V
And now I propose to show in what way he made those who were with him
more vigorous in action. (1) In the first place, as befitted one whose
creed was that a basis of self-command is indispensable to any noble
performance, he manifested himself to his companions as one who
had pre-eminently disciplined himself; (2) and in the next place by
conversation and discussion he encouraged them to a like self-restraint
beyond all others. (3) Thus it was that he continued ever mindful
himself, and was continually reminding all whom he encountered,
of matters conducive to virtue; as the following discussion with
Euthydemus, which has come to my knowledge, (4) will serve to
illustrate--the topic of the discussion being self-command.
(1) Lit. "more practical," i.e. more energetic and effective.
(2) "If any one might claim to be a prince of ascetics, it was
Socrates; such was the ineffaceable impression left on the minds
of his associates."
(3) Or, "he stimulated in these same companions a spirit of self-
restraint beyond all else."
(4) Or, "which I can vouch for."
Tell me, Euthydemus (he began), do you believe freedom to be a noble and
magnificent acquisition, whether for a man or for a state?
I cannot conceive a nobler or more magnificent (he answered).
Soc. Then do you believe him to be a free man who is ruled by the
pleasures of the body, and thereby cannot perform what is best?
Certainly not (he answered).
Soc. No! for possibly to perform what is best appears to you to savour
of freedom? And, again, to have some one over you who will prevent you
doing the like seems a loss of freedom?
Most decidedly (he answered).
Soc. It would seem you are decidedly of opinion that the incontinent are
the reverse of free? (5)
(5) Or, "incontinency is illiberal."
Euth. Upon my word, I much suspect so.
Soc. And does it appear to you that the incontinent man is merely
hindered from doing what is noblest, or that further he is impelled to
do what is most shameful?
Euth. I think he is as much driven to the one as he is hindered from the
other.
Soc. And what sort of lords and masters are those, think you, who at
once put a stop to what is best and enforce what is worst?
Euth. Goodness knows, they must be the very worst of masters.
Soc. And what sort of slavery do you take to be the worst?
I should say (he answered) slavery to the worst masters.
It would seem then (pursued Socrates) that the incontinent man is bound
over to the worst sort of slavery, would it not?
So it appears to be (the other answered).
Soc. And does it not appear to you that this same beldame incontinence
shuts out wisdom, which is the best of all things, (6) from mankind,
and plunges them into the opposite? Does it not appear to you that she
hinders men from attending to things which will be of use and benefit,
and from learning to understand them; that she does so by dragging them
away to things which are pleasant; and often though they are well aware
of the good and of the evil, she amazes and confounds (7) their wits and
makes them choose the worse in place of the better?
(6) "Wisdom, the greatest good which men can possess."
(7) Schneid. cf. Plat. "Protag." 355 A; and "Symp." iv. 23.
Yes, so it comes to pass (he answered).
Soc. And (8) soundness of soul, the spirit of temperate modesty? Who has
less claim to this than the incontinent man? The works of the temperate
spirit and the works of incontinency are, I take it, diametrically
opposed?
(8) "And if this be so concerning wisdom, {sophia}, what of
{sophrasune}, soundness of soul--sobriety?"
That too, I admit (he answered).
Soc. If this then be so concerning these virtues, (9) what with regard
to carefulness and devotion to all that ought to occupy us? Can anything
more seriously militate against these than this same incontinence?
(9) Or add, "If this be so concerning not wisdom only, but concerning
temperance and soundness of soul, what," etc.
Nothing that I can think of (he replied).
Soc. And can worse befall a man, think you? Can he be subjected to a
more baleful influence than that which induces him to choose what is
hurtful in place of what is helpful; which cajoles him to devote himself
to the evil and to neglect the good; which forces him, will he nill he,
to do what every man in his sober senses would shrink from and avoid?
I can imagine nothing worse (he replied).
Soc. Self-control, it is reasonable to suppose, will be the cause of
opposite effects upon mankind to those of its own opposite, the want of
self-control?
Euth. It is to be supposed so.
Soc. And this, which is the source of opposite effects to the very
worst, will be the very best of things?
Euth. That is the natural inference.
Soc. It looks, does it not, Euthydemus, as if self-control were the best
thing a man could have?
It does indeed, Socrates (he answered).
Soc. But now, Euthydemus, has it ever occurred to you to note one fact?
What fact? (he asked).
Soc. That, after all, incontinency is powerless to bring us to that
realm of sweetness which some look upon (10) as her peculiar province;
it is not incontinency but self-control alone which has the passport to
highest pleasures.
(10) Or, "which we are apt to think of as."
In what way? (he asked). How so?
Why, this way (Socrates answered): since incontinency will not suffer us
to resist hunger and thirst, or to hold out against sexual appetite, or
want of sleep (which abstinences are the only channels to true pleasure
in eating and drinking, to the joys of love, to sweet repose and
blissful slumber won by those who will patiently abide and endure till
each particular happiness is at the flood) (11)--it comes to this: by
incontinency we are cut off from the full fruition of the more obvious
and constantly recurring pleasures. (12) To self-control, which alone
enables us to endure the pains aforesaid, alone belongs the power to
give us any pleasure worth remembering in these common cases.
(11) Or, "at its season." Lit. "is as sweet as possible."
(12) Or, "from tasting to any extent worth speaking of the most
necessary and all-pervading sources of happiness."
You speak the words of truth (13) (he answered).
(13) Lit. "What you say is absolutely and entirely true" (the "vraie
verite" of the matter).
Soc. Furthermore, (14) if there be any joy in learning aught "beautiful
and good," or in patient application to such rules as may enable a man
to manage his body aright, or to administer his household well, or to
prove himself useful to his friends and to the state, or to dominate
his enemies--which things are the sources not only of advantage but of
deepest satisfaction (15)--to the continent and self-controlled it
is given to reap the fruits of them in their performance. It is the
incontinent who have neither part nor lot in any one of them. Since we
must be right in asserting that he is least concerned with such things
who has least ability to do them, being tied down to take an interest in
the pleasure which is nearest to hand.
(14) Or, "But indeed, if there be joy in the pursuit of any noble
study or of such accomplishments as shall enable," etc.
(15) Or, "of the highest pleasures."
Euthydemus replied: Socrates, you would say, it seems to me, that a man
who is mastered by the pleasures of the body has no concern at all with
virtue.
And what is the distinction, Euthydemus (he asked), between a man devoid
of self-control and the dullest of brute beasts? A man who foregoes all
height of aim, who gives up searching for the best and strives only to
gratify his sense of pleasure, (16) is he better than the silliest of
cattle? (17)... But to the self-controlled alone is it given to discover
the hid treasures. These, by word and by deed, they will pick out and
make selection of them according to their kinds, choosing deliberately
the good and holding aloof from the evil. (18) Thus (he added) it is
that a man reaches the zenith, as it were, of goodness and happiness,
thus it is that he becomes most capable of reasoning and discussion.
(19) The very name discussion ({dialegesthai}) is got from people coming
together and deliberating in common by picking out and selecting things
({dialegein}) according to their kinds. (20) A man then is bound to
prepare himself as much as possible for this business, and to pursue it
beyond all else with earnest resolution; for this is the right road to
excellence, this will make a man fittest to lead his fellows and be a
master in debate. (21)
(16) Or, "and seeks by hook and by crook to do what is pleasantest."
(17) i.e. he becomes an animal "feeding a blind life within the
brain."
(18) Or, "selecting the ore and repudiating the dross." Kuhner cf.
Plat. "Laws," v. 735 B.
(19) Or, "draws nearer to happiness and perfection, and is most
capable of truth-disclosing conversation." Cf. Plat. "Apol." 41:
"What would not a man give, O judges, to be able to examine the
leaders of the great Trojan expedition, or Odysseus, or Sisyphus,
or numberless others, men and women too! What infinite delight
would there be in conversing with them and asking them questions!"
(Jowett).
(20) For {dialegein kata gene} = {dialegesthai}, cf. Grote, "H. G."
viii. 590.
(21) Cf. Plat. "Rep." 534 D; "Phaedr." 252 E; "Crat." 390 C;
"Statesm." 286 D foll.
VI
At this point I will endeavour to explain in what way Socrates fostered
this greater "dialectic" capacity among his intimates. (1) He held
firmly to the opinion that if a man knew what each reality was, he would
be able to explain this knowledge to others; but, failing the possession
of that knowledge, it did not surprise him that men should stumble
themselves and cause others to stumble also. (2) It was for this reason
that he never ceased inquiring with those who were with him into
the true nature of things that are. (3) It would be a long business
certainly to go through in detail all the definitions at which he
arrived; I will therefore content myself with such examples as will
serve to show his method of procedure. As a first instance I will
take the question of piety. The mode of investigation may be fairly
represented as follows.
(1) Lit. "essayed to make those who were with him more potent in
dialectic."
(2) Or, "Socrates believed that any one who knew the nature of
anything would be able to let others into his secret; but, failing
that knowledge, he thought the best of men would be but blind
leaders of the blind, stumbling themselves and causing others to
stumble also."
(3) Or add, "'What is this among things? and what is its definition?'
--such was the ever-recurrent question for which he sought an
answer."
Tell me (said he), Euthydemus, what sort of thing you take piety to be?
Something most fair and excellent, no doubt (the other answered). (4)
(4) Or, "A supreme excellence, no doubt."
Soc. And can you tell me what sort of person the pious man is? (5)
(5) Or, "can you give me a definition of the pious man?"; "tell me who
and what the pious man is."
I should say (he answered) he is a man who honours the gods.
Soc. And is it allowable to honour the gods in any mode or fashion one
likes?
Euth. No; there are laws in accordance with which one must do that.
Soc. Then he who knows these laws will know how he must honour the gods?
I think so (he answered).
Soc. And he who knows how he must honour the gods conceives that
he ought not to do so except in the manner which accords with his
knowledge? (6) Is it not so?
(6) i.e. "his practice must square with his knowledge and be the
outward expression of his belief?"
Euth. That is so. (7)
(7) "That is so; you rightly describe his frame of mind and
persuasion."
Soc. And does any man honour the gods otherwise than he thinks he ought?
(8)
(8) "As he should and must." See K. Joel, op. cit. p. 322 foll.
I think not (he answered).
Soc. It comes to this then: he who knows what the law requires in
reference to the gods will honour the gods in the lawful way? (9)
(9) Or, "he who knows what is lawful with regard to Heaven pays honour
to Heaven lawfully."
Euth. Certainly.
Soc. But now, he who honours lawfully honours as he ought? (10)
(10) "As he should and must."
Euth. I see no alternative.
Soc. And he who honours as he ought is a pious man?
Euth. Certainly.
Soc. It would appear that he who knows what the law requires with
respect to the gods will correctly be defined as a pious man, and that
is our definition?
So it appears to me, at any rate (he replied). (11)
(11) "I accept it at any rate as mine." N.B.--in reference to this
definition of Piety, the question is never raised {poion ti esti
nomos}; nor yet {poioi tines eisin oi theoi}; but clearly there is
a growth in {ta nomima}. Cf. the conversation recorded in St. John
iv. 7 foll., and the words (verse 23) {pneuma o Theos kai tous
proskunountas auton en pneumati kai aletheia dei proskunein},
which the philosopher Socrates would perhaps readily have assented
to.
Soc. But now, with regard to human beings; is it allowable to deal with
men in any way one pleases? (12)
(12) Or, "may a man deal with his fellow-men arbitrarily according to
his fancy?" See above, II. vii. 8.
Euth. No; with regard to men also, he will be a law-observing man (13)
who knows what things are lawful as concerning men, in accordance with
which our dealings with one another must be conducted. (14)
(13) Or, "he is a man full of the law (lawful) and law-abiding who
knows," etc.
(14) Reading {kath' a dei pros allelous khresthai}, subaud.
{allelois}, or if vulg. {kath' a dei pos allelois khresthai},
translate "must be specifically conducted."
