The life of Midhat Pasha 14

The life of Midhat Pasha 14

If this agreement had not been a secret one, and the terms of it had

been known or suspected in London, does any one imagine that events

would have followed the course they did, or that the “Notes” and

“Memorandums” coming from Vienna and Berlin would have been taken

seriously by the English Cabinet? The pact between the two Emperors,

sealed at Reichstadt, was quite as much at the expense of England in

Asia as of Turkey in Europe. It was a practical corollary of Prince

Bismarck’s avowed Eastern policy.

 

There is only an academical interest now in pointing out the _rôle_

that the personality of Count Andrassy and his reputed Magyar

sentiments played in all these transactions, and it is not necessary to

interrupt the course of this narrative by dwelling on them.

 

After the Andrassy Memorandum had prepared the Cabinets of Europe for

some sort of diplomatic interference in the affairs of Turkey, and

familiarised them with the idea, the natural course of events in the

Turkish Empire did the rest. The ball set going at Vienna was taken up

at Berlin. The comparatively colourless diplomatic Memorandum concocted

in the first‐named capital was followed by a far more coercive Note

emanating from the latter. The former contained recommendations,

the latter added external sanctions to them. The policy intended to

be pursued with reference to Turkey was contained in germ in this

remarkable “Note,” and the diplomatic strategy to be employed was

herein clearly revealed. The “Conference,” which was to impose the

conditions and insist on the sanction, was already on the _tapis_,

and formed the subject of an interchange of views between the various

European governments; and it was, as it were, under the shadow of

this menace to the integrity and independence of the country that the

friends of Midhat now hastened their deliberations.

 

As early as the winter of 1875, Midhat, with a view of profiting by

the lights, and seeking the advice of the eminent diplomatist who

represented the Court of St James at Constantinople, paid a visit to

Sir Henry Elliot, the purpose of which can best be described in the

words of the Ambassador himself.[10]

 

 

“In the beginning of December 1875, I was informed by one of Midhat’s

partisans, a Pasha who had filled some of the highest offices of the

State, that the object of his party was to obtain a ‘Constitution.’

This was more than a year before its promulgation, when it was

declared to have been invented only to defeat the Conference then

sitting at Constantinople.... A few days later Midhat himself called

upon me and explained his views more fully than he had ever done

before, though I was acquainted with their general tenor. The Empire,

he said, was being rapidly brought to destruction; corruption had

reached a pitch that it had never before attained; the service of the

State was starved, while untold millions were poured into the Palace,

and the provinces were being ruined by the uncontrolled exertions of

governors who purchased their appointments at the Palace, and nothing

could save the country but a complete change of system. The only

remedy that he could perceive, lay, first, in securing a control over

the sovereign by making the Ministers—and especially as regarded the

finances—responsible to a national popular Assembly; and secondly

in making this Assembly truly national, by doing away with all

distinctions of classes and religions, and by placing the Christians

on a footing of entire equality with the Mussulmans; thirdly, by

decentralisation and by the establishment of provincial control over

the governors. It must surely be admitted that these were enlightened

and statesmanlike views, deserving of every encouragement.... He

dwelt repeatedly on the value that the sympathy of the British nation

would be to the reformers, and on the manner in which his countrymen

were now looking to England as the example they hoped to follow. I

told him in reply that I could not doubt that measures framed upon

the lines he had laid down must command the approval and ensure the

good wishes of every Englishman who, like myself, had faith in the

advantages of constitutional checks upon arbitrary power. I gave

him this assurance confidently and in good faith; for certainly

the very last thing that I anticipated was that those who in this

country make the greatest parade of their devotion to constitutional

principles would be the first to heap contumely upon men who were

trying to introduce it into theirs, and to hold up their proposals to

ridicule....”

 

 

The first of the many incidents that soon after this conversation began

to follow each other closely, took place on the 10th May 1876, when

an assemblage of several thousand Softas stopped Prince Izzeddine, the

Sultan’s eldest son, on his way to the Seraskierat (Ministry of War),

desiring him to return to the Palace, and to inform the Sultan that

they demanded the dismissal of Mahmoud Nedim, the Grand Vizier and of

Hassan Fehmi Effendi, the Sheik‐ul‐Islam. The Sultan did not venture to

reject the demand. Mahmoud and Hassan Fehmi were dismissed, the latter

being replaced by Hassan Hairullah Effendi, who enjoyed a high and

exceptional reputation for learning and enlightenment. Mehemet Rushdi

Pasha, an old man universally respected, was named Grand Vizier; and as

he insisted on Midhat joining his Cabinet (although holding no specific

office), it was believed that he would be the guiding spirit, and

general satisfaction was felt. Sir Henry Elliot proceeds to say:

 

 

“This general satisfaction did not last long. The Sultan quickly

showed his determination to resist all reforms by appointing to high

posts several of the worst of the old school of Pashas, and it then

became so evident to me that an attempt to depose him would certainly

very shortly be made, that on the 25th May I put my conviction on

record in a despatch in which I wrote that the word ‘Constitution’

was in every mouth; that the Softas, representing the intelligent

public opinion of the Capital, knowing themselves to be supported by

the bulk of the Nation—Christian as well as Mahomedan—would not, I

believed, relax their efforts till they obtained it, and that should

the Sultan refuse to grant it, an attempt to depose him appeared

almost inevitable; that texts from the Koran were circulated proving

to the faithful that the form of Government sanctioned by it was

properly democratic, and that the absolute authority now wielded by

the Sovereign was an usurpation of the rights of the people and not

sanctioned by the Sacred Law; and both texts and precedents were

appealed to to show that allegiance was not due to a Sovereign who

neglected the interests of the State. The disaffection, I said, now

ran through every class, and from the Pashas down to the porters

in the streets and the boatmen on the Bosphorus, no one thought any

longer of concealing his opinions.... Within a week after my reports

were written, the deposition had been effected....”

