at equal length; but if I am able to
understand you, let me have the benefit of your brevity, as is only fair: And
now you may do what you please with my answer.
POLUS: What do you
mean? do you think that rhetoric is flattery?
SOCRATES: Nay, I said a
part of flattery; if at your age, Polus, you cannot remember, what will you
do by-and-by, when you get older?
POLUS: And are the good rhetoricians
meanly regarded in states, under the idea that they are
flatterers?
SOCRATES: Is that a question or the beginning of a
speech?
POLUS: I am asking a question.
SOCRATES: Then my answer
is, that they are not regarded at all.
POLUS: How not regarded? Have they
not very great power in states?
SOCRATES: Not if you mean to say that
power is a good to the possessor.
POLUS: And that is what I do mean to
say.
SOCRATES: Then, if so, I think that they have the least power of all
the citizens.
POLUS: What! are they not like tyrants? They kill and
despoil and exile any one whom they please.
SOCRATES: By the dog,
Polus, I cannot make out at each deliverance of yours, whether you are giving
an opinion of your own, or asking a question of me.
POLUS: I am asking
a question of you.
SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, but you ask two questions at
once.
POLUS: How two questions?
SOCRATES: Why, did you not say
just now that the rhetoricians are like tyrants, and that they kill and
despoil or exile any one whom they please?
POLUS: I
did.
SOCRATES: Well then, I say to you that here are two questions in
one, and I will answer both of them. And I tell you, Polus, that
rhetoricians and tyrants have the least possible power in states, as I was
just now saying; for they do literally nothing which they will, but only
what they think best.
POLUS: And is not that a great
power?
SOCRATES: Polus has already said the reverse.
POLUS: Said
the reverse! nay, that is what I assert.
SOCRATES: No, by the great--what
do you call him?--not you, for you say that power is a good to him who has
the power.
POLUS: I do.
SOCRATES: And would you maintain that if a
fool does what he thinks best, this is a good, and would you call this great
power?
POLUS: I should not.
SOCRATES: Then you must prove that the
rhetorician is not a fool, and that rhetoric is an art and not a
flattery--and so you will have refuted me; but if you leave me unrefuted,
why, the rhetoricians who do what they think best in states, and the tyrants,
will have nothing upon which to congratulate themselves, if as you say, power
be indeed a good, admitting at the same time that what is done without sense
is an evil.
POLUS: Yes; I admit that.
SOCRATES: How then can the
rhetoricians or the tyrants have great power in states, unless Polus can
refute Socrates, and prove to him that they do as they will?
POLUS:
This fellow--
SOCRATES: I say that they do not do as they will;--now
refute me.
POLUS: Why, have you not already said that they do as they
think best?
SOCRATES: And I say so still.
POLUS: Then surely they
do as they will?
SOCRATES: I deny it.
POLUS: But they do what they
think best?
SOCRATES: Aye.
POLUS: That, Socrates, is monstrous and
absurd.
SOCRATES: Good words, good Polus, as I may say in your own
peculiar style; but if you have any questions to ask of me, either prove that
I am in error or give the answer yourself.
POLUS: Very well, I am
willing to answer that I may know what you mean.
SOCRATES: Do men appear
to you to will that which they do, or to will that further end for the sake
of which they do a thing? when they take medicine, for example, at the
bidding of a physician, do they will the drinking of the medicine which is
painful, or the health for the sake of which they drink?
POLUS:
Clearly, the health.
SOCRATES: And when men go on a voyage or engage in
business, they do not will that which they are doing at the time; for who
would desire to take the risk of a voyage or the trouble of business?--But
they will, to have the wealth for the sake of which they go on a
voyage.
POLUS: Certainly. |
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