At the date of Mnasippus's death he chanced to be off Sphagiae in
Laconian territory. Reaching Elis, and coasting past the mouth of the
Alpheus, he came to moorings under Cape Ichthus, (15) as it is called.
The next day he put out from that port for Cephallenia, so drawing up
his line and conducting the voyage that he might be prepared in every
detail to engage if necessary. The tale about Mnasippus and his demise
had reached him, but he had not heard it from an eye-witness, and
suspected that it might have been invented to deceive him and throw him
off his guard. He was therefore on the look-out. It was, in fact, only
on arrival in Cephallenia that he learned the news in an explicit form,
and gave his troops rest.
(15) Cape Fish, mod. Cape Katakolon, protecting harbour of Pyrgos in
Elis.
I am well aware that all these details of practice and manouvring are
customary in anticipation of a sea-fight, but what I single out for
praise in the case before us is the skill with which the Athenian
admiral attained a twofold object. Bearing in mind that it was his duty
to reach a certain point at which he expected to fight a naval battle
without delay, it was a happy discovery on his part not to allow
tactical skill, on the one hand, to be sacrificed to the pace of
sailing, (16) nor, on the other, the need of training to interfere with
the date of arrival.
(16) Lit. "the voyage."
After reducing the towns of Cephallenia, Iphicrates sailed to Corcyra.
There the first news he heard was that the triremes sent by Dionysius
were expected to relieve the Lacedaemonians. On receipt of this
information he set off in person and surveyed the country, in order
to find a spot from which it would be possible to see the vessels
approaching and to signal to the city. Here he stationed his look-out
men. A code of signals was agreed upon to signify "vessels in sight,"
"mooring," etc.; which done he gave his orders to twenty of his captains
of men-of-war who were to follow him at a given word of command. Any one
who failed to follow him must not grumble at the penalty; that he warned
them. Presently the vessels were signalled approaching; the word of
command was given, and then the enthusiasm was a sight to see--every
man of the crews told off for the expedition racing to join his ship and
embark. Sailing to the point where the enemy's vessels lay, he had no
difficulty in capturing the crews, who had disembarked from all the
ships with one exception. The exception was that of Melanippus the
Rhodian, who had advised the other captains not to stop at this point,
and had then manned his own vessel and sailed off. Thus he encountered
the ships of Iphicrates, but contrived to slip through his fingers,
while the whole of the Syracusan vessels were captured, crews and all.
Having cut the beaks off the prows, Iphicrates bore down into the
harbour of Corcyra with the captured triremes in tow. With the captive
crews themselves he came to an agreement that each should pay a fixed
sum as ransom, with one exception, that of Crinippus, their commander.
Him he kept under guard, with the intention apparently of exacting a
handsome sum in his case or else of selling him. The prisoner, however,
from vexation of spirit, put an end to his own life. The rest were sent
about their business by Iphicrates, who accepted the Corcyraeans as
sureties for the money. His own sailors he supported for the most part
as labourers on the lands of the Corcyraeans, while at the head of his
light infantry and the hoplites of the contingent he crossed over into
Acarnania, and there lent his aid to any friendly state that needed his
services; besides which he went to war with the Thyrians, (17) a sturdy
race of warriors in possession of a strong fortress.
(17) Thyreum (or Thyrium), in Acarnania, a chief city at the time of
the Roman wars in Greece; and according to Polybius (xxxviii. 5),
a meeting-place of the League on one occasion. See "Dict. Anct.
Geog." s.v.; Freeman, op. cit. iv. 148; cf. Paus. IV. xxvi. 3, in
reference to the Messenians and Naupactus; Grote, "H. G." x. 212.
B.C. 372. Having attached to his squadron the navy also of Corcyra,
with a fleet numbering now about ninety ships he set sail, in the first
instance to Cephallenia, where he exacted money--which was in some cases
voluntarily paid, in others forcibly extorted. In the next place
he began making preparations partly to harass the territory of the
Lacedaemonians, and partly to win over voluntarily the other states in
that quarter which were hostile to Athens; or in case of refusal to go
to war with them.
The whole conduct of the campaign reflects, I think, the highest credit
on Iphicrates. If his strategy was admirable, so too was the instinct
which led him to advise the association with himself of two such
colleagues as Callistratus and Chabrias--the former a popular orator
but no great friend of himself politically, (18) the other a man of
high military reputation. Either he looked upon them as men of unusual
sagacity, and wished to profit by their advice, in which case I
commend the good sense of the arrangement, or they were, in his belief,
antagonists, in which case the determination to approve himself a
consummate general, neither indolent nor incautious, was bold, I admit,
but indicative of a laudable self-confidence. Here, however, we must
part with Iphicrates and his achievements to return to Athens.
(18) Reading with the MSS. {ou mala epitedeion onta}. See Grote, "H.
G." x. 206. Boeckh ("P. E. A.," trans. Cornewall Lewis, p. 419)
wished to read {eu mala} for {ou mala k.t.l.}, in which case
translate "the former a popular orator, and a man of singular
capacity"; and for {epitedeion} in that sense, see "Hipparch." i.
8; for {eu mala}, see "Hipparch." i. 25. For details concerning
Callistratus, see Dindorf, op. cit. note ad. loc.; Curtius, "H.