 

 

The two moving spirits in the deposition of Sultan Abdul Aziz were

undoubtedly Midhat Pasha and Hussein Avni Pasha, the Minister of War

(_seraskier_). The latter, a thorough soldier and a sterling patriot,

distinguished for the great energy and decision of his character

as well as the impetuosity of his temper, had occupied the highest

military posts in the country, and had been repeatedly exiled from

Constantinople by the Sultan. He was particularly feared and disliked

by Mahmoud Nedim, who had procured his banishment each time that

he had been made Grand Vizier. Although not sharing all Midhat’s

constitutional views and professing more confidence in the efficacy

of the sword than in the saving grace of popular institutions, he had

lent a willing and energetic support to his colleague’s views as to the

indisputable necessity of deposing the Sultan as a preliminary to any

attempted amelioration in the condition of the State.

 

As soon as the final resolution of Ministers was arrived at, and

before any commencement of execution could be given to it, it was

indispensable to obtain a _Fetva_ (authoritative decree) of the

Sheik‐ul‐Islam, Hassan Hairullah, the highest authority and mouthpiece

of the Sacred Law, in order to give legal validity to the act of

deposition. Accordingly the following _Fetva_ was issued for the

deposition:—

 

 

“If the Chief of the Faithful gives proof of mental derangement; if

he displays ignorance of State matters; if he employs the public

revenues for his personal expenditure, beyond what the Nation and

the State can support; if he introduces confusion into political

and spiritual concerns, and if his continuance in power becomes

injurious to the nation, may he be deposed?”

 

Answer: “The Cheri pronounces ‘Yes.’

 

“Signed by the humble

 

“HASSAN HAIRULLAH,

 

“To whom God grant His indulgence.

 

“_Djemaziel Evel_, 1293, _Hegira_.”

(30_th May_ 1876.)

 

 

Armed with this _Fetva_, Ministers decided on the immediate execution

of their plans, the details of which, it was agreed, should be left to

the Grand Vizier, to Midhat, and to the Minister of War.

 

There was a slight divergence of views between Midhat and the

Seraskier with reference to the form of procedure which should

accompany the deposition. Hussein Avni inclined to a simple military

_pronunciamento_, whereas Midhat wished to give the consecration of

popular sanction to the act. For this purpose he proposed that the

Softas and the population of Stamboul should be convoked _en masse_ to

the Noure‐Osmanieh Mosque, where they should set forth the griefs of

the nation and demand a change of _régime_; and that on this demand

being refused or ignored, they should proceed at once to the execution

of the decree of deposition. The majority of Ministers inclined to

this latter method of proceeding; but a circumstance occurred which

necessitated a change of plans and determined the abandonment of the

proposal for a popular demonstration.

 

The 31st May was chosen for the execution of the plan agreed upon. On

the eve of that day information reached Midhat from a woman of the

Palace that the Sultan had had wind of the affair, and that the whole

plot was about to be discovered. This was corroborated by the fact that

twice that same day Hussein Avni had been peremptorily summoned to the

Palace, although on the first summons he had pleaded illness as a

reason for disregarding it.

 

It was decided thereupon by the Ministers to anticipate the hour fixed

upon, and to proceed at once with the execution of their design.

 

At midnight accordingly, of the 30th of May, Mehemet Rushdi and Midhat,

accompanied each by a single attendant carrying a lamp, proceeded to

Sirkedji to embark on a _caïque_[11] for Pachalimani on the Bosphorus,

the residence of Hussein Avni. It was a pitch‐dark night with rain

falling in torrents, and it was with some difficulty that they reached

the place of rendezvous. Here they found Hussein Avni anxiously waiting

for them, and after a hurried interview in which the final dispositions

were made, they separated to their respective posts. Hussein Avni

started for the palace of Dolma‐Bagtche, whilst Rushdi and Midhat

proceeded to the Seraskierat.

 

It had been decided that the Ministers and high civil and military

dignitaries should assemble at the War Office and await the arrival

of Prince Murad, whom Hussein Avni had undertaken to conduct there in

person; and that as soon as he should arrive, the proclamation and

investiture of the Prince as the new Sultan should take place. It

was further arranged that immediately on the arrival of the Prince a

bonfire should be lit on the tower of the Seraskierat, as a signal to

the fleet of what was taking place, and thereupon a Royal salute should

be fired by Kaisserli Ahmed’s ironclads, to announce to the whole city

the commencement of a new reign.

 

Hussein Avni, proceeding in the direction of the Palace, was, according

to preconcerted arrangement, met by Suleiman Pasha, to whom the

delicate task of executing the measures necessary to be taken at the Palace had been entrusted.