The life of Midhat Pasha 45

The life of Midhat Pasha 45

By a curious coincidence, on the same day (8th July) that this

historical interview took place, there appeared in the _Daily News_

the famous “atrocity article” that set all England ablaze and

started the greatest orator of the day on his crusade against the

“unspeakable Turk.”

 

The indirect effect on English policy of this crusade and the

atrocity meetings all over England that followed it, was seen in the

nuance already noticed, between the terms of the despatch of the 25th

May and that of the 25th September, which was the prelude to the

Conference where it was still further accentuated.

 

July was destined to bring an aggravation of trouble on the Turkish

Empire and anxiety on Turkish Ministers. Austria chose this moment

(1st July) to shut to Turkey the port of Klek, through which the

Turkish army in Herzegovina received its chief supplies. It is not

necessary to enter here into the question of international right

involved in this matter. This turned on the interpretation of ancient

treaties with the Venetian Republic, and on the boundaries of the

“enclaves” in Dalmatia, and these questions had, by mutual consent,

been left dormant for long years between the Austrian and Ottoman

Governments. Suffice it to say that a _modus vivendi_ had been

arrived at between the two Governments in 1853 (“in the hope that

an amicable arrangement will intervene relative to the question of

the enclaves of Klek and Suttorina”), and had subsisted ever since.

For Austria, after leaving the question of right in abeyance for

twenty‐three years, to choose that particular moment when the maximum

of inconvenience would be thereby caused to the Ottoman Government,

was a high‐handed proceeding of the most unfriendly nature, and

could only be justified on the principle of _la force prime le

droit_. At any rate, it finally exploded the pretext of “her deep

and earnest anxiety” for the pacification of these provinces which

she was continually putting forward as the motives of her diplomatic

actions, as well as all pretence of friendly dispositions towards the

Porte. The energy displayed by the new Government at Constantinople

in sending reinforcements to the scene of action, and the success

attending these efforts, were perhaps the real motive of this

unqualified act, for in consequence of that energy, things were not

going well with the insurrection, and new factors would have to be

imported to keep it going.

 

Accordingly, at the same time the port of supply for the Turkish

troops was closed, Montenegro and Servia declared war on the Porte

(1st July 1876). (As far as the first‐named principality was

concerned this formality was rather superfluous _ex post facto_

formality.) Ever since the “intimate relations which had existed for

two years back” between the Courts of Vienna and Cettinje, Montenegro

had never ceased to carry on war against the Ottoman troops. Indeed

her mountaineers, together with the Grenzers and Dalmatians, had

been the mainstay of the “rebellion.” Only as, nominally, peaceful

relations had never been interrupted, the Turkish Commanders were

debarred from following the rebels on Montenegrin soil, and Russia

had drawn a taboo round Montenegro, and forbidden, under penalty of

war, the invasion of that land, and Mr Jomine, the Russian diplomatic

agent at Cettinje, was, with his Austrian colleague, the confidential

adviser of the prince.

 

As far back as January 1876, Sir H. Elliot had informed Lord Derby of

“the system employed by the Montenegrins in aid of the Herzegovinian

insurgents. All the men (in Montenegro), capable of bearing arms,

are considered to be soldiers, and are made into battalions of 600

men. The commanders and majors of these battalions, who are called

commanders and pod‐commanders, receive pay; the remaining officers

and men are unpaid. When an expedition is contemplated, each man

takes with him potatoes and bread, if he has any, for five days, and

a reserve of provisions from each village is carried by women or

baggage horses. The Austrian Committees, having provided surgeons

and medicines, hospitals and ambulances have been organised in some

villages on the frontier. The prince furnishes all those who join

the insurgents _without authorisation, but he sends one‐fifth of his

effective forces into the Herzegovina. Not to overtire these poor

people, His Highness takes care to change them at the end of each

expedition, or when their provisions are exhausted. Reforms alone, it

is stated, will never put an end to the insurrection, and force is of

no avail so long as the insurgents and their Montenegrin friends have

only to cross the frontier to be in safety._”[35]

 

As for Servia, Consul‐General White had for months past warned

his Government of what was preparing, and of the wholesale influx

of Russians into the Servian army, nor had Prince Milan made any

disguise of the fact of the likelihood of his being drawn into the

_mêlée_, but a certain almost comic jealousy existed between the

rulers of these two little principalities, lest the one should steal

a march on the other, and acquire a better right to the title of the

“liberator of the Slav race.”

 

They consequently agreed to declare war on Turkey together. As

Servia, confident in her new levies, was now determined to act,

Montenegro could not afford to be behindhand, however much it might

have suited her to continue the particular mode of safe warfare that

she had, for twelve months, been indulging in.

 

In spite of the new levies, military matters did not progress to

Prince Milan’s satisfaction. The fact was that a new spirit had

been infused into Ottoman Councils by the new ministers, and large

reinforcements of regular troops under competent generals had

been hurried to the Servian frontiers and despatched into Bosnia.