G." iv. 367, 381 foll., v. 90. For Chabrias, Rehdantz, op. cit. In
the next sentence I have again adhered to the reading of the MSS.,
but the passage is commonly regarded as corrupt; see Otto Keller,
op. cit. p. 215 for various emendations.
III
The Athenians, forced to witness the expatriation from Boeotia of their
friends the Plataeans (who had sought an asylum with themselves), forced
also to listen to the supplications of the Thespiaeans (who begged them
not to suffer them to be robbed of their city), could no longer
regard the Thebans with favour; (1) though, when it came to a direct
declaration of war, they were checked in part by a feeling of shame, and
partly by considerations of expediency. Still, to go hand in hand with
them, to be a party to their proceedings, this they absolutely refused,
now that they saw them marching against time-honoured friends of the
city like the Phocians, and blotting out states whose loyalty in the
great Persian war was conspicuous no less than their friendship to
Athens. Accordingly the People passed a decree to make peace; but in the
first instance they sent an embassy to Thebes, inviting that state to
join them if it pleased them on an embassy which they proposed to send
to Lacedaemon to treat of peace. In the next place they despatched such
an embassy on their own account. Among the commissioners appointed
were Callias the son of Hipponicus, Autocles the son of Strombichides,
Demostratus the son of Aristophon, Aristocles, Cephisodotus, (2)
Melanopus, and Lycaethus.
(1) Plataea destroyed in B.C. 373. See Jowett, "Thuc." ii. 397.
(2) See below, "Hell." VII. i. 12; Hicks, 87.
B.C. 371. (These were formally introduced to the Deputies of the
Lacedaemonians and the allies. (3)) Nor ought the name of Callistratus
to be omitted. That statesman and orator was present. He had obtained
furlough from Iphicrates on an undertaking either to send money for
the fleet or to arrange a peace. Hence his arrival in Athens and
transactions in behalf of peace. After being introduced to the assembly
(4) of the Lacedaemonians and to the allies, Callias, (5) who was the
dadouchos (or torch-holder) in the mysteries, made the first speech.
He was a man just as well pleased to praise himself as to hear himself
praised by others. He opened the proceedings as follows:
(3) The bracketed words read like an annotator's comment, or possibly
they are a note by the author.
(4) See above, "Hell." II. iv. 38.
(5) See above, "Hell." IV. v. 13; Cobet, "Prosop. Xen." p. 67 foll.;
Xen. "Symp."; Plat. "Protag."; Andoc. "de Myst." If this is one
and the same person he must have been an elderly man at this date,
371 B.C.
"Lacedaemonians, the duty of representing you as proxenos at Athens is
a privilege which I am not the first member of my family to enjoy; my
father's father held it as an heirloom of our family and handed it down
as a heritage to his descendants. If you will permit me, I should like
to show you the disposition of my fatherland towards yourselves. If in
times of war she chooses us as her generals, so when her heart is set
upon quiet she sends us out as her messengers of peace. I myself have
twice already (6) stood here to treat for conclusion of war, and on both
embassies succeeded in arranging a mutually agreeable peace. Now for
the third time I am come, and I flatter myself that to-day again I shall
obtain a reconciliation, and on grounds exceptionally just. My eyes bear
witness that our hearts are in accord; you and we alike are pained at
the effacement of Plataeae and Thespiae. Is it not then reasonable that
out of agreement should spring concord rather than discord? It is never
the part, I take it, of wise men to raise the standard of war for the
sake of petty differences; but where there is nothing but unanimity they
must be marvellous folk who refuse the bond of peace. But I go further.
It were just and right on our parts even to refuse to bear arms against
each other; since, as the story runs, the first strangers to whom our
forefather Triptolemus showed the unspeakable mystic rites of Demeter
and Core, the mother and the maiden, were your ancestors;--I speak of
Heracles, the first founder of your state, and of your two citizens, the
great twin sons of Zeus--and to Peloponnesus first he gave as a gift the
seed of Demeter's corn-fruits. How, then, can it be just or right either
that you should come and ravage the corn crops of those from whom you
got the sacred seed of corn, or that we should not desire that they to
whom the gift was given should share abundantly of this boon? But if, as
it would seem, it is a fixed decree of heaven that war shall never cease
among men, yet ought we--your people and our people--to be as slow as
possible to begin it, and being in it, as swift as possible to bring it
to an end."
(6) B.C. 387 and 374; see Curtius, "H. G." vol. iv. p. 376 (Eng. ed.)
After him Autocles (7) spoke: he was of repute as a versatile lawyer and
orator, and addressed the meeting as follows: "Lacedaemonians, I do not
conceal from myself that what I am about to say is not calculated to
please you, but it seems to me that, if you wish the friendship which
we are cementing to last as long as possible, we are wise to show each
other the underlying causes of our wars. Now, you are perpetually saying
that the states ought to be independent; but it is you yourselves
who most of all stand in the way of independence--your first and last
stipulation with the allied states being that they should follow you
whithersoever you choose to lead; and yet what has this principle of
follow-my-leader got to do with independent action? (8) Again, you pick
quarrels without consulting your allies, and lead them against those
whom you account enemies; so that in many cases, with all their vaunted
independence, they are forced to march against their greatest friends;
and, what is still more opposed to independence than all else, you
are for ever setting up here your decarchies and there your thirty
commissioners, and your chief aim in appointing these officers and
governors seems to be, not that they should fulfil their office and
govern legally, but that they should be able to keep the cities under
their heels by sheer force. So that it looks as if you delighted in
despotisms rather than free constitutions. Let us go back to the date
(9) at which the Persian king enjoined the independence of the states.
At that time you made no secret of your conviction that the Thebans, if
they did not suffer each state to govern itself and to use the laws
of its own choice, would be failing to act in the spirit of the king's
rescript. But no sooner had you got hold of Cadmeia than you would not
suffer the Thebans themselves to be independent. Now, if the maintenance
of friendship be an object, it is no use for people to claim justice
from others while they themselves are doing all they can to prove the
selfishness of their aims."
(7) For the political views of Autocles, see Curtius, "H. G." iv. 387,
v. 94 (Eng. tr.); see also Grote, "H. G." x. 225.
(8) Or, "what consistency is there between these precepts of yours and
political independence?"
(9) Sixteen years before--B.C. 387. See "Pol. Lac." xiv. 5.
These remarks were received in absolute silence, yet in the hearts of
those who were annoyed with Lacedaemon they stirred pleasure. After
Autocles spoke Callistratus: "Trespasses, men of Lacedaemon, have been
committed on both sides, yours and ours, I am free to confess; but still
it is not my view that because a man has done wrong we can never again
have dealings with him. Experience tells me that no man can go very far
without a slip, and it seems to me that sometimes the transgressor by
reason of his transgression becomes more tractable, especially if he be
chastened through the error he has committed, as has been the case with
us. And so on your own case I see that ungenerous acts have sometimes
reaped their own proper reward: blow has been met by counter-blow; and
as a specimen I take the seizure of the Cadmeia in Thebes. To-day, at
any rate, the very cities whose independence you strove for have, since
your unrighteous treatment of Thebes, fallen one and all of them again
into her power. (10) We are schooled now, both of us, to know that
grasping brings not gain. We are prepared, I hope, to be once more
moderate under the influence of a mutual friendship. Some, I know, in
their desire to render our peace (11) abortive accuse us falsely, as
though we were come hither, not seeking friendship, but because we
dread the arrival of some (12) Antalcidas with moneys from the king. But
consider, what arrant nonsense they talk! Was it not, pray, the great
king who demanded that all the states in Hellas should be independent?
and what have we Athenians, who are in full agreement with the king,
both in word and deed, to fear from him? Or is it conceivable that he
prefers spending money in making others great to finding his favourite
projects realised without expense?
(10) Reading, with Breitenbach and Hartman, {as} instead of {os
espoudasate k.t.l.}
(11) Or, more lit. "to avert the peace" as an ill-omened thing.
(12) Without inserting {tis}, as Hartman proposes ("An. Xen." p. 387),
that, I think, is the sense. Antalcidas is the arch-diplomat--a
name to conjure with, like that of Bismarck in modern European
politics. But see Grote, "H. G." x. 213, note 2.
"Well! what is it really that has brought us here? No especial need
or difficulty in our affairs. That you may discover by a glance at our
maritime condition, or, if you prefer, at the present posture of our
affairs on land. Well, then, how does the matter stand? It is obvious
that some of our allies please us no better than they please you; (13)
and, possibly, in return for your former preservation of us, we may be
credited with a desire to point out to you the soundness of our policy.
(13) See, for this corrupt passage, Otto Keller, op. cit. p. 219;
Hartman, op. cit. p. 387; and Breitenbach, n. ad loc. In the next
sentence I should like to adopt Hartman's emendation (ib.) {on
orthos egnote} for the MSS. {a orthos egnomen}, and translate "we
may like to prove to you the soundness of your policy at the
time." For the "preservation" referred to, see below, VI. v. 35,
and above, II. ii. 20.
"But, to revert once more to the topic of expediency and common
interests. It is admitted, I presume, that, looking at the states
collectively, half support your views, half ours; and in every single
state one party is for Sparta and another for Athens. Suppose, then,
we were to shake hands, from what quarter can we reasonably anticipate
danger and trouble? To put the case in so many words, so long as you
are our friends no one can vex us by land; no one, whilst we are your
supports, can injure you by sea. Wars like tempests gather and grow to a
head from time to time, and again they are dispelled. That we all know.
Some future day, if not to-day, we shall crave, both of us, for peace.
Why, then, need we wait for that moment, holding on until we expire
under the multitude of our ills, rather than take time by the forelock
and, before some irremediable mischief betide, make peace? I cannot
admire the man who, because he has entered the lists and has scored many
a victory and obtained to himself renown, is so eaten up with the spirit
of rivalry that he must needs go on until he is beaten and all his
training is made futile. Nor again do I praise the gambler who, if he
makes one good stroke of luck, insists on doubling the stakes. Such
conduct in the majority of cases must end in absolute collapse. Let us
lay the lesson of these to heart, and forbear to enter into any such
lists as theirs for life or death; but, while we are yet in the heyday
of our strength and fortune, shake hands in mutual amity. So assuredly
shall we through you and you through us attain to an unprecedented
pinnacle of glory throughout Hellas."
The arguments of the speakers were approved, and the Lacedaemonians
passed a resolution to accept peace on a threefold basis: the withdrawal
of the governors from the cities, (14) the disbanding of armaments naval
and military, and the guarantee of independence to the states. "If any
state transgressed these stipulations, it lay at the option of any power
whatsoever to aid the states so injured, while, conversely, to bring
such aid was not compulsory on any power against its will." On these
terms the oaths were administered and accepted by the Lacedaemonians on
behalf of themselves and their allies, and by the Athenians and
their allies separately state by state. The Thebans had entered their
individual name among the states which accepted the oaths, but their
ambassadors came the next day with instructions to alter the name of
the signatories, substituting for Thebans Boeotians. (15) But Agesilaus
answered to this demand that he would alter nothing of what they had in
the first instance sworn to and subscribed. If they did not wish to
be included in the treaty, he was willing to erase their name at their
bidding. So it came to pass that the rest of the world made peace, the
sole point of dispute being confined to the Thebans; and the Athenians
came to the conclusion that there was a fair prospect of the Thebans
being now literally decimated. (16) As to the Thebans themselves, they
retired from Sparta in utter despondency.
(14) Grote ("H. G." x. 236) thinks that Diod. xv. 38 ({exagogeis})
belongs to this time, not to the peace between Athens and Sparta
in 374 B.C.
(15) See, for a clear explanation of the matter, Freeman, "Hist. Red.
Gov." iv. p. 175, note 3, in reference to Grote, ib. x. 231 note,
and Paus. IX. xiii. 2; Plut. "Ages." 28; Thirlwall, "H. G." v. p
69 note.
(16) Or, "as the saying is, taken and tithed." See below, VI. v. 35,
and for the origin of the saying, Herod. vii. 132.
IV
In consequence of the peace the Athenians proceeded to withdraw their
garrisons from the different sates, and sent to recall Iphicrates with
his fleet; besides which they forced him to restore everything captured
subsequently to the late solemn undertaking at Lacedaemon. The
Lacedaemonians acted differently. Although they withdrew their governors
and garrisons from the other states, in Phocis they did not do so. Here
Cleombrotus was quartered with his army, and had sent to ask directions
from the home authorities. A speaker, Prothous, maintained that their
business was to disband the army in accordance with their oaths, and
then to send round invitations to the states to contribute what each
felt individually disposed, and lay such sum in the temple of Apollo;
after which, if any attempt to hinder the independence of the states on
any side were manifested, it would be time enough then again to invite
all who cared to protect the principle of autonomy to march against its
opponents. "In this way," he added, "I think the goodwill of heaven
will be secured, and the states will suffer least annoyance." But the
Assembly, on hearing these views, agreed that this man was talking
nonsense. Puppets in the hands of fate! (1) An unseen power, it would
seem, was already driving them onwards; so they sent instructions to
Cleombrotus not to disband the army, but to march straight against
the Thebans if they refused to recognise the autonomy of the states.
(Cleombrotus, it is understood, had, on hearing the news of the
establishment of peace, sent to the ephorate to ask for guidance;
and then they sent him the above instructions, bidding him under the
circumstances named to march upon Thebes. (2))
(1) See Grote, "H. G." x. 237: "The miso-Theban impulse now drove them
on with a fury which overcame all other thoughts... a
misguiding inspiration sent by the gods--like that of the Homeric
Ate."
(2) This passage reads like an earlier version for which the above was
substituted by the author.
The Spartan king soon perceived that, so far from leaving the Boeotian
states their autonomy, the Thebans were not even preparing to disband
their army, clearly in view of a general engagement; he therefore felt
justified in marching his troops into Boeotia. The point of ingress
which he adopted was not that which the Thebans anticipated from Phocis,
and where they were keeping guard at a defile; but, marching through
Thisbae by a mountainous and unsuspected route, he arrived before
Creusis, taking that fortress and capturing twelve Theban war-vessels
besides. After this achievement he advanced from the seaboard and
encamped in Leuctra on Thespian territory. The Thebans encamped in
a rising ground immediately opposite at no great distance, and were
supported by no allies except the Boeotians.
At this juncture the friends of Cleombrotus came to him and urged upon
him strong reasons for delivering battle. "If you let the Thebans escape
without a battle," they said, "you will run great risks of suffering
the extreme penalty at the hands of the state. People will call to mind
against you the time when you reached Cynoscephelae and did not ravage a
square foot of Theban territory; and again, a subsequent expedition when
you were driven back foiled in your attempt to make an entry into the
enemy's country--while Agesilaus on each occasion found his entry
by Mount Cithaeron. If then you have any care for yourself, or any
attachment to your fatherland, march you against the enemy." That was
what his friends urged. As to his opponents, what they said was, "Now
our fine friend will show whether he really is so concerned on behalf of
the Thebans as he is said to be."
Cleombrotus, with these words ringing in his ears, felt driven (3) to
join battle. On their side the leaders of Thebes calculated that, if
they did not fight, their provincial cities (4) would hold aloof from
them and Thebes itself would be besieged; while, if the commonalty of
Thebes failed to get supplies, there was every prospect that the city
itself would turn against them; and, seeing that many of them had
already tasted the bitterness of exile, they came to the conclusion that
it was better for them to die on the field of battle than to renew that
experience. Besides this they were somewhat encouraged by the recital of
an oracle which predicted that the Lacedaemonians would be defeated
on the spot where the monument of the maidens stood, who, as the story
goes, being violated by certain Lacedaemonians, had slain themselves.
