Great Heart The Life Story of Theodore Roosevelt 11

Great Heart The Life Story of Theodore Roosevelt 11

As a remedy for these evils Roosevelt advocated higher wages for girls,

early marriages and a co-operation of nation, state and municipality to

crush commercialized vice.

 

The verdict of history was that Roosevelt was in advance of his time in

his battle for righteousness within the police ranks of New York. He

did a great work, but the job he had undertaken would have worn out a

hundred Roosevelts.

 

He resigned from the department on April 17, 1897, to accept an

appointment from the McKinley administration as Assistant Secretary of

the Navy.

 

 

 

 

VII

 

Roosevelt’s Influence on American Naval Affairs

 

 

In 1897 the menace of war hung heavy above America. Spain’s barbarous

rule in Cuba had stirred the American conscience. It became plain that

it was the duty of America to become the protector of the sunny island

that cried out to it for deliverance from the oppression of the Old

World power.

 

Cuba, under Spain’s management, was a pest hole of yellow fever.

Her government was vile and corrupt. The Spanish rulers crushed

remonstrances with blood and iron.

 

A new American navy was then being built. Before it began, Roosevelt

himself said, America was not in a position to fight Spain or anyone

else. Timidly and haltingly, contrasting strongly with America’s

present-day naval programme, the work had been begun by the country.

The need was felt for a man of energetic character, modern methods and

foresight to put the fleet in condition for war. Roosevelt’s work as

Police Commissioner had made him famous throughout the country, and the

nation met with hearty approval President McKinley’s appointment of

him as Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

 

It was Senator H. C. Lodge, of Massachusetts, a long and close friend

of Roosevelt, who worked hardest for his appointment. Fifteen years

before, Roosevelt had written “The History of the Naval War of 1812,”

and since that time had taken a deep interest in the navy.

 

He was a strong opponent of that class of impractical men typified by a

Senator who, in answer to a question as to what we would do if we were

suddenly attacked by a foreign power, replied:

 

“We would build a battleship in every creek.”

 

Roosevelt, in his autobiography, thus describes how gingerly the

American people went about the work of building the ships that later

won the battle of Santiago Bay:

 

“We built some modern cruisers to start with, the people who felt

that battleships were wicked compromising with their misguided

consciences by saying that the cruisers could be used ‘to protect our

commerce’--which they could not be, unless they had battleships to back

them.

 

“Then we attempted to build more powerful fighting vessels, and as

there was a section of the public which regarded battleships as

possessing a name immorally suggestive of violence, we compromised by

calling the new ships armored cruisers, and making them combine with

exquisite nicety all the defects and none of the virtues of both types.

Then we got to the point of building battleships.

 

“But there still remained a public opinion as old as the time of

Jefferson which thought that in the event of war all our problem ought

to be one of coast defence; that we should do nothing except repel

attack; an attitude about as sensible as that of a prizefighter who

expected to win by merely parrying instead of hitting.

 

“To meet the susceptibilities of this large class of well-meaning

people we provided for the battleships under the name of ‘coast

defence battleships,’ meaning thereby that we did not make them quite

as seaworthy as they ought to have been, or with quite as much coal

capacity as they ought to have had. Then we decided to build real

battleships.

 

“But there still remained a lingering remnant of public opinion that

clung to the coast defence theory, and we met this in beautiful fashion

by providing for ‘seagoing coast defence battleships,’ the fact that

the name was a contradiction in terms being of very small consequence

as compared to the fact that we did thereby get real battleships.

 

“Our men had to be trained to handle the ships singly and in fleet

formation, and they had to be trained to use the new weapons of

precision with which the ships were armed.

 

“Not a few of the older officers, kept in the service under our foolish

rule of pure seniority promotion, were not competent for the task; but

a proportion of the older officers were excellent, and this was true of

almost all the younger officers.

 

“They were naturally first-class men, trained in the admirable naval

school at Annapolis. They were overjoyed that at last they were given

proper instruments to work with, and they speedily grew to handle their

ships individually in the best fashion. They were fast learning to

handle them in squadron and fleet formation; but when war with Spain

broke out they had as yet hardly grasped the principles of modern

scientific naval gunnery.”

