The life of Midhat Pasha 12

The life of Midhat Pasha 12

An incident soon occurred which brought matters to a crisis. The

Khedive of Egypt, desirous of changing the order of succession in

his family and of obtaining various privileges and prerogatives

from his suzerain, was in the habit of making periodical visits

to Constantinople, carrying away with him each time, by judicious

payments, some shred of the sovereign rights of the Porte. These visits

became a regular source of income and emolument to the Palace and all

its myrmidons. Arriving at Constantinople on the occasion of one of

these visits he found Midhat Pasha installed as Grand Vizier, and to

his surprise and disappointment, and to the discomfiture of the Palace

clique, he was obliged this time to return to Alexandria with his

presents, _re infectâ_.

 

It soon became apparent that one of two things must happen: the Sultan

would either have to change the whole _régime_ and scale of expenditure

of the Palace, or change his Grand Vizier; and as he never really

contemplated the former course, he adopted the latter. The determining

cause was Midhat’s action with reference to certain scandals—incidents

connected with Baron Hirsch’s railway schemes.

 

It is only in a despotic country, where State contracts are signed in

the dark, and _cahiers de charge_ are examined by carefully chosen

experts and passed by complaisant accountants, that such a scandal as

the Hirsch railways is possible or conceivable. If the cynicism of the

whole transaction had not become notorious, and thus excited as much

laughter as its nefariousness caused indignation, it would be worth

while to set out in detail all the circumstances of this stupendous

business.

 

To obtain a contract giving unlimited control over the richest forests

in the world, on the pretext of cutting sleepers, is in itself a

pretty smart stroke of business. To stipulate for payment of railways

according to the mileage executed, irrespective of topographical

considerations or local requirements, is a triumph of contracting

skill; but to claim payment for work done in the plains only, on

the basis of an average calculated for working through plains and

mountain‐chains alike, is the very glory of financial genius. The

secret, too, of the art was as simple as the result was lucrative.

Backsheesh in adequate amounts, distributed at appropriate moments in

the right quarters, was the alpha and omega of the business.

 

Midhat, in his determination to strike at the root of the whole system

of corruption, irrespective of persons or of consequences, having

discovered that the highest person in the land was himself a recipient

of the largesses of the Austrian baron, insisted on the restitution of

the sums received. The Sultan listened to the advice tendered, returned

the money, and dismissed his Grand Vizier.

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER III

 

DEPOSITION AND DEATH OF ABDUL AZIZ

 

 

After an honourable exile as Governor of Salonica, Midhat obtained

leave to return to Constantinople, and after a brief tenure of the

office of Minister of Justice and of the Presidency of the Council

of State, he handed in his resignation in the following terms, and

retired to his Konak in the neighbourhood of the capital and awaited

developments:

 

 

_To Midhat Pasha, President of the Council of State._

 

 

“I beg that your Highness will be good enough to instruct me as to

the reply I am to make to His Majesty, in case he should question me

as to the motives for your resignation.

 

“HAFIZ MEHEMED

 

“_Head Chamberlain_ (_of Sultan Aziz_).”

 

 

_Reply._

 

“EXCELLENCY,—My request is not based upon any personal motives. I

have nothing but praise for all my colleagues, both high and low;

but the motives which have forced me to this decision are, as I have

already set out in my petition, the difficulties of the position in

which we are placed, that is to say, our finances are in a hopeless

condition, the civil administration is utterly disorganised, and the

state of the army is beyond description; all this compromised the

security and credit of the country, and the non‐Mussulman element

loudly proclaims the intention that it long ago formed of placing

itself under foreign protection. While the faults and mistakes

made twenty years ago have prepared the way for the disasters

which are now showing themselves in rapid succession, and which are

sufficient to employ all our time, our foreign policy has also been

misdirected, the feelings of the Powers have changed towards us,

and they entertain hostile intentions towards our country to such a

degree that the most friendly Power has lost all confidence in us.

It is impossible for us not to deplore the unfortunate results which

this line of conduct cannot fail to produce for Turkey, and for the

faithful servants of His Majesty—that of being unable to see the

future clearly before them. In view of the attitude adopted by His

Highness the Grand Vizier, which gives reason to hope that this state

of affairs may be remedied, I feel compelled to devote my feeble

efforts and support to those duties which are specially incumbent on

me in the existing crisis through which the Ministry is passing. But

as I have explained in the petition which I have already sent in, I

have passed the greater portion of my life in provincial service, and

have never taken part in such delicate and complicated affairs, and

am therefore compelled to ask you to have the goodness to intercede

with His Majesty to accept my resignation.

 

“I am, etc.,

 

“MIDHAT.

 

“29 _Cheval_, 1291 (1874).”

 

 

In the meantime things went from bad to worse in the affairs of the

State. Grand Viziers one after the other were appointed and dismissed.

Mehemet Rushdi Pasha, Essad Pasha, Chervani Rushdi Pasha, held office

for a few months only, and with the best of intentions were utterly

unable to grapple with the situation, and the “villain of the piece,”

Mahmoud Nedim, was at last recalled to office. The finances of the

country were fast getting beyond all remedy. Although it was only

twenty years since the fatal secret of a national debt had been learnt

in Turkey, bankruptcy was already staring the country in the face. So

palpable was this to the best friends of Turkey, that Mr Yorke in the

British Parliament, in the interests of a long‐standing ally of Great

Britain, and of the alliance itself, called attention to the state of

Turkish finances, and summoned the British Government to intervene

through its ambassador at Constantinople to endeavour to ward off

impending catastrophes. Three months after this warning the Turkish

Treasury suspended payment on half the amount of the coupons of the

public debt.

 

The outcry caused by this measure throughout Europe, not only in

strictly commercial and financial circles, but in every class of the

community, was indescribable. Tempted by the high rate of interest,

and confiding in the assurances of financiers interested in floating

successive loans that “Turkey always has paid and therefore always

would pay” the coupons of its debts, the _petite bourgeoisie_ and the

small investor had largely placed their savings in Turkish bonds, and

the “tightness” and misery caused by the suspension was undoubtedly

very great (1875). Meetings of indignant bond‐holders were held in

every capital and large city in Europe, and the Turkish Government and

the Turkish nation, the Pasha and the people, were confounded in a

common anathema. The ground was admirably prepared for an explosion of

political passion directed against Turkey. The occasion for this was

not long in presenting itself.

 

During the second Vizierate of Essad Pasha, certain movements of a

suspicious nature took place on the Montenegrin frontier which would

have arrested the attention of a more vigilant Government. A party of

sixty Slav peasants from the village of Nevesinje in the Commune of

Mostar, on some trivial quarrel with the local authorities, emigrated

in a body across the frontier into Montenegro. In a short time, through

the good offices of the Russian Ambassador, they obtained leave to

return to their homes; but very soon, in concert with their Montenegrin

friends, they organised a _razzia_ on the lands of the neighbouring

Mussulmans. Instead of nipping this incipient rebellion in the bud and

enquiring into its cause, the local authorities temporised with its

leaders and awaited instructions from Constantinople as to how they

were to proceed. Encouraged by this impunity, and with the assurance

of external support, the insurgent bands rapidly increased in numbers,

and when at last the Government determined to act, it found itself in

presence of a serious rebellion. Essad Pasha, well‐intentioned but

weak, and preoccupied with the serious outlook of affairs generally,

accepted the insidious offer of the Russian and Austrian Ambassadors to

intervene between the leaders of the bands and the Supreme Government.

No policy could have been more fatal. It afforded the greatest possible

encouragement to the rebels, who considered the step an acknowledgment

by the Government of its own inability to deal with the movement;

it practically conceded belligerent rights to the rebels, and it

encouraged the habit and consecrated the principle of interference by

foreign governments in the internal affairs of the empire.

 

The hollowness of the offer was apparent the moment the terms of

surrender came to be discussed, and the net result of this diplomatic

comedy was, as was no doubt intended, that what was at first an

insignificant rising of a handful of peasants was raised to the dignity

of a recognised rebellion that could negotiate on equal terms with

the Imperial Government through the medium of foreign consuls and

ambassadors.

 

Mahmoud Nedim had now succeeded Essad Pasha as Grand Vizier (1875),

and as no effective measures were taken to suppress the rising, it

went on spreading from village to village and district to district

till the contagion was caught in Bulgaria. There, in the beginning

of 1874, a commencement of unrest showed itself in the districts

of Drenova, Kazanlik, and Zagra; but the local authorities (warned

by what had taken place in the Herzegovina through the neglect of

initial precautions) had all the leaders of the movement arrested.

Thereupon General Ignatieff made such energetic representations to the

Porte, that orders arrived not only for the release of the imprisoned

malcontents, but for the dismissal of all the functionaries concerned

in their arrest.[6]

 

The effect of this novel and original mode of dealing with an

insurrection was soon apparent in the effervescence and excitement it

caused among the Mussulman population throughout the province. They

saw rebel bands, the leaders of which were patronised and supported by

foreign consuls and diplomatists, being organised without disguise and

approaching their own hearths, whereas all defensive measures on the

part of their own natural leaders were discountenanced and punished. They thereupon resolved to take the matter into their own hands, and formed vigilance committees and organised local bands under the command of retired _zaptiés_ throughout the province.