(3) For the restoration of Mantinea, see Freeman, "Fed. Gov." iv. p.
198; Grote, "H. G." x. 283 foll.
(4) See above, V. ii. 1, sub anno B.C. 386.
(5) = 731 pounds: 5 shillings. See Busolt, op. cit. p. 199.
There were in Tegea two political parties. The one was the party of
Callibius and Proxenus, who were for drawing together the whole Arcadian
population in a confederacy, (6) in which all measures carried in
the common assembly should be held valid for the individual component
states. The programme of the other (Stasippus's) party was to leave
Tegea undisturbed and in the enjoyment of the old national laws.
Perpetually defeated in the Sacred College, (7) the party of Callibius
and Proxenus were persuaded that if only the commons met they would gain
an easy victory by an appeal to the multitude; and in this faith they
proceeded to march out the citizen soldiers. (8) At sight of this
Stasippus and his friends on their side armed in opposition, and proved
not inferior in numbers. The result was a collision and battle, in which
Proxenus and some few others with him were slain and the rest put to
flight; though the conquerors did not pursue, for Stasippus was a
man who did not care to stain his hands with the blood of his
fellow-citizens. (9)
(6) Although the historian does not recount the foundation of
Megalopolis (see Pausanias and Diodorus), the mention of the
common assembly of the League {en to koino} in this passage and,
still more, of the Ten Thousand (below, "Hell." VII. i. 38),
implies it. See Freeman, op. cit. iv. 197 foll.; Grote, "H. G." x.
306 foll., ii. 599; "Dict. of Geog." "Megalopolis." As to the date
of its foundation Pausanias (VIII. xxvii. 8) says "a few months
after the battle of Leuctra," before midsummer B.C. 370; Diodorus
(xv. 72) says B.C. 368. The great city was not built in a day.
Messene, according to Paus. IV. xxvii. 5, was founded between the
midsummers of B.C. 370 and B.C. 369.
(7) Lit. "in the Thearoi." For the Theari, see Thuc. v. 47, Arnold's
note; and "C. I. G." 1756 foll.; and for the revolution at Tegea
here recounted, see Grote, "H. G." x. 285 foll.
(8) Or, "they mustered under arms."
(9) Or, "opposed to a wholesale slaughter of the citizens."
Callibius and his friends had retired under the fortification walls and
gates facing Mantinea; but, as their opponents made no further attempts
against them, they here collected together and remained quiet. Some
while ago they had sent messages to the Mantineans demanding assistance,
but now they were ready to discuss terms of reconciliation with the
party of Stasippus. Presently they saw the Mantineans advancing;
whereupon some of them sprang to the walls, and began calling to them to
bring succour with all speed. With shouts they urged upon them to make
haste, whilst others threw open wide the gates to them. Stasippus
and his party, perceiving what was happening, poured out by the gates
leading to Pallantium, (10) and, outspeeding their pursuers, succeeded
in reaching the temple of Artemis, where they found shelter, and,
shutting to the doors, kept quiet. Following close upon their heels,
however, their foes scaled the temple, tore off the roof, and began
striking them down with the tiles. They, recognising that there was no
choice, called upon their assailants to desist, and undertook to come
forth. Then their opponents, capturing them like birds in a fowler's
hand, bound them with chains, threw them on to the prisoner's van, (11)
and led them off to Tegea. Here with the Mantineans they sentenced and
put them to death.
(10) Pallantium, one of the most ancient towns of Arcadia, in the
Maenalia (Paus. VIII. xliv. 5; Livy, i. 5), situated somewhat
south of the modern Tripolitza (see "Dict. of Anc. Geog."); like
Asea and Eutaea it helped to found Megalopolis (Paus. VIII. xxvii.
3, where for {'Iasaia} read {'Asea}); below, VII. v. 5; Busolt,
op. cit. p. 125.
(11) For the sequel of the matter, see above, "Hell." VI. iv. 18;
Busolt, op. cit. p. 134.
The outcome of these proceedings was the banishment to Lacedaemon of the
Tegeans who formed the party of Stasippus, numbering eight hundred; but
as a sequel to what had taken place, the Lacedaemonians determined that
they were bound by their oaths to aid the banished Tegeans and to avenge
the slain. With this purpose they marched against the Mantineans, on the
ground that they had violated their oaths in marching against Tegea with
an armed force. The ephors called out the ban and the state commanded
Agesilaus to head the expedition.
Meanwhile most of the Arcadian contingents were mustering at Asea. (12)
The Orchomenians not only refused to take part in the Arcadian league,
on account of their personal hatred to Mantinea, but had actually
welcomed within their city a mercenary force under Polytropus, which had
been collected at Corinth. The Mantineans themselves were forced to
stay at home to keep an eye on these. The men of Heraea and Lepreum made
common cause with the Lacedaemonians in a campaign against Mantinea.
(12) Asea is placed by Leake ("Travels in Morea," i. 84; iii. 34) near
Frangovrysi, a little south of Pallantium.
Heraea, the most important town of Arcadia in the Cynuria, near
Elis, on the high road to Olympia, and commanding other main
roads. See Leake, "Peloponnesiaca," p. 1 foll.; "Morea," ii. 91.
Lepreum, chief town of the Triphylia (Herod. iv. 148, ix. 28;
Thuc. v. 31; above, III. ii. 25; Paus. V. v. 3; Polyb. iv. 77
foll.; Strab. viii. 345), near modern Strovitzi; Leake, "Morea,"
i. 56; Dodwell, "Tour," ii. 347.
Eutaea is placed by Leake between Asea and Pallantium at Barbitza
("Morea," iii. 31); but see Grote, "H. G." x. 288.
Finding the frontier sacrifices favourable, Agesilaus began his march
at once upon Arcadia. He began by occupying the border city of Eutaea,
where he found the old men, women, and children dwelling in their
houses, while the rest of the population of a military age were off
to join the Arcadian league. In spite of this he did not stir a finger
unjustly against the city, but suffered the inhabitants to continue in
their homes undisturbed. The troops took all they needed, and paid for
it in return; if any pillage had occurred on his first entrance into
the town, the property was hunted up and restored by the Spartan king.
Whilst awaiting the arrival of Polytropus's mercenaries, he amused
himself by repairing such portions of their walls as necessity demanded.
Meanwhile the Mantineans had taken the field against Orchomenus;
but from the walls of that city the invaders had some difficulty in
retiring, and lost some of their men. On their retreat they found
themselves in Elymia; (13) here the heavy infantry of the Orchomenians
ceased to follow them; but Polytropus and his troops continued to assail
their rear with much audacity. At this conjuncture, seeing at a glance
that either they must beat back the foe or suffer their own men to be
shot down, the Mantineans turned right about and met the assailant in
a hand-to-hand encounter. Polytropus fell fighting on that battlefield;
and of the rest who took to flight, many would have shared his fate, but
for the opportune arrival of the Phliasian cavalry, who swooped round to
the conqueror's rear and checked him in his pursuit. (14)
(13) Elymia, mentioned only by Xenophon, must have been on the
confines of the Mantinice and Orchomenus, probably at Levidhi.--
Leake, "Morea," iii. 75; "Peloponn." p. 229.
(14) See "Cyrop." VII. i. 36.
Content with this achievement, the Mantineans retired homewards; while
Agesilaus, to whom the news was brought, no longer expecting that the
Orchomenian mercenaries could effect a junction with himself, determined
to advance without further delay. (15) On the first day he encamped for
the evening meal in the open country of Tegea, and the day following
crossed into Mantinean territory. Here he encamped under the
westward-facing (16) mountains of Mantinea, and employed himself in
ravaging the country district and sacking the farmsteads; while the
troops of the Arcadians who were mustered in Asea stole by night into
Tegea. The next day Agesilaus shifted his position, encamping about
two miles' (17) distance from Mantinea; and the Arcadians, issuing from
Tegea and clinging to the mountains between Mantinea and that city,
appeared with large bodies of heavy infantry, wishing to effect a
junction with the Mantineans. The Argives, it is true, supported them,
but they were not in full force. And here counsellors were to be found
who urged on Agesilaus to attack these troops separately; but fearing
lest, in proportion as he pressed on to engage them, the Mantineans
might issue from the city behind and attack him on flank and rear, he
decided it was best to let the two bodies coalesce, and then, if they
would accept battle, to engage them on an open and fair field.
(15) See "Ages." ii. 23.
(16) See Leake, "Morea," iii. 73.
(17) Lit. "twenty stades."
And so ere long the Arcadians had effected their object and were united
with the Mantineans. The next incident was the sudden apparition at
break of day, as Agesilaus was sacrificing in front of the camp, of a
body of troops. These proved to be the light infantry from Orchomenus,
who in company with the Phliasian cavalry had during the night made
their way across past the town of Mantinea; and so caused the mass of
the army to rush to their ranks, and Agesilaus himself to retire within
the lines. Presently, however, the newcomers were recognised as friends;
and as the sacrifices were favourable, Agesilaus led his army forward
a stage farther after breakfast. As the shades of evening descended he
encamped unobserved within the fold of the hills behind the Mantinean
territory, with mountains in close proximity all round. (18)
(18) Lit. "within the hindmost bosom of the Mantinice." In reference
to the position, Leake ("Morea," iii. 75) says: "The northern bay
(of the Mantinic plain between Mantinea and the Argon) corresponds
better by its proximity to Mantinea; by Mount Alesium it was
equally hidden from the city, while its small dimensions, and the
nearness of the incumbent mountains, rendered it a more hazardous
position to an army under the circumstances of that of Agesilaus"
(than had he encamped in the Argon itself). For the Argon (or
Inert Plain), see Leake, ib. 54 foll.
On the next morning, as day broke, he sacrificed in front of the army;
and observing a mustering of men from the city of Mantinea on the hills
which overhung the rear of his army, he decided that he must lead his
troops out of the hollow by the quickest route. But he feared lest, if
he himself led off, the enemy might fall upon his rear. In this dilemma
he kept quiet; presenting a hostile front to the enemy, he sent orders
to his rear to face about to the right, (19) and so getting into line
behind his main body, to move forward upon him; and in this way he
at once extricated his troops from their cramped position and kept
continually adding to the weight and solidity of his line. As soon as
the phalanx was doubled in depth he emerged upon the level ground, with
his heavy infantry battalions in this order, and then again extended his
line until his troops were once more nine or ten shields deep. But the
Mantineans were no longer so ready to come out. The arguments of the
Eleians who had lent them their co-operation had prevailed: that it was
better not to engage until the arrival of the Thebans. The Thebans,
it was certain, would soon be with them; for had they not borrowed ten
talents (20) from Elis in order to be able to send aid? The Arcadians
with this information before them kept quiet inside Mantinea. On
his side Agesilaus was anxious to lead off his troops, seeing it was
midwinter; but, to avoid seeming to hurry his departure out of fear,
he preferred to remain three days longer and no great distance from
Mantinea. On the fourth day, after an early morning meal, the retreat
commenced. His intention was to encamp on the same ground which he had
made his starting-point on leaving Eutaea. But as none of the Arcadians
appeared, he marched with all speed and reached Eutaea itself, although
very late, that day; being anxious to lead off his troops without
catching a glimpse of the enemy's watch-fires, so as to silence the
tongues of any one pretending that he withdrew in flight. His main
object was in fact achieved. To some extent he had recovered the state
from its late despondency, since he had invaded Arcadia and ravaged the
country without any one caring to offer him battle. But, once arrived
on Laconian soil, he dismissed the Spartan troops to their homes and
disbanded the provincials (21) to their several cities.
(19) See "Anab." IV. iii. 29; "Pol. Lac." xi. 10.
(20) 2,437 pounds: 10 shillings. See Busult, op. cit. p. 199.
(21) Lit. "perioeci"; and below, SS. 25, 32.
B.C. 370-369. The Arcadians, now that Agesilaus had retired, realising
that he had disbanded his troops, while they themselves were fully
mustered, marched upon Heraea, the citizens of which town had not only
refused to join the Arcadian league, but had joined the Lacedaemonians
in their invasion of Arcadia. For this reason they entered the country,
burning the homesteads and cutting down the fruit-trees.
Meanwhile news came of the arrival of the Theban reinforcements at
Mantinea, on the strength of which they left Heraea and hastened to
fraternise (22) with their Theban friends. When they were met together,
the Thebans, on their side, were well content with the posture of
affairs: they had duly brought their succour, and no enemy was any
longer to be discovered in the country; so they made preparations to
return home. But the Arcadians, Argives and Eleians were eager in
urging them to lead the united forces forthwith into Laconia: they dwelt
proudly on their own numbers, extolling above measure the armament of
Thebes. And, indeed, the Boeotians one and all were resolute in their
military manouvres and devotion to arms, (23) exulting in the victory of
Leuctra. In the wake of Thebes followed the Phocians, who were now their
subjects, Euboeans from all the townships of the island, both sections
of the Locrians, the Acarnanians, (24) and the men of Heraclea and of
Melis; while their force was further swelled by Thessalian cavalry and
light infantry. With the full consciousness of facts like these, and
further justifying their appeal by dwelling on the desolate condition of
Lacedaemon, deserted by her troops, they entreated them not to turn back
without invading the territory of Laconia. But the Thebans, albeit they
listened to their prayers, urged arguments on the other side. In the
first place, Laconia was by all accounts most difficult to invade;
and their belief was that garrisons were posted at all the points most
easily approached. (As a matter of fact, Ischolaus was posted at Oeum
in the Sciritid, with a garrison of neodamodes and about four hundred
of the youngest of the Tegean exiles; and there was a second outpost on
Leuctrum above the Maleatid. (25)) Again it occurred to the Thebans
that the Lacedaemonian forces, though disbanded, would not take long to
muster, and once collected they would fight nowhere better than on their
own native soil. Putting all these considerations together, they
were not by any means impatient to march upon Lacedaemon. A strong
counter-impulse, however, was presently given by the arrival of
messengers from Caryae, giving positive information as to the
defenceless condition of the country, and offering to act as guides
themselves; they were ready to lose their lives if they were convicted
of perfidy. A further impulse in the same direction was given by the
presence of some of the provincials, (26) with invitations and promises
of revolt, if only they would appear in the country. These people
further stated that even at the present moment, on a summons of the
Spartans proper, the provincials did not care to render them assistance.
With all these arguments and persuasions echoing from all sides, the
Thebans at last yielded, and invaded. They chose the Caryan route
themselves, while the Arcadians entered by Oeum in the Sciritid. (27)
(22) Or, "effect a junction with."
(23) Or, "in practising gymnastics about the place of arms." See "Pol.
Lac." xii. 5.
(24) See "Hell." IV. vii. 1; "Ages." ii. 20. For a sketch of the
relations of Acarnania to Athens and Sparta, see Hicks, No. 83, p.
150; and above, "Hell." V. iv. 64.
(25) Leuctrum, a fortress of the district Aegytis on the confines of
Arcadia and Laconia ("in the direction of Mount Lycaeum," Thuc. v.
54). See Leake, "Morea," ii. 322; also "Peloponn." p. 248, in
which place he corrects his former view as to the situation of
Leuctrum and the Maleatid.
Oeum or Ium, the chief town of the Sciritis, probably stood in the
Klisura or series of narrow passes through the watershed of the
mountains forming the natural boundary between Laconia and Arcadia
(in the direct line north from Sparta to Tegea), "Dict. of Anc.
Geog." s.v. Leake says ("Morea," iii. 19, 30 foll.) near the
modern village of Kolina; Baedeker ("Greece," p. 269) says perhaps
at Palaeogoulas.
Caryae. This frontier town was apparently (near Arachova) on the
road from Thyrea (in the direction of the Argolid) to Sparta
(Thuc. v. 55; Paus. III. x. 7; Livy, xxxiv. 26, but see Leake,
"Morea," iii. 30; "Peloponn." p. 342).
Sellasia, probably rightly placed "half an hour above Vourlia"
(Baedeker, "Greece," p. 269). The famous battle of Sellasia, in
the spring of B.C. 221, in which the united Macedonians under
Antigonus and the Achaeans finally broke the power of Sparta, was
fought in the little valley where the stream Gorgylus joins the
river Oenus and the Khan of Krevatas now stands. For a plan, see
"Dict. of Anc. Geog." s.v.
(26) "Perioeci."
(27) Diodorus (xv. 64) gives more details; he makes the invaders
converge upon Sellasia by four separate routes. See Leake,
"Morea," iii. 29 foll.
By all accounts Ischolaus made a mistake in not advancing to meet them
on the difficult ground above Oeum. Had he done so, not a man, it is
believed, would have scaled the passes there. But for the present,
wishing to turn the help of the men of Oeum to good account, he waited
down in the village; and so the invading Arcadians scaled the heights
in a body. At this crisis Ischolaus and his men, as long as they fought
face to face with their foes, held the superiority; but, presently, when
the enemy, from rear and flank, and even from the dwelling-houses up
which they scaled, rained blows and missiles upon them, then and there
Ischolaus met his end, and every man besides, save only one or two who,
failing to be recognised, effected their escape.
After these achievements the Arcadians marched to join the Thebans
at Caryae, and the Thebans, hearing what wonders the Arcadians had
performed, commenced their descent with far greater confidence. Their
first exploit was to burn and ravage the district of Sellasia, but
finding themselves ere long in the flat land within the sacred enclosure
of Apollo, they encamped for the night, and the next day continued
their march along the Eurotas. When they came to the bridge they made
no attempt to cross it to attack the city, for they caught sight of
the heavy infantry in the temple of Alea (28) ready to meet them. So,
keeping the Eurotas on their right, they tramped along, burning and
pillaging homesteads stocked with numerous stores. The feelings of the
citizens may well be imagined. The women who had never set eyes upon a
foe (29) could scarcely contain themselves as they beheld the cloud of
smoke. The Spartan warriors, inhabiting a city without fortifications,
posted at intervals, here one and there another, were in truth what they
appeared to be--the veriest handful. And these kept watch and ward. The
authorities passed a resolution to announce to the helots that whosoever
among them chose to take arms and join a regiment should have his
freedom guaranteed to him by solemn pledges in return for assistance in
the common war. (30) More than six thousand helots, it is said, enrolled
themselves, so that a new terror was excited by the very incorporation
of these men, whose numbers seemed to be excessive. But when it was
found that the mercenaries from Orchomenus remained faithful, and
reinforcements came to Lacedaemon from Phlius, Corinth, Epidaurus,
and Pellene, and some other states, the dread of these new levies was
speedily diminished.
(28) See Pausanias, III. xix. 7.
(29) See Plutarch, "Ages." xxxi. 3 (Clough, vol. iv. p. 38); Aristot.
"Pol." ii. 9-10.
(30) See below, VII. ii. 2.
The enemy in his advance came to Amyclae. (31) Here he crossed the
Eurotas. The Thebans wherever they encamped at once formed a stockade
of the fruit-trees they had felled, as thickly piled as possible, and
so kept ever on their guard. The Arcadians did nothing of the sort.
They left their camping-ground and took themselves off to attack the
homesteads and loot. On the third or fourth day after their arrival the
cavalry advanced, squadron by squadron, as far as the racecourse, (32)
within the sacred enclosure of Gaiaochos. These consisted of the
entire Theban cavalry and the Eleians, with as many of the Phocian
or Thessalian or Locrian cavalry as were present. The cavalry of the
Lacedaemonians, looking a mere handful, were drawn up to meet them. They
had posted an ambuscade chosen from their heavy infantry, the younger
men, about three hundred in number, in the house of the Tyndarids (33);
and while the cavalry charged, out rushed the three hundred at the
same instant at full pace. The enemy did not wait to receive the double
charge, but swerved, and at sight of that many also of the infantry took
to headlong flight. But the pursuers presently paused; the Theban army
remained motionless; and both parties returned to their camps. And
now the hope, the confidence strengthened that an attack upon the city
itself would never come; nor did it. The invading army broke up from
their ground, and marched off on the road to Helos and Gytheum. (34)
The unwalled cities were consigned to the flames, but Gytheum, where
the Lacedaemonians had their naval arsenal, was subjected to assault for
three days. Certain of the provincials (35) also joined in this attack,
and shared the campaign with the Thebans and their friends.
(31) For this ancient (Achaean) town, see Paus. III. ii. 6; Polyb. v.
19. It lay only twenty stades (a little more than two miles) from
the city of Sparta.
(32) Or, "hippodrome." See Paus. III. ii. 6.
(33) Paus. III. xvi. 2.
(34) See Baedeker's "Greece," p. 279. Was Gytheum taken? See Grote,
"H. G." x. 305; Curt. "H. G." Eng. trans. iv. 431.
(35) "Perioeci." See above, III. iii. 6; VI. v. 25; below, VII. ii. 2;
Grote, "H. G." x. 301. It is a pity that the historian should
hurry us off to Athens just at this point. The style here is
suggestive of notes ({upomnemata}) unexpanded.
The news of these proceedings set the Athenians deeply pondering
what they ought to do concerning the Lacedaemonians, and they held an
assembly in accordance with a resolution of the senate. It chanced that
the ambassadors of the Lacedaemonians and the allies still faithful
to Lacedaemon were present. The Lacedaemonian ambassadors were Aracus,
Ocyllus, Pharax, Etymocles, and Olontheus, and from the nature of the
case they all used, roughly speaking, similar arguments. They reminded
the Athenians how they had often in old days stood happily together,
shoulder to shoulder, in more than one great crisis. They (the
Lacedaemonians), on their side, had helped to expel the tyrant
from Athens, and the Athenians, when Lacedaemon was besieged by the
Messenians, had heartily leant her a helping hand. (36) Then they fell to
enumerating all the blessings that marked the season when the two states
shared a common policy, hinting how in common they had warred against
the barbarians, and more boldly recalling how the Athenians with the
full consent and advice of the Lacedaemonians were chosen by united
Hellas leaders of the common navy (37) and guardians of all the common
treasure, while they themselves were selected by all the Hellenes as
confessedly the rightful leaders on land; and this also not without the
full consent and concurrence of the Athenians.
(36) In reference (1) to the expulsion of the Peisistratidae (Herod.
v. 64); (2) the "third" Messenian war (Thuc. i. 102).
(37) See "Revenues," v. 6.
One of the speakers ventured on a remark somewhat to this strain: "If
you and we, sirs, can only agree, there is hope to-day that the old
saying may be fulfilled, and Thebes be 'taken and tithed.'" (38) The
Athenians, however, were not in the humour to listen to that style of
argument. A sort of suppressed murmur ran through the assembly which
seemed to say, "That language may be well enough now; but when they
were well off they pressed hard enough on us." But of all the pleas put
forward by the Lacedaemonians, the weightiest appeared to be this: that
when they had reduced the Athenians by war, and the Thebans wished
to wipe Athens off the face of the earth, they (the Lacedaemonians)
themselves had opposed the measure. (39) If that was the argument of
most weight, the reasoning which was the most commonly urged was to the
effect that "the solemn oaths necessitated the aid demanded. Sparta had
done no wrong to justify this invasion on the part of the Arcadians and
their allies. All she had done was to assist the men of Tegea when
(40) the Mantineans had marched against that township contrary to
their solemn oaths." Again, for the second time, at these expressions
a confused din ran through the assembly, half the audience maintaining
that the Mantineans were justified in supporting Proxenus and his
friends, who were put to death by the party with Stasippus; the other
half that they were wrong in bringing an armed force against the men of
Tegea.
(38) Or, "the Thebans be decimated"; for the phrase see above, "Hell."
VI. iii. 20.
(39) See "Hell." II. ii. 19; and "Hell." III. v. 8.
(40) Lit. "because," {oti}.
Whilst these distinctions were being drawn by the assembly itself,
Cleiteles the Corinthian got up and spoke as follows: "I daresay, men
of Athens, there is a double answer to the question, Who began the
wrongdoing? But take the case of ourselves. Since peace began, no one
can accuse us either of wantonly attacking any city, or of seizing the
wealth of any, or of ravaging a foreign territory. In spite of which the
Thebans have come into our country and cut down our fruit-trees, burnt
to the ground our houses, filched and torn to pieces our cattle and our
goods. How then, I put it to you, will you not be acting contrary to
your solemn oaths if you refuse your aid to us, who are so manifestly
the victims of wrongdoings? Yes; and when I say solemn oaths, I speak
of oaths and undertakings which you yourselves took great pains to exact
from all of us." At that point a murmur of applause greeted Cleiteles,
the Athenians feeling the truth and justice of the speaker's language.
He sat down, and then Procles of Phlius got up and spoke as follows:
"What would happen, men of Athens, if the Lacedaemonians were well out
of the way? The answer to that question is obvious. You would be the
first object of Theban invasion. Clearly; for they must feel that you
and you alone stand in the path between them and empire over Hellas. If
this be so, I do not consider that you are more supporting Lacedaemon
by a campaign in her behalf than you are helping yourselves. For imagine
the Thebans, your own sworn foes and next-door neighbours, masters of
Hellas! You will find it a painful and onerous exchange indeed for the
distant antagonism of Sparta. As a mere matter of self-interest, now
is the time to help yourselves, while you may still reckon upon allies,
instead of waiting until they are lost, and you are forced to fight
a life-and-death battle with the Thebans single-handed. But the fear
suggests itself, that should the Lacedaemonians escape now, they will
live to cause you trouble at some future date. Lay this maxim to heart,
then, that it is not the potential greatness of those we benefit, but of
those we injure, which causes apprehension. And this other also, that
it behoves individuals and states alike so to better their position (41)
while yet in the zenith of their strength that, in the day of weakness,
when it comes, they may find some succour and support in what their
former labours have achieved. (42) To you now, at this time, a
heaven-sent opportunity is presented. In return for assistance to the
Lacedaemonians in their need, you may win their sincere, unhesitating
friendship for all time. Yes, I say it deliberately, for the acceptance
of these benefits at your hands will not be in the presence of one or
two chance witnesses. The all-seeing gods, in whose sight to-morrow is
even as to-day, will be cognisant of these things. The knowledge of them
will be jointly attested by allies and enemies; nay, by Hellenes and
barbarians alike, since to not one of them is what we are doing a
matter of unconcern. If, then, in the presence of these witnesses, the
Lacedaemonians should prove base towards you, no one will ever again
be eager in their cause. But our hope, our expectation should rather be
that they will prove themselves good men and not base; since they beyond
all others would seem persistently to have cherished a high endeavour,
reaching forth after true praise, and holding aloof from ugly deeds.
(41) Lit. "to acquire some good."
(42) Or, "for what," etc.
"But there are further considerations which it were well you should lay
to heart. If danger were ever again to visit Hellas from the barbarian
world outside, in whom would you place your confidence if not in the
Lacedaemonians? Whom would you choose to stand at your right hand in
battle if not these, whose soldiers at Thermopylae to a man preferred to
fall at their posts rather than save their lives by giving the barbarian
free passage into Hellas? Is it not right, then, considering for
what thing's sake they displayed that bravery in your companionship,
considering also the good hope there is that they will prove the like
again--is it not just that you and we should lend them all countenance
and goodwill? Nay, even for us their allies' sake, who are present, it
would be worth your while to manifest this goodwill. Need you be assured
that precisely those who continue faithful to them in their misfortunes
would in like manner be ashamed not to requite you with gratitude?
And if we seem to be but small states, who are willing to share their
dangers with them, lay to heart that there is a speedy cure for this
defect: with the accession of your city the reproach that, in spite of
all our assistance, we are but small cities, will cease to be.
"For my part, men of Athens, I have hitherto on hearsay admired and
envied this great state, whither, I was told, every one who was wronged
or stood in terror of aught needed only to betake himself and he would
obtain assistance. To-day I no longer hear, I am present myself and
see these famous citizens of Lacedaemon here, and by their side their
trustiest friends, who have come to you, and ask you in their day of
need to give them help. I see Thebans also, the same who in days bygone
failed to persuade the Lacedaemonians to reduce you to absolute slavery,
(43) to-day asking you to suffer those who saved you to be destroyed.
(43) See "Hell." II. ii. 19; III. v. 8, in reference to B.C. 405.
"That was a great deed and of fair renown, attributed in old story to
your ancestors, that they did not suffer those Argives who died on the
Cadmeia (44) to lie unburied; but a fairer wreath of glory would
you weave for your own brows if you suffer not these still living
Lacedaemonians to be trampled under the heel of insolence and destroyed.
Fair, also, was that achievement when you stayed the insolence of
Eurystheus and saved the sons of Heracles; (45) but fairer still than
that will your deed be if you rescue from destruction, not the primal
authors (46) merely, but the whole city which they founded; fairest of
all, if because yesterday the Lacedaemonians won you your preservation
by a vote which cost them nothing, you to-day shall bring them help with
arms, and at the price of peril. It is a proud day for some of us to
stand here and give what aid we can in pleading for assistance to brave
men. What, then, must you feel, who in very deed are able to render
that assistance! How generous on your parts, who have been so often the
friends and foes of Lacedaemon, to forget the injury and remember only
the good they have done! How noble of you to repay, not for yourselves
only, but for the sake of Hellas, the debt due to those who proved
themselves good men and true in her behalf!"
(44) In reference to the Seven against Thebes, see Herod. IX. xxvii.
4; Isoc. "Paneg." 55.
(45) Herod. IX. xxvii. 3; see Isoc. "Paneg." 56. "The greatness of
Sparta was founded by the succour which Athens lent to the
Heraklid invaders of the Peloponnese--a recollection which ought
to restrain Sparta from injuring or claiming to rule Athens.
Argos, Thebes, Sparta were in early times, as they are now, the
foremost cities of Hellas; but Athens was the greatest of them all
--the avenger of Argos, the chastiser of Thebes, the patron of
those who founded Sparta."--Jebb, "Att. Or." ii. 154.
(46) Plut. "Lyc." vi.
After these speeches the Athenians deliberated, and though there was
opposition, the arguments of gainsayers (47) fell upon deaf ears. The
assembly finally passed a decree to send assistance to Lacedaemon in
force, and they chose Iphicrates general. Then followed the preliminary
sacrifices, and then the general's order to his troops to take the
evening meal in the grove of the Academy. (48) But the general himself,
it is said, was in no hurry to leave the city; many were found at their
posts before him. Presently, however, he put himself at the head of his
troops, and the men followed cheerily, in firm persuasion that he was
about to lead them to some noble exploit. On arrival at Corinth
he frittered away some days, and there was a momentary outburst of
discontent at so much waste of precious time; but as soon as he led the
troops out of Corinth there was an obvious rebound. The men responded to
all orders with enthusiasm, heartily following their general's lead, and
attacking whatever fortified place he might confront them with.
(47) As to the anti-Laconian or Boeotian party at Athens, see Curtius,
"H. G." vol. v. ch. ii. (Eng. tr.)
(48) See Baedeker, "Greece," p. 103.
And now reverting to the hostile forces on Laconian territory, we find
that the Arcadians, Argives, and Eleians had retired in large numbers.
They had every inducement so to do since their homes bordered on
Laconia; and off they went, driving or carrying whatever they had
looted. The Thebans and the rest were no less anxious to get out of the
country, though for other reasons, partly because the army was melting
away under their eyes day by day, partly because the necessities of life
were growing daily scantier, so much had been either fairly eaten up
and pillaged or else recklessly squandered and reduced to ashes. Besides
this, it was winter; so that on every ground there was a general desire
by this time to get away home.
As son as the enemy began his retreat from Laconian soil, Iphicrates
imitated his movement, and began leading back his troops out of Arcadia
into Corinthia. Iphicrates exhibited much good generalship, no doubt,
with which I have no sort of fault to find. But it is not so with that
final feature of the campaign to which we are now come. Here I find his
strategy either meaningless in intent or inadequate in execution.
He made an attempt to keep guard at Oneion, in order to prevent the
Boeotians making their way out homewards; but left meanwhile far the
best passage through Cenchreae unguarded. Again, when he wished to
discover whether or not the Thebans had passed Oneion, he sent out on
a reconnaissance the whole of the Athenian and Corinthian cavalry;
whereas, for the object in view, the eyes of a small detachment would
have been as useful as a whole regiment; (49) and when it came to
falling back, clearly the smaller number had a better chance of hitting
on a traversable road, and so effecting the desired movement quietly.
But the height of folly seems to have been reached when he threw into
the path of the enemy a large body of troops which were still too weak
to cope with him. As a matter of fact, this body of cavalry, owing to
their very numbers, could not help covering a large space of ground;
and when it became necessary to retire, had to cling to a series of
difficult positions in succession, so that they lost not fewer than
twenty horsemen. (50) It was thus the Thebans effected their object and
retired from Peloponnese.
(49) See "Hipparch." viii. 10 foll.
(50) See Diod. xv. 63; Plut. "Pelop." 24.
BOOK VII
I
B.C. 369. In the following year (1) plenipotentiary ambassadors (2) from
the Lacedaemonians and their allies arrived at Athens to consider and
take counsel in what way the alliance between Athens and Lacedaemon
might be best cemented. It was urged by many speakers, foreigners and
Athenians also, that the alliance ought to be based on the principle of
absolute equality, (3) "share and share alike," when Procles of Phlius
put forward the following argument:
(1) I.e. the official year from spring to spring. See Peter, "Chron.
Table" 95, note 215; see Grote, "H. G." x. 346, note 1.
(2) See Hicks, 89.
(3) For the phrase {epi toi isois kai omoiois}, implying "share and
share alike," see Thuc. i. 145, etc.
"Since you have already decided, men of Athens, that it is good to
secure the friendship of Lacedaemon, the point, as it appears to me,
which you ought now to consider is, by what means this friendship may be
made to last as long as possible. The probability is, that we shall hold
together best by making a treaty which shall suit the best interests of
both parties. On most points we have, I believe, a tolerable unanimity,
but there remains the question of leadership. The preliminary decree of
your senate anticipates a division of the hegemony, crediting you with
the chief maritime power, Lacedaemon with the chief power on land; and
to me, personally, I confess, that seems a division not more established
by human invention than preordained by some divine naturalness or happy
fortune. For, in the first place, you have a geographical position
pre-eminently adapted for naval supremacy; most of the states to whom
the sea is important are massed round your own, and all of these are
inferior to you in strength. Besides, you have harbours and roadsteads,
without which it is not possible to turn a naval power to account.
Again, you have many ships of war. To extend your naval empire is a
traditional policy; all the arts and sciences connected with these
matters you possess as home products, and, what is more, in skill and
experience of nautical affairs you are far ahead of the rest of the
world. The majority of you derive your livelihood from the sea, or
things connected with it; so that in the very act of minding your own
affairs you are training yourselves to enter the lists of naval combat.
(4) Again, no other power in the world can send out a larger collective
fleet, and that is no insignificant point in reference to the
question of leadership. The nucleus of strength first gained becomes
a rallying-point, round which the rest of the world will gladly
congregate. Furthermore, your good fortune in this department must
be looked upon as a definite gift of God: for, consider among the
numberless great sea-fights which you have fought how few you have
lost, how many you have won. It is only rational, then, that your allies
should much prefer to share this particular risk with you. Indeed,
to show you how natural and vital to you is this maritime study, the
following reflection may serve. For several years the Lacedaemonians,
when at war with you in old days, dominated your territory, but they
made no progress towards destroying you. At last God granted them one
day to push forward their dominion on the sea, and then in an instant
you completely succumbed to them. (5) Is it not self-evident that
your safety altogether depends upon the sea? The sea is your natural
element--your birthright; it would be base indeed to entrust the
hegemony of it to the Lacedaemonians, and the more so, since, as they
themselves admit, they are far less acquainted with this business than
yourselves; and, secondly, your risk in naval battles would not be for
equal stakes--theirs involving only the loss of the men on board their
ships, but yours, that of your children and your wives and the entire
state.
(4) See "Pol. Ath." i. 19 foll.
(5) See "Hell." II. i.
"And if this is a fair statement of your position, turn, now, and
consider that of the Lacedaemonians. The first point to notice is, that
they are an inland power; as long as they are dominant on land it does
not matter how much they are cut off from the sea--they can carry
on existence happily enough. This they so fully recognise, that from
boyhood they devote themselves to training for a soldier's life. The
keystone of this training is obedience to command, (6) and in this they
hold the same pre-eminence on land which you hold on the sea. Just as
you with your fleets, so they on land can, at a moment's notice, put
the largest army in the field; and with the like consequence, that their
allies, as is only rational, attach themselves to them with undying
courage. (7) Further, God has granted them to enjoy on land a like good
fortune to that vouchsafed to you on sea. Among all the many contests
they have entered into, it is surprising in how few they have failed, in
how many they have been successful. The same unflagging attention which
you pay to maritime affairs is required from them on land, and, as the
facts of history reveal, it is no less indispensable to them. Thus,
although you were at war with them for several years and gained many a
naval victory over them, you never advanced a step nearer to reducing
them. But once worsted on land, in an instant they were confronted with
a danger affecting the very lives of child and wife, and vital to the
interests of the entire state. We may very well understand, then, the
strangeness, not to say monstrosity, in their eyes, of surrendering to
others the military leadership on land, in matters which they have made
their special study for so long and with such eminent success. I end
where I began. I agree absolutely with the preliminary decrees of your
own senate, which I consider the solution most advantageous to both
parties. My prayer (8) is that you may be guided in your deliberations
to that conclusion which is best for each and all of us."
(6) Or, "the spirit of discipline." See "Mem." III. v. 16; IV. iv. 15;
Thuc. ii. 39; "Pol. Lac." viii.
(7) Or, "with unlimited confidence."
(8) See above, "Hell." VI. i. 13, {kai su prattois ta kratista}, "and
so may the best fortune attend you!"--if that reading and
rendering be adopted.
Such were the words of the orator, and the sentiments of his speech were
vehemently applauded by the Athenians no less than by the Lacedaemonians
who were present. Then Cephisodotus (9) stepped forward and addressed
the assembly. He said, "Men of Athens, do you not see how you are being
deluded? Lend me your ears, and I will prove it to you in a moment.
There is no doubt about your leadership by sea: it is already secured.
But suppose the Lacedaemonians in alliance with you: it is plain they
will send you admirals and captains, and possibly marines, of Laconian
breed; but who will the sailors be? Helots obviously, or mercenaries
of some sort. These are the folk over whom you will exercise your
leadership. Reverse the case. The Lacedaemonians have issued a general
order summoning you to join them in the field; it is plain again, you
will be sending your heavy infantry and your cavalry. You see what
follows. You have invented a pretty machine, by which they become leaders
of your very selves, and you become the leaders either of their slaves
or of the dregs of their state. I should like to put a question to the
Lacedaemonian Timocrates seated yonder. Did you not say just now, Sir,
that you came to make an alliance on terms of absolute equality, 'share
and share alike'? Answer me." "I did say so." "Well, then, here is a
plan by which you get the perfection of equality. I cannot conceive of
anything more fair and impartial than that 'turn and turn about' each
of us should command the navy, each the army; whereby whatever advantage
there may be in maritime or military command we may each of us share."
(9) See above, "Hell." VI. iii. 2; Hicks, 87.
These arguments were successful. The Athenians were converted, and
passed a decree vesting the command in either state (10) for periods of
five days alternately.
(10) See "Revenues," v. 7.
B.C. 369. (11) The campaign was commenced by both Athenians and
Lacedaemonians with their allies, marching upon Corinth, where it was
resolved to keep watch and ward over Oneion jointly. On the advance of
the Thebans and their allies the troops were drawn out to defend the
pass. They were posted in detachments at different points, the most
assailable of which was assigned to the Lacedaemonians and the men of Pellene. (12) |
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