Soc. Then those who deal with one another in this way, deal with each
other as they ought? (15)
(15) "As they should and must."
Obviously (he answered).
Soc. And they who deal with one another as they ought, deal well and
nobly--is it not so?
Certainly (he answered).
Soc. And they who deal well and nobly by mankind are well-doers in
respect of human affairs?
That would seem to follow (he replied).
Soc. I presume that those who obey the laws do what is just and right?
Without a doubt, (he answered).
Soc. And by things right and just you know what sort of things are
meant?
What the laws ordain (he answered).
Soc. It would seem to follow that they who do what the laws ordain both
do what is right and just and what they ought? (16)
(16) "What they should and must."
Euth. I see no alternative.
Soc. But then, he who does what is just and right is upright and just?
(17)
(17) This proposition, as Kuhner argues (ad loc.), is important as
being the middle term of the double syllogism (A and B)--
A. Those who do what the law demands concerning men do what is
just and right.
Those who do what is just and right are righteous and just.
Ergo--Those who do what the law demands concerning men are
righteous and just.
B. Those who know what is just and right ought (and are bound,
cf. above, III. ix. 4) to do also what is just and right.
Those who do what is just and right are righteous and just.
Ergo--Righteous and Just ({dikaioi}) may be defined as "Those
who know what the law demands (aliter things right and just)
concerning men."
I should say so myself (he answered).
Soc. And should you say that any one obeys the laws without knowing what
the laws ordain?
I should not (he answered).
Soc. And do you suppose that any one who knows what things he ought to
do supposes that he ought not to do them? (18)
(18) Or, "and no one who knows what he must and should do imagines
that he must and should not do it?"
No, I suppose not (he answered).
Soc. And do you know of anybody doing other than what he feels bound to
do? (19)
(19) Or, "and nobody that you know of does the contrary of what he
thinks he should do?"
No, I do not (he answered).
Soc. It would seem that he who knows what things are lawful (20) as
concerning men does the things that are just and right?
(20) Or, "of lawful obligation."
Without a doubt (he answered).
Soc. But then, he who does what is just and right is upright and just?
(21)
(21) N.B.--In reference to this definition of justice, see K. Joel,
op. cit. p. 323 foll., "Das ist eine Karrikatur des Sokratischen
Dialogs."
Who else, if not? (he replied).
Soc. It would seem, then, we shall have got to a right definition if we
name as just and upright those who know the things which are lawful as
concerning men?
That is my opinion (he answered).
Soc. And what shall we say that wisdom is? Tell me, does it seem to you
that the wise are wise in what they know, (22) or are there any who are
wise in what they know not?
(22) Or, "in that of which they have the knowledge ({episteme})."
Euth. Clearly they are wise in what they know; (23) for how could a man
have wisdom in that which he does not know?
(23) Or, "their wisdom is confined to that of which they have the
{episteme}. How could a man be wise in what he lacks the knowledge
of?"
Soc. In fact, then, the wise are wise in knowledge?
Euth. Why, in what else should a man be wise save only in knowledge?
Soc. And is wisdom anything else than that by which a man is wise, think
you?
Euth. No; that, and that only, I think.
Soc. It would seem to follow that knowledge and wisdom are the same?
Euth. So it appears to me.
Soc. May I ask, does it seem to you possible for a man to know all the
things that are?
Euth. No, indeed! not the hundredth part of them, I should say.
Soc. Then it would seem that it is impossible for a man to be all-wise?
Quite impossible (he answered).
Soc. It would seem the wisdom of each is limited to his knowledge; each
is wise only in what he knows?
Euth. That is my opinion. (24)
(24) Cf. Plat. "Theaet." 145 D. N.B.--For this definition of wisdom
see K. Joel, ib. p. 324 foll.
Soc. Well! come now, Euthydemus, as concerning the good: ought we to
search for the good in this way?
What way? (he asked).
Soc. Does it seem to you that the same thing is equally advantageous to
all?
No, I should say not (he answered).
Soc. You would say that a thing which is beneficial to one is sometimes
hurtful to another?
Decidedly (he replied).
Soc. And is there anything else good except that which is beneficial,
should you say? (25)
(25) Or reading (1) {allo d' an ti phaies e agathon einai to
ophelimon}; or else (2) {allo d' an ti phaies agathon einai to
ophelimon}; (in which case {alloti} = {allo ti e};) translate (1)
"and what is beneficial is good (or a good), should you not say?"
lit. "could you say that the beneficial is anything else than good
(or a good)?" or else (2) "and what is beneficial is good (or a
good)? or is it anything else?"
Nothing else (he answered).
Soc. It would seem to follow that the beneficial is good relatively to
him to whom it is beneficial?
That is how it appears to me (he answered).
Soc. And the beautiful: can we speak of a thing as beautiful in any
other way than relatively? or can you name any beautiful thing, body,
vessel, or whatever it be, which you know of as universally beautiful?
(26)
(26) i.e. "beautiful in all relations into which it enters." Reading
{to de kalon ekhoimen an pos allos eipein e estin onomazein kalon
e soma e skeuos e all' otioun, o oistha pros tanta kalon on; Ma
Di', ouk egog', ephe}. For other emendations of the vulg., and the
many interpretations which have been given to the passage, see R.
Kuhner ad loc.
Euth. I confess I do not know of any such myself. (27)
(27) Or, adopting the reading {ekhois an} in place of {ekhoimen an}
above, translate "I certainly cannot, I confess."
Soc. I presume to turn a thing to its proper use is to apply it
beautifully?
Euth. Undoubtedly it is a beautiful appliance. (28)
(28) Or, "I presume it is well and good and beautiful to use this,
that, and the other thing for the purpose for which the particular
thing is useful?"--"That nobody can deny (he answered)." It is
impossible to convey simply the verbal play and the quasi-
argumentative force of the Greek {kalos ekhei pros ti tini
khresthai}. See K. Joel, p. 426.
Soc. And is this, that, and the other thing beautiful for aught else
except that to which it may be beautifully applied?
Euth. No single thing else.
Soc. It would seem that the useful is beautiful relatively to that for
which it is of use?
So it appears to me (he answered).
Soc. And what of courage, (29) Euthydemus? I presume you rank courage
among things beautiful? It is a noble quality? (30)
(29) Or, perhaps better, "fortitude." See H. Sidgwick, "Hist. of
Ethics," p. 43.
(30) It is one of {ta kala}. See K. Joel, ib. p. 325, and in reference
to the definitions of the Good and of the Beautiful, ib. p. 425
foll.
Nay, one of the most noble (he answered).
Soc. It seems that you regard courage as useful to no mean end?
Euth. Nay, rather the greatest of all ends, God knows.
Soc. Possibly in face of terrors and dangers you would consider it an
advantage to be ignorant of them?
Certainly not (he answered).
Soc. It seems that those who have no fear in face of dangers, simply
because they do not know what they are, are not courageous?
Most true (he answered); or, by the same showing, a large proportion of
madmen and cowards would be courageous.
Soc. Well, and what of those who are in dread of things which are not
dreadful, are they--
Euth. Courageous, Socrates?--still less so than the former, goodness
knows.
Soc. Possibly, then, you would deem those who are good in the face of
terrors and dangers to be courageous, and those who are bad in the face
of the same to be cowards?
Certainly I should (he answered).
Soc. And can you suppose any other people to be good in respect of such
things except those who are able to cope with them and turn them to
noble account? (31)
(31) {kalos khresthai}, lit. "make a beautiful use of them."
No; these and these alone (he answered).
Soc. And those people who are of a kind to cope but badly with the same
occurrences, it would seem, are bad?
Who else, if not they? (he asked).
Soc. May it be that both one and the other class do use these
circumstances as they think they must and should? (32)
(32) Or, "feel bound and constrained to do."
Why, how else should they deal with them? (he asked).
Soc. Can it be said that those who are unable to cope well with them or
to turn them to noble account know how they must and should deal with
them? (33)
(33) Or, "Can it be said that those who are unable to cope nobly with
their perilous surroundings know how they ought to deal with
them?"
I presume not (he answered).
Soc. It would seem to follow that those who have the knowledge how to
behave are also those who have the power? (34)
(34) "He who kens can."
Yes; these, and these alone (he said).
Soc. Well, but now, what of those who have made no egregious blunder (in
the matter); can it be they cope ill with the things and circumstances
we are discussing?
I think not (he answered).
Soc. It would seem, conversely, that they who cope ill have made some
egregious blunder?
Euth. Probably; indeed, it would appear to follow.
Soc. It would seem, then, that those who know (35) how to cope with
terrors and dangers well and nobly are courageous, and those who fail
utterly of this are cowards?
(35) "Who have the {episteme}."
So I judge them to be (he answered). (36)
(36) N.B.--For this definition of courage see Plat. "Laches," 195 A
and passim; K. Joel, op. cit. p. 325 foll.
A kingdom and a tyranny (37) were, he opined, both of them forms of
government, but forms which differed from one another, in his belief; a
kingdom was a government over willing men in accordance with civil law,
whereas a tyranny implied the government over unwilling subjects not
according to law, but so as to suit the whims and wishes of the ruler.
(37) Or, "despotism."
There were, moreover, three forms of citizenship or polity; in the
case where the magistrates were appointed from those who discharged the
obligations prescribed by law, he held the polity to be an aristocracy
(or rule of the best); (38) where the title to office depended on
rateable property, it was a plutocracy (or rule of wealth); and lastly,
where all the citizens without distinction held the reins of office,
that was a democracy (or rule of the people).
(38) Or, "in which the due discharge of lawful (law-appointed)
obligations gave the title to magisterial office and government,
this form of polity he held to be an aristocracy (or rule of the
best)." See Newman, op. cit. i. 212, 235.
Let me explain his method of reply where the disputant had no clear
statement to make, but without attempt at proof chose to contend
that such or such a person named by himself was wiser, or more of a
statesman, or more courageous, and so forth, than some other person.
(39) Socrates had a way of bringing the whole discussion back to the
underlying proposition, (40) as thus:
(39) Or, "if any one encountered him in argument about any topic or
person without any clear statement, but a mere ipse dixit, devoid
of demonstration, that so and so," etc.
(40) Or, "question at bottom." Cf. Plat. "Laws," 949 B.
Soc. You state that so and so, whom you admire, is a better citizen that
this other whom I admire?
The Disputant. Yes; I repeat the assertion.
Soc. But would it not have been better to inquire first what is the work
or function of a good citizen?
The Disputant. Let us do so.
Soc. To begin, then, with the matter of expenditure: his superiority
will be shown by his increasing the resources and lightening the
expenditure of the state? (41)
(41) Or, "In the management of moneys, then, his strength will consist
in his rendering the state better provided with ways and means?"
Certainly (the disputant would answer).
Soc. And in the event of war, by rendering his state superior to her
antagonists?
The Disputant. Clearly.
Soc. Or on an embassy as a diplomatist, I presume, by securing friends
in place of enemies?
That I should imagine (replies the disputant).
Soc. Well, and in parliamentary debate, by putting a stop to party
strife and fostering civic concord?
The Disputant. That is my opinion.
By this method of bringing back the argument to its true starting-point,
even the disputant himself would be affected and the truth become
manifest to his mind.
His own--that is, the Socratic--method of conducting a rational
discussion (42) was to proceed step by step from one point of general
agreement to another: "Herein lay the real security of reasoning," (43)
he would say; and for this reason he was more successful in winning the
common assent of his hearers than any one I ever knew. He had a saying
that Homer had conferred on Odyesseus the title of a safe, unerring
orator, (44) because he had the gift to lead the discussion from one
commonly accepted opinion to another.
(42) Of, "of threading the mazes of an argument."
(43) Reading {tauton asphaleian}; aliter. {tauten ten asphaleian} =
"that this security was part and parcel of reasoning."