 

While bearing the title of Assistant to Secretary of the Navy John

D. Long, Roosevelt’s work was soon felt in every department of the

navy. He found out that many evils had grown up that would seriously

handicap the department if suddenly brought face to face with the

problem of preparing for war. He therefore began a thorough overhauling

of the various bureaus, cutting red tape in every direction. The list

of merchant vessels that could be drafted for an auxiliary navy was

incomplete and full of errors. This he revised.

 

Meanwhile the good offices extended by the United States to bring about

peace between Spain and the Cubans who had rebelled against her tyranny

were refused by Spain. She even refused to consider selling Cuba to the

United States. The natives cried to the United States for help.

 

The commercial interests of our country in Cuba also required

protection. Public opinion began to demand armed intervention.

 

President McKinley, a man wholly inclined to peace, hesitated.

Roosevelt, however, had become convinced that the interests of humanity

required a declaration of war against Spain. He felt that Spain should

be made to withdraw from American soil. He cited the Monroe Doctrine as

one of his chief reasons.

 

Francis E. Leupp, in his book “The Man Roosevelt,” thus describes

Roosevelt’s attitude at this time:

 

“One Sunday morning in March, 1898, we were sitting in his library

discussing the significance of the news that Cervera’s squadron was

about to sail for Cuba, when he suddenly rose and brought his hands

together with a resounding clap.

 

“‘If I could do what I pleased,’ he exclaimed, ‘I would send Spain

notice today that we should consider her dispatch of that squadron a

hostile act. Then, if she didn’t heed the warning, she would have to

take the consequences.’

 

“‘You are sure,’ I asked, ‘that it is with unfriendly intent that she

is sending the squadron?’

 

“‘What else can it be? The Cubans have no navy; therefore the squadron

cannot be coming to fight the insurgents. The only naval power

interested in Cuban affairs is the United States. Spain is simply

forestalling the “brush” which she knows, as we do, is coming sooner or

later.’

 

“‘And if she refused to withdraw the orders to Cervera’--

 

“‘I should send out a squadron to meet his on the high seas and smash

it! Then I would force the fighting from that day to the end of the

war.’”

 

The President’s Cabinet was divided in its opinion. The President

himself, surrounded by men of different views, remained in a quandary.

 

One day the President learned that Roosevelt had stated what course he

would pursue. McKinley sent for Roosevelt and heard his plans.

 

Later in the day, at a Cabinet meeting, McKinley remarked:

 

“Gentlemen, not one of you have put half so much enthusiasm into your

__EXPRESSION__s as Mr. Roosevelt, our Assistant Secretary of the Navy. He

has mapped out a programme for the impending war!”

 

“Let’s ask him to explain it!” one of the secretaries said, rather

jocosely.

 

McKinley sent for Roosevelt and asked him some leading questions.

Roosevelt urged that Spain be warned that she must take the

consequences if the fleet came to our waters. McKinley remarked that,

as the country was still at peace with Spain, to interfere with her

fleet would be an act of war. Roosevelt replied that Spain should be

made to understand that the sending of her fleet to America would be

considered by us an act of war. Roosevelt then launched upon his war

plan. With characteristic gestures and __EXPRESSION__s he set forth what

he would do to Spain if she did not consent to the just demands of the

United States.

 

The members of the Cabinet complimented him, patted him on the back,

and, as he bowed himself out, wondered whether this was just a radical

young enthusiast or indeed a born leader. Some of them afterward

told of the scene in the Cabinet chamber, and the tale was gossiped

throughout official circles as a good joke on Roosevelt.

 

Meanwhile, with the care of the fleet resting largely on his shoulders,

Roosevelt toiled to secure from Congress appropriations that would put

it in first-class fighting condition.

 

Interesting, in view of our modern naval appropriations, is

the following incident in Roosevelt’s battles to secure naval appropriations: