After the departure of Agesilaus, Phoebidas devoted himself to harrying
the Thebans by sending out robber bands, and laid waste their land by
a system of regular incursions. The Thebans, on their side, desiring
to retaliate, marched out with their whole force into the territory
of Thespiae. But once well inside the district they found themselves
closely beset by Phoebidas and his light troops, who would not give
them the slightest chance to scatter from their main body, so that
the Thebans, heartily vexed at the turn their foray had taken, beat a
retreat quicker than they had come. The muleteers threw away with their
own hands the fruits they had captured, in their anxiety to get home as
quickly as possible; so dire a dread had fallen upon the invading army.
This was the chance for the Spartan to press home his attack boldly,
keeping his light division in close attendance on himself, and leaving
the heavy infantry under orders to follow him in battle order. He was
in hopes even that he might put the enemy to complete rout, so valiantly
did he lead the advance, encouraging the light troops to "come to a
close grip with the invadors," or summoning the heavy infantry of the
Thespiaeans to "bring up their supports." Presently the Theban cavalry
as they retired found themselves face to face with an impassable glen
or ravine, where in the first instance they collected in a mob, and next
wheeled right-about-face in sheer resourcelessness where to cross. The
handful of light troops who formed the Spartan vanguard took fright
at the Thebans and fled, and the Theban horsemen seeing this put in
practice the lesson of attack which the fugitives taught them. As for
Phoebidas himself, he and two or three with him fell sword in hand,
whereupon his mercenary troops all took to their heels.
When the stream of fugitives reached the Thespiaean heavy infantry
reserves, they too, in spite of much boasting beforehand that they would
never yield to Thebans, took to flight, though there was now absolutely
no pursuit whatever, for it was now late. The number slain was not
large, but, for all that, the men of Thespiae did not come to a
standstill until they found themselves safe inside their walls. As a
sequel, the hopes and spirits of the Thebans were again kindled into new
life, and they made campaigns against Thespiae and the other provincial
cities of Boeotia. (22) It must be admitted that in each case the
democratical party retired from these cities to Thebes; since absolute
governments had been established in all of them on the pattern
previously adopted at Thebes; and the result was that the friends of
Lacedaemon in these cities also needed her assistance. (23) After the
death of Phoebidas the Lacedaemonians despatched a polemarch with a
division by sea to form the garrison of Thespiae.
(22) Lit. "their other perioecid cities." For the significance of this
title as applied by the Thebans (and perhaps commonly) to the
other cities of Boeotia, see Freeman, op. cit. ch. iv. pp. 157,
173 foll.
(23) See Grote, "H. G." x. 174; Freeman, op. cit. iv. 171, 172.
B.C. 377. With the advent of spring (24) the ephors again called out the
ban against Thebes, and requested Agesilaus to lead the expedition, as
on the former campaign. He, holding to his former theory with regard to
the invasion, even before sacrificing the customary frontier sacrifice,
sent a despatch to the polemarch at Thespiae, with orders to seize the
pass which commands the road over Cithaeron, and to guard it against his
arrival. Then, having once more crossed the pass and reached Plataeae,
he again made a feint of marching first into Thespiae, and so sent a
despatch ordering supplies to be in readiness, and all embassies to
be waiting his arrival there; so that the Thebans concentrated their
attention on the approaches from Thespiae, which they strongly guarded.
Next morning, however, Agesilaus sacrificed at daybreak and set out on
the road to Erythrae, (25) and completing in one day what was a good two
days' march for an army, gave the Thebans the slip, and crossed
their palisade-work at Scolus before the enemy had arrived from the
closely-guarded point at which he had effected his entrance formerly.
This done he proceeded to ravage the eastward-facing districts of the
city of Thebes as far as the territory of Tanagra, for at that date
Tanagra was still in the hands of Hypatodorus and his party, who were
friends of the Lacedaemonians. After that he turned to retire, keeping
the walls of Thebes on his left. But the Thebans, who had stolen, as
it were, upon the scene, drew up at the spot called "The Old Wife's
Breast," (26) keeping the trench and palisading in their rear: they were
persuaded that here, if anywhere, lay their chance to risk a decisive
engagement, the ground at this point being somewhat narrow and difficult
to traverse. Agesilaus, however, in view of the situation, refused to
accept the challenge. Instead of marching upon them he turned sharp off
in the direction of the city; and the Thebans, in alarm for the city in
its undefended state, abandoned the favourable ground on which they
were drawn up in battle line, and retired at the double towards the city
along the road to Potniae, which seemed the safer route. This last
move of Agesilaus may be described as a stroke of genius: (27) while it
allowed him to retire to a distance, it forced the enemy themselves
to retreat at the double. In spite of this, however, one or two of the
polemarchs, with their divisions, charged the foe as he raced past.
But again the Thebans, from the vantage-ground of their heights, sent
volleys of spears upon the assailants, which cost one of the polemarchs,
Alypetus, his life. He fell pierced by a spear. But again from this
particular crest the Thebans on their side were forced to turn in
flight; so much so that the Sciritae, with some of the cavalry, scaled
up and speedily cut down the rearmost ranks of the Thebans as they
galloped past into the city. When, however, they were close under
cover of their walls the Thebans turned, and the Sciritae seeing them
retreated at more than a steady walking pace. No one, it is true, was
slain; but the Thebans all the same set up a trophy in record of
the incident at the point where the scaling party had been forced to
retreat.
(24) See for affairs of Delos, never actually named by Xenophon,
between B.C. 377 and 374, the Sandwich Marble in Trinity College,
Cambridge; Boeckh, "C. I. G" 158, and "P. E. A." ii. p. 78 foll.;
Hicks, 82.
(25) Erythrae (Redlands) stands between Hysiae and Scolus, east of
Katzula.--Leake, "N. Gr." ii. 329. See Herod. ix. 15, 25; Thuc.
iii. 24; Paus. IX. ii. 1; Strab. IX. ii.
(26) Lit. "Graos Stethos."
(27) Or, "and this move of Agesilaus was regarded as a very pretty
one."
And now, since the hour was come, Agesilaus fell back and encamped on
the very site on which he had seen the enemy drawn up in battle array.
Next day he retired by the road to Thespiae. The light troops, who
formed a free corps in the pay of the Thebans, hung audaciously at his
heels. Their shouts could be heard calling out to Chabrias (28) for not
bringing up his supports; when the cavalry of the Olynthians (who now
contributed a contingent in accordance with their oaths) (29) wheeled
round on them, caught the pursuers in the heat of their pursuit, and
drove them uphill, putting large numbers of them to the sword--so
quickly are infantry overhauled by cavalry on steep ground which can be
ridden over. Being arrived within the walls of Thespiae, Agesilaus
found the citizens in a state of party feud, the men of Lacedaemonian
proclivities desiring to put their political opponents, one of whom was
Menon, to death (30)--a proceeding which Agesilaus would not sanction.
After having healed their differences and bound them over by solemn oath
to keep the peace with one another, he at once retired, taking his
old route across Cithaeron to Megara. Here once more he disbanded the
allies, and at the head of the city troops himself marched back to
Sparta.
(28) For the exploits of Chabrias, who commanded a division of mixed
Athenians and mercenaries (see above, S. 14), see Dem. "c. Lept."
479; Polyaen. ii. 1, 2; Diod. xv. 32, 33, who gives interesting
details; Grote, "H. G." x. 172 foll.
(29) See above, "Hell." V. iii. 26.
(30) Or, "under the pretext of furthering Laconian interests there was
a desire to put political opponents to death." For "Menon," Diod.
conj. "Melon."
The Thebans had not gathered in the fruits of their soil for two years
now, and began to be sorely pinched for want of corn; they therefore
sent a body of men on board a couple of triremes to Pagasae, with
ten talents (31) in hand for the purchase of corn. But while these
commissioners were engaged in effecting their purchases, Alcetas, the
Lacedaemonian who was garrisoning Oreus, (32) fitted out three triremes,
taking precautions that no rumour of his proceedings should leak out.
As soon as the corn was shipped and the vessels under weigh, he captured
not only the corn but the triremes, escort and all, numbering no less
than three hundred men. This done he locked up his prisoners in the
citadel, where he himself was also quartered. Now there was a youth, the
son of a native of Oreus, fair of mien and of gentle breeding, (33) who
danced attendance on the commandant: and the latter must needs leave the
citadel and go down to busy himself with this youth. This was a piece of
carelessness which the prisoners did not fail to observe, and turned to
good account by seizing the citadel, whereupon the town revolted,
and the Thebans experienced no further difficulty in obtaining corn
supplies.
(31) = 2,437 pounds: 10 shillings.
(32) Oreus, formerly called Histiaea, in the north of Euboea. See
Thuc. vii. 57, viii. 95; Diod. xv. 30; Grote, "H. G." ix. 263. For
Pagasae at the north extremity of the Pagasaean Gulf, "the cradle
of Greek navigation," see Tozer, "Geog. Gr." vi. p. 124; Strab.
IX. v. 15.
(33) Or, "beautiful and brave if ever youth was."
B.C. 376. At the return of spring Agesilaus lay sick--a bedridden
invalid. The history of the case is this: During the withdrawal of his
army from Thebes the year before, when at Megara, while mounting from
the Aphrodision (34) to the Government house he ruptured a vein or other
vessel of the body. This was followed by a rush of blood to his sound
leg. The knee was much swelled, and the pain intolerable, until a
Syracusan surgeon made an incision in the vein near the ankle. The blood
thus let flowed night and day; do what they could to stop the discharge,
all failed, till the patient fainted away; then it ceased. In this
plight Agesilaus was conveyed home on a litter to Lacedaemon, and
remained an invalid the rest of that summer and throughout the winter.
(34) Pausanius (I. xi. 6) mentions a temple of Aphrodite
{'Epistrophoa} (Verticordia), on the way up to the Carian
Acropolis of Megara.