(44) "Od." viii. 171, {o d' asphaleos agoreuei}, "and his speech runs
surely on its way" (Butcher and Lang), where Odysseus is
describing himself. Cf. Dion. Hal. "de Arte Rhet." xi. 8.
VII
The frankness and simplicity with which Socrates endeavoured to declare
his own opinions, in dealing with those who conversed with him, (1) is,
I think, conclusively proved by the above instances; at the same time,
as I hope now to show, he was no less eager to cultivate a spirit of
independence in others, which would enable them to stand alone in all
transactions suited to their powers.
(1) Or, "who frequented his society, is, I hope, clear from what has
been said."
Of all the men I have ever known, he was most anxious to ascertain in
what any of those about him was really versed; and within the range of
his own knowledge he showed the greatest zeal in teaching everything
which it befits the true gentleman (2) to know; or where he was
deficient in knowledge himself, (3) he would introduce his friends to
those who knew. (4) He did not fail to teach them also up to what point
it was proper for an educated man to acquire empiric knowledge of any
particular matter. (5)
(2) Lit. "a beautiful and good man."
(3) Or, "where he lacked acquaintance with the matter himself." See,
for an instance, "Econ." iii. 14.
(4) "To those who had the special knowledge"; "a connoisseur in the
matter."
(5) Or, "of any particular branch of learning"; "in each department of
things."
To take geometry as an instance: Every one (he would say) ought to be
taught geometry so far, at any rate, as to be able, if necessary, to
take over or part with a piece of land, or to divide it up or assign a
portion of it for cultivation, (6) and in every case by geometric rule.
(7) That amount of geometry was so simple indeed, and easy to learn,
that it only needed ordinary application of the mind to the method of
mensuration, and the student could at once ascertain the size of the
piece of land, and, with the satisfaction of knowing its measurement,
depart in peace. But he was unable to approve of the pursuit of geometry
up to the point at which it became a study of unintelligible diagrams.
(8) What the use of these might be, he failed, he said, to see; and
yet he was not unversed in these recondite matters himself. (9) These
things, he would say, were enough to wear out a man's life, and to
hinder him from many other more useful studies. (10)
(6) {e ergon apodeixasthai}, or "and to explain the process." Cf.
Plat. "Rep." vii. 528 D. See R. Kuhner ad loc. for other
interpretations of the phrase. Cf. Max. Tyr. xxxvii. 7.
(7) Or, "by correct measurement"; lit. "by measurement of the earth."
(8) Cf. Aristot. "Pol." v. (viii.) 2; Cic. "Acad. Post." I. iv. 15.
For the attitude compare the attitude of a philosopher in other
respects most unlike Socrates--August Comte, e.g. as to the
futility of sidereal astronomy, "Pos. Pol." i. 412 (Bridges).
(9) Cf. Isocr. "On the Antidosis," 258-269, as to the true place of
"Eristic" in education. See above, IV. ii. 10.
(10) Cf. A. Comte as to "perte intellectuelle" in the pursuit of
barren studies.
Again, a certain practical knowledge of astronomy, a certain skill in
the study of the stars, he strongly insisted on. Every one should know
enough of the science to be able to discover the hour of the night or
the season of the month or year, for the purposes of travel by land or
sea--the march, the voyage, and the regulations of the watch; (11) and
in general, with regard to all matters connected with the night season,
or with the month, or the year, (12) it was well to have such reliable
data to go upon as would serve to distinguish the various times and
seasons. But these, again, were pieces of knowledge easily learnt from
night sportsmen, (13) pilots of vessels, and many others who make it
their business to know such things. As to pushing the study of astronomy
so far as to include a knowledge of the movements of bodies outside
our own orbit, whether planets or stars of eccentric movement, (14) or
wearing oneself out endeavouring to discover their distances from
the earth, their periods, and their causes, (15) all this he strongly
discountenanced; for he saw (he said) no advantage in these any more
than in the former studies. And yet he was not unversed (16) in the
subtleties of astronomy any more than in those of geometry; only these, again, he insisted, were sufficient to wear out a man's lifetime, and to keep him away from many more useful pursuits. |
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