(5) This sepulchral monument the Thebans decked with ornaments before
the battle. Furthermore, tidings were brought them from the city that
all the temples had opened of their own accord; and the priestesses
asserted that the gods revealed victory. Again, from the Heracleion
men said that the arms had disappeared, as though Heracles himself had
sallied forth to battle. It is true that another interpretation (6)
of these marvels made them out to be one and all the artifices of the
leaders of Thebes. However this may be, everything in the battle turned
out adverse to the Lacedaemonians; while fortune herself lent aid to
the Thebans and crowned their efforts with success. Cleombrotus held his
last council "whether to fight or not," after the morning meal. In the
heat of noon a little goes a long way; and the people said that it took
a somewhat provocative effect on their spirits. (7)
(3) Or, "was provoked."
(4) Lit. "perioecid." See Thuc. iv. 76, Arnold's note, and "Hell." V.
iv. 46, 63.
(5) See Diod. xv. 54; Paus. IX. xiii. 3; Plut. "Pelop." xx.
(6) Or, "it is true that some people made out these marvels."
(7) Or, "they were somewhat excited by it."
Both sides were now arming, and there was the unmistakeable signs of
approaching battle, when, as the first incident, there issued from the
Boeotian lines a long train bent on departure--these were the furnishers
of the market, a detachment of baggage bearers, and in general such
people as had no inclination to join in the fight. These were met on
their retreat and attacked by the mercenary troops under Hiero, who got
round them by a circular movement. (8) The mercenaries were supported by
the Phocian light infantry and some squadrons of Heracleot and Phliasian
cavalry, who fell upon the retiring train and turned them back, pursuing
them and driving them into the camp of the Boeotians. The immediate
effect was to make the Boeotian portion of the army more numerous and
closer packed than before. The next feature of the combat was that in
consequence of the flat space of plain (9) between the opposing armies,
the Lacedaemonians posted their cavalry in front of their squares
of infantry, and the Thebans followed suit. Only there was this
difference--the Theban cavalry was in a high state of training and
efficiency, owing to their war with the Orchomenians and again their war
with Thespiae, whilst the cavalry of the Lacedaemonians was at its worst
at this period. (10) The horses were reared and kept by the wealthiest
members of the state; but whenever the ban was called out, an appointed
trooper appeared who took the horse with any sort of arms which might
be presented to him, and set off on the expedition at a moment's notice.
Moreover, these troopers were the least able-bodied of the men: raw
recruits set simply astride their horses, and devoid of soldierly
ambition. Such was the cavalry of either antagonist.
(8) Or, "surrounded them."
(9) See Rustow and Kochly, op. cit. p. 173.
(10) See "Hipparch." ix. 4; also "Cyrop." VIII. viii.
The heavy infantry of the Lacedaemonians, it is said, advanced by
sections three files abreast, (11) allowing a total depth to the whole
line of not more than twelve. The Thebans were formed in close order of
not less than fifty shields deep, calculating that victory gained over
the king's division of the army implied the easy conquest of the rest.
(11) It would appear that the "enomoty" (section) numbered thirty-six
files. See "Pol. Lac." xi. 4; xiii. 4. For further details as to
the tactical order of the Thebans, see Diod. xv. 55; Plut.
"Pelop." xxiii.
Cleombrotus had hardly begun to lead his division against the foe
when, before in fact the troops with him were aware of his advance, the
cavalry had already come into collision, and that of the Lacedaemonians
was speedily worsted. In their flight they became involved with their
own heavy infantry; and to make matters worse, the Theban regiments were
already attacking vigorously. Still strong evidence exists for
supposing that Cleombrotus and his division were, in the first instance,
victorious in the battle, if we consider the fact that they could never
have picked him up and brought him back alive unless his vanguard had
been masters of the situation for the moment.
When, however, Deinon the polemarch and Sphodrias, a member of the
king's council, with his son Cleonymus, (12) had fallen, then it was
that the cavalry and the polemarch's adjutants, (13) as they are
called, with the rest, under pressure of the mass against them, began
retreating; and the left wing of the Lacedaemonians, seeing the right
borne down in this way, also swerved. Still, in spite of the numbers
slain, and broken as they were, as soon as they had crossed the trench
which protected their camp in front, they grounded arms on the spot (14)
whence they had rushed to battle. This camp, it must be borne in mind,
did not lie at all on the level, but was pitched on a somewhat steep
incline. At this juncture there were some of the Lacedaemonians who,
looking upon such a disaster as intolerable, maintained that they ought
to prevent the enemy from erecting a trophy, and try to recover the
dead not under a flag of truce but by another battle. The polemarchs,
however, seeing that nearly a thousand men of the total Lacedaemonian
troops were slain; seeing also that of the seven hundred Spartans
themselves who were on the field something like four hundred lay dead;
(15) aware, further, of the despondency which reigned among the allies,
and the general disinclination on their parts to fight longer (a frame
of mind not far removed in some instances from positive satisfaction at
what had taken place)--under the circumstances, I say, the polemarchs
called a council of the ablest representatives of the shattered army
(16) and deliberated as to what should be done. Finally the unanimous
opinion was to pick up the dead under a flag of truce, and they sent a
herald to treat for terms. The Thebans after that set up a trophy and
gave back the bodies under a truce.
(12) See above, V. iv. 33.
(13) {sumphoreis}. For the readings of this corrupt passage see Otto
Keller.
(14) Or, "in orderly way." See Curt. "H. G." iv. 400.
(15) See "Ages." ii. 24.
(16) {tous epikairiotatous}. See above, III. iii. 10; "Cyrop." VII.
iv. 4; VIII. iv. 32, vi. 2.
After these events, a messenger was despatched to Lacedaemon with news
of the calamity. He reached his destination on the last day of the
gymnopaediae, (17) just when the chorus of grown men had entered the
theatre. The ephors heard the mournful tidings not without grief and
pain, as needs they must, I take it; but for all that they did not
dismiss the chorus, but allowed the contest to run out its natural
course. What they did was to deliver the names of those who had fallen
to their friends and families, with a word of warning to the women not
to make any loud lamentations but to bear their sorrow in silence; and
the next day it was a striking spectacle to see those who had relations
among the slain moving to and fro in public with bright and radiant
looks, whilst of those whose friends were reported to be living barely a
man was to be seen, and these flitted by with lowered heads and scowling
brows, as if in humiliation.
(17) The festival was celebrated annually about midsummer. See Herod.
vi. 67; Thuc. v. 82, and Arnold's note; Pollux. iv. 105; Athen.
xiv. 30, xv. 22; Muller, "Dorians," ii. 389.
After this the ephors proceeded to call out the ban, including the
forty-years-service men of the two remaining regiments; (18) and they
proceeded further to despatch the reserves of the same age belonging
to the six regiments already on foreign service. Hitherto the Phocian
campaign had only drawn upon the thirty-five-years-service list. Besides
these they now ordered out on active service the troops retained at
the beginning of the campaign in attendance on the magistrates at the
government offices. Agesilaus being still disabled by his infirmity,
the city imposed the duty of command upon his son Archidamus. The new
general found eager co-operators in the men of Tegea. The friends of
Stasippus at this date were still living, (19) and they were stanch
in their Lacedaemonian proclivities, and wielded considerable power in
their state. Not less stoutly did the Mantineans from their villages
under their aristocratic form of government flock to the Spartan
standard. Besides Tegea and Mantinea, the Corinthians and Sicyonians,
the Phliasians and Achaeans were equally enthusiastic to joining the
campaign, whilst other states sent out soldiers. Then came the fitting
out and manning of ships of war on the part of the Lacedaemonians
themselves and of the Corinthians, whilst the Sicyonians were requested
to furnish a supply of vessels on board of which it was proposed to
transport the army across the gulf. And so, finally, Archidamus was able
to offer the sacrifices usual at the moment of crossing the frontier.
But to return to Thebes.
(18) I.e. every one up to fifty-eight years of age.
(19) See below, VI. v. 9.
Immediately after the battle the Thebans sent a messenger to Athens
wearing a chaplet. Whilst insisting on the magnitude of the victory they
at the same time called upon the Athenians to send them aid, for now the
opportunity had come to wreak vengeance on the Lacedaemonians for all
the evil they had done to Athens. As it chanced, the senate of the
Athenians was holding a session on the Acropolis. As soon as the
news was reported, the annoyance caused by its announcement was
unmistakeable. They neither invited the herald to accept of hospitality
nor sent back one word in reply to the request for assistance. And so
the herald turned his back on Athens and departed.
But there was Jason still to look to, and he was their ally. To him then
the Thebans sent, and earnestly besought his aid, their thoughts running
on the possible turn which events might take. Jason on his side at
once proceeded to man a fleet, with the apparent intention of sending
assistance by sea, besides which he got together his foreign brigade
and his own cavalry; and although the Phocians and he were implacable
enemies, (20) he marched through their territory to Boeotia. Appearing
like a vision to many of the states before his approach was even
announced--at any rate before levies could be mustered from a dozen
different points--he had stolen a march upon them and was a long way
ahead, giving proof that expedition is sometimes a better tool to work
with than sheer force.
(20) Or, "though the Phocians maintained a war 'a outrance' with him."
When he arrived in Boeotia the Thebans urged upon him that now was the
right moment to attack the Lacedaemonians: he with his foreign brigade
from the upper ground, they face to face in front; but Jason dissuaded
them from their intention. He reminded them that after a noble
achievement won it was not worth their while to play for so high a
stake, involving a still greater achievement or else the loss of victory
already gained. "Do you not see," he urged, "that your success followed
close on the heels of necessity? You ought then to reflect that the
Lacedaemonians in their distress, with a choice between life and death,
will fight it out with reckless desperation. Providence, as it seems,
ofttimes delights to make the little ones great and the great ones
small." (21)
(21) Cf. "Anab." III. ii. 10.
By such arguments he diverted the Thebans from the desperate adventure.
But for the Lacedaemonians also he had words of advice, insisting on the
difference between an army defeated and an army flushed with victory.