But to resume: at the first burst of spring the Lacedaemonians
again called out the ban, and gave orders to Cleombrotus to lead the
expedition. The king found himself presently with his troops at the foot
of Cithaeron, and his light infantry advanced to occupy the pass which
commands the road. But here they found a detachment of Thebans and
Athenians already in occupation of the desired height, who for a while
suffered them to approach; but when they were close upon them, sprang
from their position and charged, putting about forty to the sword. This
incident was sufficient to convince Cleombrotus that to invade Thebes by
this mountain passage was out of the question, and in this faith he led
back and disbanded his troops.
The allies met in Lacedaemon, and arguments were adduced on the part of
the allies to show that faintheartedness would very soon lead to their
being absolutely worn out by the war. They had got it in their power,
it was urged, to fit out a fleet far outnumbering that of Athens, and
to reduce that city by starvation; it was open to them, in the self-same
ships, to carry an army across into Theban territory, and they had
a choice of routes--the road into Phocis, or, if they preferred, by
Creusis. After thus carefully considering the matter they manned a fleet
of sixty triremes, and Pollis was appointed admiral in command. Nor
indeed were their expectations altogether belied. The Athenians were
soon so closely blockaded that their corn vessels could get no farther
than Geraestus; (35) there was no inducing them to coast down father
south, with a Lacedaemonian navy hovering about Aegina and Ceos and
Andros. The Athenians, making a virtue of necessity, manned their ships
in person, gave battle to Pollis under the leadership of Chabrias, and
came out of the sea-fight (36) victorious.
(35) The promontory at the southern extremity of Euboea.
(36) Battle of Naxos, B.C. 376. For interesting details, see Diod. xv.
35, 35.
B.C. 375. Then the corn supplies flowed freely into Athens. The
Lacedaemonians, on their side, were preparing to transport an army
across the water into Boeotia, when the Thebans sent a request to the
Athenians urging them to despatch an armament round Peloponnesus, under
the persuasion that if this were done the Lacedaemonians would find it
impossible at once to guard their own or the allied territory in that
part of the world, and at the same time to convery an army of any size
to operate against Thebes. The proposals fell in with the present temper
of the Athenians, irritated with Lacedaemon on account of the exploit
of Sphodrias. Accordingly they eagerly manned a fleet of sixty vessels,
appointing Timotheus as admiral in command, and despatched it on a
cruise round Peloponnesus.
The Thebans, seeing that there had been no hostile invasion of their
territory for so long (neither during the campaign of Cleombrotus
nor now, (37) whilst Timotheus prosecuted his coasting voyage), felt
emboldened to carry out a campaign on their own account against the
provincial cities; (38) and one by one they again recovered them.
(37) Lit. "nor at the date of Timotherus's periplus." To the historian
writing of the events of this period several years later, the
coasting voyage of Timotheus is a single incident ({periepleuse}),
and as Grote ("H. G." x. 185, note 3) observes, the words may
"include not simply the time which Timotheus took in actually
circumnavigating Peloponnesos, but the year which he spent
afterwards in the Ionian sea, and the time which he occupied in
performing his exploits near Korkyra, Leukas, and the
neighbourhood generally." For the character and exploits of
Timotheus, son of Conon, see Isocr. "Or." xv. "On the Antidosis,"
SS. 101-139; Jebb, "Att. Or." ii. p. 140 foll.; Rehdantz, "Vit.
Iphicr. Chabr. Timoth. Atheniensium."
(38) Or, "the cities round about their territory," lit. "the perioecid
cities." For the import of the epithet, see V. iv. 46; Freeman,
op. cit. iv. 173, note 1, in reference to Grote, "H. G." x. 183,
note 4. For the battle of Tegyra see Grote, ib. 182; Plut.
"Pelop." 17; Diod. xv. 57 ("evidently this battle," Grote);
Callisthenes, fr. 3, ed. Did. Cf. Steph. Byz., {Tegura}.
Timotheus in his cruise reached Corcyra, and reduced it at a blow. That
done, he neither enslaved the inhabitants nor drove them into exile,
nor changed their laws. And of this conduct he reaped the benefit of
the increased cordiality (39) of all the cities of those parts. The
Lacedaemonians thereupon fitted out and despatched a counter fleet, with
Nicolochus in command, an officer of consummate boldness. This admiral
no sooner caught sight of Timotheus's fleet than without hesitation, and
in spite of the absence of six Ambraciot vessels which formed part
of his squadron, he gave battle, with fifty-five ships to the enemy's
sixty. The result was a defeat at the moment, and Timotheus set up a
trophy at Alyzia. But as soon as the six missing Ambraciot vessels
had reinforced him--the ships of Timotheus meanwhile being docked and
undergoing repairs--he bore down upon Alyzia in search of the Athenian,
and as Timotheus refused to put out to meet him, the Lacedaemonian in
turn set up a trophy on the nearest group of islands.
(39) The Corcyraeans, Acarnanians, and Cephallenians join the alliance
B.C. 375; see Hicks, 83. "This decree dates from the autumn of
B.C. 375, immediately after Timotheos's visit to Korkyra (Xen.
'Hell.' V. iv. 64). The result was that the names of Korkyra,
Kephallenia, and Akarnania were inscribed upon the list (No. 81),
and an alliance was made with them." (See "C. I. A." ii. p. 399
foll.; Hicks, loc. cit.; "Hell." VI. v. 23); "C. I. A." ii. 14.
The tablet is in the Asclepeian collection at the entrance of the
Acropolis at Athens. See Milchofer, "Die Museum Athens," 1881, p.
45.
B.C. 374. Timotheus, after repairing his original squadron and manning
more vessels from Corcyra, found himself at the head of more than
seventy ships. His naval superiority was undisputed, but he was forced
to send to Athens for moneys, seeing his fleet was large and his wants
not trifling.
BOOK VI
I
B.C. 374. The Athenians and Lacedaemonians were thus engaged. But to
return to the Thebans. After the subjugation of the cities in Boeotia,
they extended the area of aggression and marched into Phocis. The
Phocians, on their side, sent an embassy to Lacedaemon, and pleaded that
without assistance from that power they must inevitably yield to Thebes.
The Lacedaemonians in response conveyed by sea into the territory of
Phocis their king Cleombrotus, at the head of four regiments and the
contingents of the allies.
About the same time Polydamus of Pharsalus arrived from Thessaly to
address the general assembly (1) of Lacedaemon. He was a man of high
repute throughout the whole of Thessaly, while in his native city he was
regarded as so true a gentleman that the faction-ridden Pharsalians
were content to entrust the citadel to his keeping, and to allow their
revenues to pass through his hands. It was his privilege to disburse the
money needed for sacred rites or other expenditure, within the limits
of their written law and constitution. Out of these moneys this faithful
steward of the state was able to garrison and guard in safety for
the citizens their capital. Every year he rendered an account of his
administration in general. If there was a deficit he made it up out of
his own pocket, and when the revenues expanded he paid himself back. For
the rest, his hospitality to foreigners and his magnificence were on a
true Thessalian scale. Such was the style and character of the man who
now arrived in Lacedaemon and spoke as follows:
(1) {pros to koinon}, "h.e. vel ad ad senatum vel ad ephoros vel ad
concionem."--Sturz, "Lex. Xen." s.v.
"Men of Lacedaemon, it is in my capacity as 'proxenos' and 'benefactor'
(titles borne by my ancestry from time immemorial) that I claim, or
rather am bound, in case of any difficulty to come to you, and, in case
of any complication dangerous to your interests in Thessaly, to give you
warning. The name of Jason, I feel sure, is not unknown to Lacedaemonian
ears. His power as a prince is sufficiently large, and his fame
widespread. It is of Jason I have to speak. Under cover of a treaty of
peace he has lately conferred with me, and this is the substance of what
he urged: 'Polydamas,' he said, 'if I chose I could lay your city at my
feet, even against its will, as the following considerations will prove
to you. See,' he went on, 'the majority and the most important of the
states of Thessaly are my allies. I subdued them in campaigns in which
you took their side in opposition to myself. Again, you do not need
to be told that I have six thousand mercenaries who are a match in
themselves, I take it, for any single state. It is not the mere numbers
on which I insist. No doubt as large an army could be raised in other
quarters; but these citizen armies have this defect--they include men
who are already advanced in years, with others whose beards are scarcely
grown. Again, it is only a fraction of the citizens who attend to bodily
training in a state, whereas with me no one takes mercenary service who
is not as capable of endurance as myself.'
"And here, Lacedaemonians, I must tell you what is the bare truth. This
Jason is a man stout of limb and robust of body, with an insatiable
appetite for toil. Equally true is it that he tests the mettle of those
with him day by day. He is always at their head, whether on a field-day
under arms, or in the gymnasium, or on some military expedition. The
weak members of the corps he weeds out, but those whom he sees bear
themselves stout-heartedly in the face of war, like true lovers of
danger and of toil, he honours with double, treble, and quadruple
pay, or with other gifts. On the bed of sickness they will not lack
attendance, nor honour in their graves. Thus every foreigner in his
service knows that his valour in war may obtain for him a livelihood--a
life replete at once with honour and abundance. (2)
(2) Or, "a life satisfying at once to soul and body."
"Then with some parade he pointed out to me what I knew before, that
the Maracians, and the Dolopians, and Alcetas the hyparch (3) in
Epirus, were already subject to his sway; 'so that I may fairly ask you,
Polydamas,' he proceeded, 'what I have to apprehend that I should not
look on your future subjugation as mere child's play. Perhaps some one
who did not know me, and what manner of man I am, might put it to me:
"Well! Jason, if all you say be true, why do you hesitate? why do you
not march at once against Pharsalia?" For the good reason, I reply, that
it suits me better to win you voluntarily than to annex you against your
wills. Since, if you are forced, you will always be planning all the
mischief you can against me, and I on my side shall be striving
to diminish your power; whereas if you throw in your lot with mine
trustfully and willingly, it is certain we shall do what we can to help
each other. I see and know, Polydamas, that your country fixes her eyes
on one man only, and that is yourself: what I guarantee you, therefore,
is that, if you will dispose her lovingly to myself, I on my side will
raise you up to be the greatest man in Hellas next to me. Listen, while
I tell you what it is in which I offer you the second prize. Listen,
and accept nothing which does not approve itself as true to your own
reasoning. First, is it not plain to us both, that with the adhesion
of Pharsalus and the swarm of pettier states dependent on yourselves,
I shall with infinite ease become Tagos (4) of all the Thessalians; and
then the corollary--Thessaly so united--sixteen thousand cavalry and
more than ten thousand heavy infantry leap into life. Indeed, when I
contemplate the physique and proud carriage of these men, I cannot but
persuade myself that, with proper handling, there is not a nation or
tribe of men to which Thessalians would deign to yield submission. Look
at the broad expanse of Thessaly and consider: when once a Tagos is
established here, all the tribes in a circle round will lie stilled in
subjection; and almost every member of each of these tribes is an archer
born, so that in the light infantry division of the service our power
must needs excel. Furthermore, the Boeotians and all the rest of the
world in arms against Lacedaemon are my allies; they clamour to follow
my banner, if only I will free them from Sparta's yoke. So again the
Athenians, I make sure, will do all they can to gain our alliance; but
with them I do not think we will make friends, for my persuasion is that
empire by sea will be even easier to acquire than empire by land; and
to show you the justice of this reasoning I would have you weigh the
following considerations. With Macedonia, which is the timber-yard (5)
of the Athenian navy, in our hands we shall be able to construct a far
larger fleet than theirs. That stands to reason. And as to men, which
will be the better able to man vessels, think you--Athens, or ourselves
with our stalwart and numerous Penestae? (6) Which will better support
mariners--a nation which, like our own, out of her abundance exports her
corn to foreign parts, or Athens, which, but for foreign purchases, has
not enough to support herself? And so as to wealth in general it is
only natural, is it not, that we, who do not look to a string of little
islands for supplies, but gather the fruits of continental peoples,
should find our resources more copious? As soon as the scattered powers
of Thessaly are gathered into a principality, all the tribes around, I
repeat, will become our tributaries. I need not tell you that the king
of Persia reaps the fruits, not of islands, but of a continent, and he
is the wealthiest of men! But the reduction of Persia will be still more
practicable, I imagine, than that of Hellas, for there the men, save
one, are better versed in slavery than in prowess. Nor have I forgotten,
during the advance of Cyrus, and afterwards under Agesilaus, how scant
the force was before which the Persian quailed.'
(3) Or, "his underlord in Epirus." By hyparch, I suppose, is implied
that Alcetas regarded Jason as his suzerain. Diodorus (xv. 13, 36)
speaks of him as "king" of the Molossians.
(4) Or, "Prince," and below, "Thessaly so converted into a
Principality." "The Tagos of Thessaly was not a King, because his
office was not hereditary or even permanent; neither was he
exactly a Tyrant, because his office had some sort of legal
sanction. But he came much nearer to the character either of a
King or of a Tyrant than to that of a Federal President like the
General of the Achaians.... Jason of Pherai acts throughout
like a King, and his will seems at least as uncontrolled as that
of his brother sovereign beyond the Kambunian hills. Even Jason
seems to have been looked upon as a Tyrant (see below, 'Hell.' VI.
iv. 32); possibly, like the Athenian Demos, he himself did not
refuse the name" (cf. Arist. "Pol." iii. 4, 9).--Freeman, "Hist.
Fed. Gov." "No True Federation in Thessaly," iv. pp. 152 foll.
(5) See above, and Hicks, 74.
(6) Or, "peasantry."
"Such, Lacedaemonians, were the glowing arguments of Jason. In answer
I told him that what he urged was well worth weighing, but that we, the
friends of Lacedaemon, should so, without a quarrel, desert her and rush
into the arms of her opponents, seemed to me sheer madness. Whereat he
praised me, and said that now must he needs cling all the closer to me
if that were my disposition, and so charged me to come to you and
tell you the plain truth, which is, that he is minded to march against
Pharsalus if we will not hearken to him. Accordingly he bade me demand
assistance from you; 'and if they suffer you,' (7) he added, 'so to work
upon them that they will send you a force sufficient to do battle with
me, it is well: we will abide by war's arbitrament, nor quarrel with
the consequence; but if in your eyes that aid is insufficient, look to
yourself. How shall you longer be held blameless before that fatherland
which honours you and in which you fare so well?' (8)
(7) Or, reading {theoi}, after Cobet; translate "if providentially
they should send you."
(8) Reading {kai e su pratteis}, after Cobet. The chief MSS. give {ouk
ede anegkletos an dikaios eies en te patridi e se tima kai su
prattois ta kratista}, which might be rendered either, "and how be
doing best for yourself?" (lit. "and you would not be doing best
for yourself," {ouk an} carried on from previous clause), or
(taking {prattois} as pure optative), "may you be guided to adopt
the course best for yourself!" "may the best fortune attend you!
Farewell." See Otto Keller, op. cit. ad loc. for various
emendations.
"These are the matters," Polydamas continued, "which have brought me to
Lacedaemon. I have told you the whole story; it is based partly on what
I see to be the case, and partly on what I have heard from yonder man.
My firm belief is, men of Lacedaemon, that if you are likely to despatch
a force sufficient, not in my eyes only, but in the eyes of all the rest
of Thessaly, to cope with Jason in war, the states will revolt from
him, for they are all in alarm as to the future development of the man's
power; but if you think a company of newly-enfranchised slaves and any
amateur general will suffice, I advise you to rest in peace. You may
take my word for it, you will have a great power to contend against, and
a man who is so prudent a general that, in all he essays to do, be it an
affair of secrecy, or speed, or force, he is wont to hit the mark of his
endeavours: one who is skilled, should occasion serve, to make the night
of equal service to him with the day; (9) or, if speed be needful,
will labour on while breakfasting or taking an evening meal. And as for
repose, he thinks that the time for it has come when the goal is reached
or the business on hand accomplished. And to this same practice he
has habituated those about him. Right well he knows how to reward the
expectations of his soldiers, when by the extra toil which makes the
difference they have achieved success; so that in his school all have
laid to heart that maxim, 'Pain first and pleasure after.' (10) And
in regard to pleasure of the senses, of all men I know, he is the most
continent; so that these also are powerless to make him idle at the
expense of duty. You must consider the matter then and tell me, as
befits you, what you can and will do."
(9) See "Cyrop." III. i. 19.
(10) For this sentiment, see "Mem." II. i. 20 et passim.
Such were the representations of Polydamas. The Lacedaemonians, for the
time being, deferred their answer; but after calculating the next
day and the day following how many divisions (11) they had on foreign
service, and how many ships on the coast of Laconia to deal with the
foreign squadron of the Athenians, and taking also into account the war
with their neighbours, they gave their answer to Polydamas: "For the
present they would not be able to send him sufficient aid: under the
circumstances they advised him to go back and make the best settlement
he could of his own affairs and those of his city." He, thanking the
Lacedaemonians for their straightforwardness, withdrew.
(11) Lit. "morai."
The citadel of Pharsalus he begged Jason not to force him to give up:
his desire was to preserve it for those who had entrusted it to his safe
keeping; his own sons Jason was free to take as hostages, and he would
do his best to procure for him the voluntary adhesion of his city by
persuasion, and in every way to further his appointment as Tagos of
Thessaly. Accordingly, after interchange of solemn assurances between
the pair, the Pharsalians were let alone and in peace, and ere long
Jason was, by general consent, appointed Tagos of all the Thessalians.
Once fairly vested with that authority, he drew up a list of the cavalry
and heavy infantry which the several states were capable of furnishing
as their quota, with the result that his cavalry, inclusive of allies,
numbered more than eight thousand, while his infantry force was computed
at not less than twenty thousand; and his light troops would have been a
match for those of the whole world--the mere enumeration of their cities
would be a labour in itself. (12) His next act was a summons to all the
dwellers round (13) to pay tribute exactly the amount imposed in the
days of Scopas. (14) And here in this state of accomplishment we may
leave these matters. I return to the point reached when this digression
into the affairs of Jason began.
(12) See "Cyrop." I. i. 5.
(13) Lit. perioeci.
(14) It is conjectured that the Scopadae ruled at Pherae and Cranusa
in the earlier half of the fifth century B.C.; see, for the change
of dynasty, what is said of Lycophron of Pherae in "Hell." II.
iii. 4. There was a famous Scopas, son of Creon, to whom Simonides
addressed his poem--
{Andr' agathon men alatheos genesthai khalepon khersin te kai posi kai
noo tetragonon, aneu psogou tetugmenon.}
a sentiment criticised by Plato, "Protag." 359 A. "Now Simonides says to
Scopas, the son of Creon, the Thessalian:
'Hardly on the one hand can a man become truly good; built four-square
in hands and feet and mind, a work without a flaw.'
Do you know the poem?"--Jowett, "Plat." i. 153. But whether this Scopas
is the Scopas of our text and a hero of Jason's is not clear.
II
B.C. 374. The Lacedaemonians and their allies were collecting in
Phocia, and the Thebans, after retreating into their own territory,
were guarding the approaches. At this juncture the Athenians, seeing the
Thebans growing strong at their expense without contributing a single
penny to the maintenance of the fleet, while they themselves, what
with money contributions, and piratical attacks from Aegina, and the
garrisoning of their territory, were being pared to the bone, conceived
a desire to cease from war. In this mood they sent an embassy to
Lacedaemon and concluded peace. (1)
(1) See Curtius, "H. G." vol. iv. p. 376 (Eng. trans.)
B.C. 374-373. This done, two of the ambassadors, in obedience to a
decree of the state, set sail at once from Laconian territory, bearing
orders to Timotheus to sail home, since peace was established. That
officer, while obeying his orders, availed himself of the homeward
voyage to land certain Zacynthian exiles (2) on their native soil,
whereupon the Zacynthian city party sent to Lacedaemon and complained of
the treatment they had received from Timotheus; and the Lacedaemonians,
without further consideration, decided that the Athenians were in the
wrong, and proceeded to equip another navy, and at length collected from
Laconia itself, from Corinth, Leucas, (3) Ambracia, Elis, Zacynthus,
Achaia, Epidaurus, Troezen, Hermione, and Halieis, a force amounting
to sixty sail. In command of this squadron they appointed Mnasippus
admiral, with orders to attack Corcyra, and in general to look after
their interests in those seas. They, moreover, sent an embassy to
Dionysius, instructing him that his interests would be advanced by the
withdrawal of Corcyra from Athenian hands.
(2) See Hicks, 81, p. 142.
(3) Ibid. 81, 86.
B.C. 373. Accordingly Mnasippus set sail, as soon as his squadron was
ready, direct to Corcyra; he took with him, besides his troops from
Lacedaemon, a body of mercenaries, making a total in all of no less
than fifteen hundred men. His disembarked, and soon became master of the
island, the country district falling a prey to the spoiler. It was in
a high state of cultivation, and rich with fruit-trees, not to speak of
magnificent dwelling-houses and wine-cellars fitted up on the farms: so
that, it was said, the soldiers reached such a pitch of luxury that they
refused to drink wine which had not a fine bouquet. A crowd of slaves,
too, and fat beasts were captured on the estates.
The general's next move was to encamp with his land forces about
three-quarters of a mile (4) from the city district, so that any
Corcyraean who attempted to leave the city to go into the country would
certainly be cut off on that side. The fleet he stationed on the other
side of the city, at a point where he calculated on detecting and
preventing the approach of convoys. Besides which he established a
blockade in front of the harbour when the weather permitted. In this way
the city was completely invested.
(4) Lit. "five stades."
The Corcyraeans, on their side, were in the sorest straits. They could
get nothing from their soil owing to the vice in which they were gripped
by land, whilst owing to the predominance of the enemy at sea nothing
could be imported. Accordingly they sent to the Athenians and begged for
their assistance. They urged upon them that it would be a great mistake
if they suffered themselves to be robbed of Corcyra. If they did so,
they would not only throw away a great advantage to themselves, but add
a considerable strength to their enemy; since, with the exception of
Athens, no state was capable of furnishing a larger fleet or revenue.
Moreover, Corcyra lay favourably (5) for commanding the Corinthian gulf
and the cities which line its shores; it was splendidly situated for
injuring the rural districts of Laconia, and still more splendidly in
relation to the opposite shores of the continent of Epirus, and the
passage between Peloponnesus and Sicily.
(5) See Thuc. i. 36.
This appeal did not fall on deaf ears. The Athenians were persuaded
that the matter demanded their most serious attention, and they at once
despatched Stesicles as general, (6) with about six hundred peltasts.
They also requested Alcetas to help them in getting their troops across.
Thus under cover of night the whole body were conveyed across to a point
in the open country, and found their way into the city. Nor was that
all. The Athenians passed a decree to man sixty ships of war, and
elected (7) Timotheus admiral. The latter, being unable to man the fleet
on the spot, set sail on a cruise to the islands and tried to make up
the complements of his crews from those quarters. He evidently looked
upon it as no light matter to sail round Peloponnesus as if on a voyage
of pleasure, and to attack a fleet in the perfection of training. (8) To
the Athenians, however, it seemed that he was wasting the precious time
seasonable for the coastal voyage, and they were not disposed to condone
such an error, but deposed him, appointing Iphicrates in his stead.
The new general was no sooner appointed than he set about getting
his vessels manned with the utmost activity, putting pressure on the
trierarchs. He further procured from the Athenians for his use not
only any vessels cruising on the coast of Attica, but the Paralus and
Salaminia (9) also, remarking that, if things turned out well yonder,
he would soon send them back plenty of ships. Thus his numbers grew to
something like seventy sail.
(6) The name of the general was Ctesicles, according to Diod. xv. 47.
Read {strategon} for {tagon}, with Breitenbach, Cobet, etc. For
Alcetas, see above, "Hell." VI. i. 7.
(7) I.e. by show of hands, {ekheirotonoun}.
(8) See Jowett, note to Thuc. VIII. xcv. 2, ii. p. 525.
(9) The two sacred galleys. See Thuc. iii. 33; Aristoph. "Birds," 147
foll.
Meanwhile the Corcyraeans were sore beset with famine: desertion became
every day more frequent, so much so that Mnasippus caused proclamation
to be made by herald that all deserters would be sold there and then;
(10) and when that had no effect in lessening the stream of runaways,
he ended by driving them back with the lash. Those within the walls,
however, were not disposed to receive these miserable slaves within
the lines, and numbers died outside. Mnasippus, not blind to what was
happening, soon persuaded himself that he had as good as got the city
into his possession: and he began to try experiments on his mercenaries.
Some of them he had already paid off; (11) others still in his service
had as much as two months' pay owing to them by the general, who, if
report spoke true, had no lack of money, since the majority of the
states, not caring for a campaign across the seas, sent him hard cash
instead of men. But now the beleaguered citizens, who could espy
from their towers that the outposts were less carefully guarded than
formerly, and the men scattered about the rural districts, made a
sortie, capturing some and cutting down others. Mnasippus, perceiving
the attack, donned his armour, and, with all the heavy troops he had,
rushed to the rescue, giving orders to the captains and brigadiers (12)
to lead out the mercenaries. Some of the captains answered that it
was not so easy to command obedience when the necessaries of life were
lacking; whereat the Spartan struck one man with his staff, and another
with the butt of his spear. Without spirit and full of resentment
against their general, the men mustered--a condition very unfavourable
to success in battle. Having drawn up the troops, the general in person
repulsed the division of the enemy which was opposite the gates, and
pursued them closely; but these, rallying close under their walls,
turned right about, and from under cover of the tombs kept up a
continuous discharge of darts and other missiles; other detachments,
dashing out at other gates, meanwhile fell heavily on the flanks of the
enemy. The Lacedaemonians, being drawn up eight deep, and thinking that
the wing of their phalanx was of inadequate strength, essayed to wheel
around; but as soon as they began the movement the Corcyraeans attacked
them as if they were fleeing, and they were then unable to recover
themselves, (13) while the troops next in position abandoned themselves
to flight. Mnasippus, unable to succour those who were being pressed
owing to the attack of the enemy immediately in front, found himself
left from moment to moment with decreasing numbers. At last the
Corcyraeans collected, and with one united effort made a final rush upon
Mnasippus and his men, whose numbers were now considerably reduced.
At the same instant the townsmen, (14) eagerly noticing the posture of
affairs, rushed out to play their part. First Mnasippus was slain, and
then the pursuit became general; nor could the pursuers well have failed
to capture the camp, barricade and all, had they not caught sight of
the mob of traffickers with a long array of attendants and slaves, and
thinking that here was a prize indeed, desisted from further chase.
(10) Or, "he would knock them all down to the hammer."
(11) Or, "cut off from their pay."
(12) Lit. "lochagoi and taxiarchs."
(13) Or, "to retaliate"; or, "to complete the movement."
(14) Reading, after Dindorf, {oi politai}, or, if with the MSS., {oi
oplitai}; translate "the heavy-armed among the assailants saw
their advantage and pressed on."
The Corcyraeans were well content for the moment to set up a trophy
and to give back the enemy's dead under a flag of truce; but the
after-consequences were even more important to them in the revival of
strength and spirits which were sunk in despondency. The rumour spread
that Iphicrates would soon be there--he was even at the doors; and in
fact the Corcyraeans themselves were manning a fleet. So Hypermenes,
who was second in command to Mnasippus and the bearer of his despatches,
manned every vessel of the fleet as full as it would hold, and then
sailing round to the entrenched camp, filled all the transports with
prisoners and valuables and other stock, and sent them off. He himself,
with his marines and the survivors of his troops, kept watch over the
entrenchments; but at last even this remnant in the excess of panic and
confusion got on board the men-of-war and sailed off, leaving behind
them vast quantities of corn and wine, with numerous prisoners and
invalided soldiers. The fact was, they were sorely afraid of being
caught by the Athenians in the island, and so they made safely off to
Leucas.
Meanwhile Iphicrates had commenced his voyage of circumnavigation,
partly voyaging and partly making every preparation for an engagement.
He at once left his large sails behind him, as the voyage was only to
be the prelude of a battle; his flying jibs, even if there was a good
breeze, were but little used, since by making his progress depend on
sheer rowing, he hoped at once to improve the physique of his men and
the speed of his attack. Often when the squadron was about to put into
shore for the purpose of breakfast or supper, he would seize the moment,
and draw back the leading wing of the column from the land off the point
in question; and then facing round again with the triremes posted well
in line, prow for prow, at a given signal let loose the whole fleet in a
stoutly contested race for the shore. Great was the triumph in being the
first to take in water or whatever else they might need, or the first to
breakfast; just as it was a heavy penalty on the late-comers, not only
to come short in all these objects of desire, but to have to put out
to sea with the rest as soon as the signal was given; since the
first-comers had altogether a quiet time of it, whilst the hindmost must
get through the whole business in hot haste. So again, in the matter
of outposts, if he chanced to be getting the morning meal on hostile
territory, pickets would be posted, as was right and proper, on the
land; but, apart from these, he would raise his masts and keep look-out
men on the maintops. These commanded of course a far wider prospect from
their lofty perches than the outposts on the level ground. So too, when
he dined or slept he had no fires burning in the camp at night, but
only a beacon kindled in front of the encampment to prevent any unseen
approach; and frequently in fine weather he put out to sea immediately
after the evening meal, when, if the breeze favoured, they ran along and
took their rest simultaneously, or if they depended on oars he gave his
mariners repose by turns. During the voyage in daytime he would at
one time signal to "sail in column," and at another signal "abreast in
line." So that whilst they prosecuted the voyage they at the same time
became (both as to theory and practice) well versed in all the details
of an engagement before they reached the open sea--a sea, as they
imagined, occupied by their foes. For the most part they breakfasted
and dined on hostile territory; but as he confined himself to bare
necessaries he was always too quick for the enemy. Before the hostile
reinforcement would come up he had finished his business and was out to sea again. |
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