The consequence was that victory did not attend the Servian arms,

and, after the loss of an important position near Deligrad on the

24th August 1876, barely two months after the pompous declaration

of war, Prince Milan “with the approval of his ally, the Prince

of Montenegro,” requested the good offices of the Powers for a

suspension of hostilities. All Europe eagerly seconded this request,

and although a formal armistice was never concluded, a _de facto_

suspension of hostilities took place. It is unnecessary to detail the

negotiations that followed.

 

The Porte very naturally desired that an agreement on the basis of

peace should precede or accompany an armistice, otherwise it would

lose all the advantages of its present military position. Servia

wanted an armistice without any basis of peace. When at last, in

consequence of the insistence of Europe, the Porte agreed to this, a

dispute arose about the duration of the armistice. The Porte proposed

six months to give ample time to negotiate a permanent settlement,

and England adhered to this view of the matter. Servia would have

none of it; one month or nothing. She was moving on safe ground,

for she knew well that Europe had taken the negotiations out of

her hand and would never allow a renewed attack upon her. Russia

strongly insisted on the shorter term, and when, in order to solve

the difficulty, England appealed to the honest broker at Berlin, he

proposed as a compromise an armistice of six weeks.

 

These _pourparlers_ occupied about a month, and when they seemed to

be on the point of being settled, as usual by the Porte yielding in

the matter, it was found that Prince Milan had changed his mind, and

would have no armistice at all.

 

What had occurred in the interval to account for this change of front?

 

On the 24th September, Consul‐General White writes to Sir Henry

Elliot[36] “that the last six weeks have produced an important change

in the affairs of Servia. The Civil Government has ceased to have

a voice in public affairs; the presence of Russian officers, some

of them officers of the Imperial Guard, the courage and enthusiasm

with which they are animated, the growing influence of the Slavonic

Committees through their agents, have all given a warlike tone to

what is called public opinion here.... The Russians present here say

openly that it is their aim and object to prevent the conclusions of

peace.” And again, on 4th October 1876, he writes to Lord Derby:[37]

“It may be interesting for your Lordship to hear that money appears

abundant in the Servian Exchequer, and although the Ministers deny

that it is derived from Russian sources, it is quite impossible to

account in any other way for its origin.”

 

But something more particular must have occurred to encourage Prince

Milan to order on the 26th September, the very next day on which

the suspension of hostilities terminated, a general attack on the

Turks in the Morava Valley. What was it? On the 28th September

1876, Mr Malet (afterwards Sir Edward Malet), writing from Rome to

Lord Derby,[38] states that Sig. Melegari, the Minister for Foreign

Affairs, in order to convince him “of the imminence of the danger to

the Ottoman Empire” read the following paper to him, as coming from

Livadia, adding that England alone was able to avert the execution of

the design by “compelling” the Porte to acquiesce in His Lordship’s

demands. The paper was dated 26th September, and ran as follows: “The

Emperor has sent General Soumarakoff to Vienna with instructions to

propose a peace, should Turkey attempt to evade the armistice, upon

conditions that would suit all the Powers, viz. Austrian military

intervention in Bosnia, Russian military intervention in Bulgaria,

and the joint entry of all the squadrons of the Levant into the

Bosphorus. These steps appear to us indispensable in order to bring

the Porte to its senses, to prevent war, and save the Christians from

a general massacre.”[39]

 

This _grandis epistola a Capreis_ which frightened Mr Malet so

much that he immediately telegraphed its substance to Lord Derby,

and which was, no doubt, intended to frighten Lord Derby, had no

chance at all of being accepted at Vienna, and if the constant and

continuous intercourse between the three Northern “and allied Powers”

was to any purpose at all, it is quite impossible that the nature of

the reception it should meet with there, should have been ignored. It

could therefore only have been intended as a “spur” to the Foreign

Office, and it succeeded admirably in its intention.

 

It is scarcely worth while to waste many words over the proposal

from Livadia. Austria feared nothing so much as a joint occupation

with Russia. It would have been a guarantee exacted from her for

her own eventual simultaneous retirement, which would have upset

all her plans. Nor was England yet brought up to concert pitch. But

the notice had served its purpose. England, a little timorously,

and with the best intentions towards Turkey, and with the general

approval and even applause of Europe,[40] had undertaken the lead

in proposing terms to Turkey as a basis of pacification. As early

as the 11th September Count Schouvaloff in an interview described

“(1) The _status quo_, speaking roughly, both as regards Servia

and Montenegro. (2) Administrative reforms in the nature of local

autonomy for Bosnia and the Herzegovina. (3) Guarantees of some

similar kinds (the exact details of which might be reserved for later

discussion) against the future maladministration of Bulgaria.”[41]

 

Ten days later, on the 21st September, Lord Derby, having in the

meantime secured the agreement of the Austrian Government[42] to

these proposals, these terms were forwarded to Sir H. Elliot for

communication to the Porte. The second condition relating to Bosnia

and Herzegovina was amplified by the important stipulation “that the

Porte should undertake, _in a Protocol to be signed at Constantinople

with the Representatives of the mediatory Powers_, to grant, etc.”[43]