"If you are minded," he said, "to forget this disaster, my advice to you
is to take time to recover breath and recruit your energies. When you
have grown stronger then give battle to these unconquered veterans. (22)
At present," he continued, "you know without my telling you that among
your own allies there are some who are already discussing terms of
friendship with your foes. My advice is this: by all means endeavour
to obtain a truce. This," he added, "is my own ambition: I want to save
you, on the ground of my father's friendship with yourselves, and
as being myself your representative." (23) Such was the tenor of his
speech, but the secret of action was perhaps to be found in a desire
to make these mutual antagonists put their dependence on himself
alone. Whatever his motive, the Lacedaemonians took his advice, and
commissioned him to procure a truce.
(22) Or, "the invincibles."
(23) Lit. "your proxenos."
As soon as the news arrived that the terms were arranged, the polemarchs
passed an order round: the troops were to take their evening meal, get
their kit together, and be ready to set off that night, so as to scale
the passes of Cithaeron by next morning. After supper, before the hour
of sleep, the order to march was given, and with the generals at their
head the troops advanced as the shades of evening fell, along the road
to Creusis, trusting rather to the chance of their escaping notice, than
to the truce itself. It was weary marching in the dead of night, making
their retreat in fear, and along a difficult road, until they fell in
with Archidamus's army of relief. At this point, then, Archidamus waited
till all the allies had arrived, and so led the whole of the united
armies back to Corinth, from which point he dismissed the allies and led
his fellow-citizens home.
Jason took his departure from Boeotia through Phocis, where he captured
the suburbs of Hyampolis (24) and ravaged the country districts, putting
many to the sword. Content with this, he traversed the rest of Phocis
without meddling or making. Arrived at Heraclea, (25) he knocked down
the fortress of the Heracleots, showing that he was not troubled by any
apprehension lest when the pass was thrown open somebody or other might
march against his own power at some future date. Rather was he haunted
by the notion that some one or other might one day seize Heraclea, which
commanded the pass, and bar his passage into Hellas--should Hellas ever
be his goal. (26) At the moment of his return to Thessaly he had reached
the zenith of his greatness. He was the lawfully constituted Prince (27)
of Thessaly, and he had under him a large mercenary force of infantry
and cavalry, and all in the highest perfection of training. For this
twofold reason he might claim the title great. But he was still greater
as the head of a vast alliance. Those who were prepared to fight his
battles were numerous, and he might still count upon the help of many
more eager to do so; but I call Jason greatest among his contemporaries,
because not one among them could afford to look down upon him. (28)
(24) An ancient town in Phocis (see Hom. "Il." ii. 521) on the road
leading from Orchomenus to Opus, and commanding a pass from Locris
into Phocis and Boeotia. See Herod. viii. 28; Paus. ix. 35, S. 5;
Strab. ix. 424; "Dict. of Geog." s.v.
(25) Or, "Heracleia Trachinia," a fortress city founded (as a colony)
by the Lacedaemonians in B.C. 426, to command the approach to
Thermopylae from Thessaly, and to protect the Trachinians and the
neighbouring Dorians from the Oetean mountaineers. See "Dict. of
Geog." "Trachis"; Thuc. iii. 92, 93, v. 51, 52; Diod. xii. 59.
(26) B.C. 370. The following sections 28-37 form an episode concerning
Thessalian affairs between B.C. 370 and B.C. 359.
(27) Lit. "Tagos."
(28) For a similar verbal climax see below, VI. v. 47.
B.C. 370. The Pythian games were now approaching, and an order went
round the cities from Jason to make preparation for the solemn sacrifice
of oxen, sheep and goats, and swine. It was reported that although the
requisitions upon the several cities were moderate, the number of beeves
did not fall short of a thousand, while the rest of the sacrificial
beasts exceeded ten times that number. He issued a proclamation also
to this effect: a golden wreath of victory should be given to whichever
city could produce the best-bred bull to head the procession in honour
of the god. And lastly there was an order issued to all the Thessalians
to be ready for a campaign at the date of the Pythian games. His
intention, as people said, was to act as manager of the solemn assembly
and games in person. What the thought was that passed through his mind
with reference to the sacred money, remains to this day uncertain;
only, a tale is rife to the effect that in answer to the inquiry of the
Delphians, "What ought we to do, if he takes any of the treasures of the
god?" the god made answer, "He would see to that himself." This great
man, his brain teeming with vast designs of this high sort, came now
to his end. He had ordered a military inspection. The cavalry of
the Pheraeans were to pass muster before him. He was already seated,
delivering answers to all petitioners, when seven striplings approached,
quarrelling, as it seemed, about some matter. Suddenly by these seven
the Prince was despatched; his throat gashed, his body gored with
wounds. Stoutly his guard rushed to the rescue with their long spears,
and one of the seven, while still in the act of aiming a blow at Jason,
was thrust through with a lance and died; a second, in the act of
mounting his horse, was caught, and dropped dead, the recipient of many
wounds. The rest leaped on the horses which they had ready waiting
and escaped. To whatever city of Hellas they came honours were almost
universally accorded them. The whole incident proves clearly that the
Hellenes stood in much alarm of Jason. They looked upon him as a tyrant
in embryo.
So Jason was dead; and his brothers Polydorus and Polyphron were
appointed princes (29) in his place. But of these twain, as they
journeyed together to Larissa, Polydorus was slain in the night, as
he slept, by his brother Polyphron, it was thought; since a death so
sudden, without obvious cause, could hardly be otherwise accounted for.
(29) Lit. "Tagoi."
Polyphron governed for a year, and by the year's end he had refashioned
his princedom into the likeness of a tyranny. In Pharsalus he put to
death Polydamas (30) and eight other of the best citizens; and from
Larissa he drove many into exile. But while he was thus employed, he,
in his turn, was done to death by Alexander, who slew him to avenge
Polydorus and to destroy the tyranny. This man now assumed the reins of
office, and had no sooner done so than he showed himself a harsh prince
to the Thessalians: harsh too and hostile to the Thebans and Athenians,
(31) and an unprincipled freebooter everywhere by land and by sea. But
if that was his character, he too was doomed to perish shortly. The
perpetrators of the deed were his wife's brothers. (32) The counsellor
of it and the inspiring soul was the wife herself. She it was who
reported to them that Alexander had designs against them; who hid them
within the house a whole day; who welcomed home her husband deep in his
cups and laid him to rest, and then while the lamp still burned brought
out the prince's sword. It was she also who, perceiving her brothers
shrank bank, fearing to go in and attack Alexander, said to them, "If
you do not be quick and do the deed, I will wake him up!" After they had
gone in, she, too, it was who caught and pulled to the door, clinging
fast to the knocker till the breath was out of her husband's body. (33)
Her fierce hatred against the man is variously explained. By some it
was said to date from the day when Alexander, having imprisoned his own
favourite--who was a fair young stripling--when his wife supplicated
him to release the boy, brought him forth and stabbed him in the throat.
Others say it originated through his sending to Thebes and seeking the
hand of the wife of Jason in marriage, because his own wife bore him no
children. These are the various causes assigned to explain the treason
of his wife against him. Of the brothers who executed it, the eldest,
Tisiphonus, in virtue of his seniority accepted, and up to the date of
this history (34) succeeded in holding, the government.
(30) See above, VI. i. 2 foll.
(31) See Dem. "c. Aristocr." 120; Diod. xv. 60 foll.
(32) B.C. 359 or 358.
(33) The woman's name was Thebe. See Diod. xvi. 14; Cicero, "de
Inven." II. xlix. 144; "de Div." I. xxv. 52; "de Off." II. vii.
25; Ovid, "Ibis," iii. 21 foll.
(34) Or, "portion of my work;" lit. "argument," {logos}. See
{Kuprianos, Peri ton 'Ell}: p. 111.
V
The above is a sketch of Thessalian affairs, including the incidents
connected with Jason, and those subsequent to his death, down to
the government of Tisiphonus. I now return to the point at which we
digressed.
B.C. 371. Archidamus, after the relief of the army defeated at Leuctra,
had led back the united forces. When he was gone, the Athenians,
impressed by the fact that the Peloponessians still felt under an
obligation to follow the Lacedaemonians to the field, whilst Sparta
herself was by no means as yet reduced to a condition resembling that
to which she had reduced Athens, sent invitations to those states which
cared to participate in the peace authorised by the great king. (1) A
congress met, and they passed a resolution in conjunction with those
who wished to make common cause with them to bind themselves by oath
as follows: "I will abide by the treaty terms as conveyed in the king's
rescript, as also by the decrees of the Athenians and the allies. If any
one marches against any city among those which have accepted this oath,
I will render assistance to that city with all my strength." The oath
gave general satisfaction, the Eleians alone gainsaying its terms and
protesting that it was not right to make either the Marganians or the
Scilluntians or the Triphylians independent, since these cities belonged
to them, and were a part of Elis. (2) The Athenians, however, and the
others passed the decree in the precise language of the king's rescript:
that all states--great and small alike--were to be independent; and
they sent out administrators of the oath, and enjoined upon them to
administer it to the highest authorities in each state. This oath they
all, with the exception of the Eleians, swore to.
(1) I.e. in B.C. 387, the peace "of" Antalcidas. See Grote, "H. G." x.
274.
(2) See Busolt, op. cit. p. 186.
B.C. 371-370. As an immediate consequence of this agreement, the
Mantineans, on the assumption that they were now absolutely independent,
met in a body and passed a decree to make Mantinea into a single state
and to fortify the town. (3) The proceeding was not overlooked by the
Lacedaemonians, who thought it would be hard if this were done without
their consent. Accordingly they despatched Agesilaus as ambassador to
the Mantineans, choosing him as the recognised ancestral friend of that
people. When the ambassador arrived, however, the chief magistrates had
no inclination to summon a meeting of the commons to listen to him, but
urged him to make a statement of his wishes to themselves. He, on his
side, was ready to undertake for himself and in their interests that,
if they would at present desist from their fortification work, he
would bring it about that the defensive walls should be built with the
sanction of Lacedaemon and without cost. Their answer was, that it was
impossible to hold back, since a decree had been passed by the whole
state of Mantinea to build at once. Whereupon Agesilaus went off in high
dudgeon; though as to sending troops to stop them, (4) the idea seemed
impracticable, as the peace was based upon the principle of autonomy.
Meanwhile the Mantineans received help from several of the Arcadian
states in the building of their walls; and the Eleians contributed
actually three talents (5) of silver to cover the expense of their
construction. And here leaving the Mantineans thus engaged, we will turn to the men of Tegea. |
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