The life of Midhat Pasha 8
The key of all these reforms, and the cardinal principle of this
administration, was to work hand in hand with the local authorities.
By their aid the valuation of all property held in the respective
districts was carried out equitably and fairly, and taxes founded
on this assessment were levied without complaint; and although the
salaries of responsible officials, such as the police and judges, were
considerably increased, and many vexatious taxes abolished, the new
revenue of the province showed a considerable and increasing surplus.
The prosperity of this large province under its new administrator could
not fail to attract the attention of the authorities at Constantinople,
and Midhat now received the congratulations both of the Sultan and
of the Sublime Porte. An Imperial Irade, moreover, enjoined all the
governors of the other provinces of the empire to apply in their
respective vilayets the same reforms that Midhat had introduced in
that of the Danube, a detailed plan and description of which had been
forwarded to Constantinople by Rifat Effendi, the secretary of the
vilayet (subsequently Grand Vizier).
So far everything seemed to go well, and a new era of prosperity seemed
about to dawn for the provinces of the empire generally. It is worth
while for those who really desire to obtain an inside view of the
working of Turkish absolutism, and to discern the secret springs that
move the Government of Turkey, and make themselves acquainted with the
hidden causes that have time after time wrecked the hopes of Turkish
reformers, to follow attentively what we are now about to relate, on
the authority, be it noted, of one in a position, if any one was, to
know the truth and put his fingers on the plague‐spot.
Midhat felt that his work would not be complete, nor would the return
of material prosperity suffice to attach his province permanently
to the Government of the Sultan, unless he applied himself as well
to the moral side of the problem and succeeded in counteracting the
manœuvres of the enemies of the empire to sow disaffection in the
minds of the youth of the province. One of the most effective devices
contrived by them with this view was the plan, pursued for many
years, of sending large numbers of Bulgarian youths to carry on their
studies at the Russian universities of Odessa, Kharkoff, and Kieff,
and these, on their return, became the chiefs of the staffs of the
active propagandists of Panslavic ideas among the youths of Bulgaria.
These missionaries of disaffection constituted one of the most serious
dangers to Ottoman sovereignty, and one of the most difficult problems
to deal with. Midhat determined to grapple with it, and with this view
he determined to establish in the principal centres of the province
schools and universities where the Bulgarian youths, Christians and
Mussulmans alike, should enjoy all the advantages of a first‐class
modern education without having to seek it abroad. The incidental
advantage of a fusion of Christian and Mussulman elements in the
country, under the inspiring influence of a common education, at an
age when friendships are most easily formed and generous sentiments
evoked, did not escape the sagacity of Midhat. The whole project
was explained by him in a detailed report to the Sublime Porte, the
expenses being provided half by the surplus revenues of the province,
and the rest by voluntary subscriptions.
When this project was made known at Constantinople, the person who most
readily seized the full import of it was General Ignatieff, the Russian
ambassador. It went directly counter to all the most cherished plans
and projects of the Panslavic party, of which he was the moving spirit.
There was nothing that he did not do to wreck the plan and upset the
Pasha. Unfortunately the nature of an absolute government and the
character of an Eastern autocrat afforded him ample means of action.
The interference of a foreign ambassador in the internal economy of a
province of the empire had nothing in it which appeared abnormal or
impertinent; such interference was consecrated by long usage and had
become chronic and accepted. Ignatieff began by representing to the
sovereign that the spirit of the reforms effected by Midhat in his
vilayet, especially the institution of local councils (which was of
the very essence of the reforms introduced), were in direct opposition
to the spirit of absolutism, and that the result would infallibly be
that little by little the province itself would become detached from
the body of the empire, and would claim its entire independence, as had
already happened in the case of Egypt. It is not certain, however, that
the ambassador would have gained his point, even with a sovereign so
tenacious of his prerogatives as was Abdul Aziz, had not an unfortunate
error of typography, eagerly seized on and exploited by Ignatieff,
played into the hands of the ambassador. In a passage of the official
journal of the province, the term “deputies” was inadvertently applied
to the members of the chief council of the vilayet. This apparently
trivial circumstance, the slip of a typographist, was sufficient to
turn the scale in the Sultan’s mind and to wreck the project. Abdul
Aziz refused his consent to the proposal, on the obviously insincere
pretext of the expense connected with it. Thus this crowning act of
Midhat’s work, the reform which above all others was calculated to
attach the Bulgarians to the central government and to destroy a
nest of disaffectation in the province, was defeated by a foreign
ambassador playing on the ignorant susceptibilities and autocratic
instincts of the sovereign of the country. If this were a single and
exceptional example of the working of autocracy, it might be passed
over in comparative silence, however regrettable it was in this
particular instance; but the whole modern history of Turkey shows
that such intervention was nothing less than a system of statecraft
whereby autocracy was cunningly worked for the ruin of the country in
as certain and deadly a way as was the _Liberum Veto_ of the Polish
constitution. The spontaneous caprices and whims of an autocrat are the
least part of the baneful effects of autocracy; it is in the shadows
that flit behind the throne, stronger than the throne itself, working
systematically on the ignorance and fears of the autocrat, with settled
purpose and in pursuit of settled plans, that lies, in the East at any
rate, the real curse of absolutism.
Simultaneously with this diplomatic action at Constantinople, order
was given to the Panslavic Committees established at Bucharest and
Kichenew to prepare for action in the field. Midhat’s agents had kept
him informed of the revival of agitation entertained by the agents of
these committees among the Bulgarian peasants, and he lost no time in
transmitting this information to the Porte.
[Illustration: 6 7 4 2 1 3 5
MIDHAT PASHA AND HIS SUITE IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PROVINCE OF THE
DANUBE.
1. Midhat Pasha.
2. “Inspecteur de la Cour Judiciare.”
3. “Juge du Cheri.”
4. Adib Effendi, Minister of Customs (1889).
5. Rifat Pasha, Grand Vizier (1897).
6. Raïf Pasha, Minister (1890).
7. Chakir Pasha, “Maréchal” (1878).]
On the 2nd May, 1867, Midhat received the following telegram from
Sistovo:—“Last night numerous armed bands crossed the frontier close
to Sistovo, and were immediately joined by other bands who were waiting
for them on this side of the frontier, and early this morning they
commenced operations by the horrible mutilation of five Mussulman
children, aged from eight to twelve, who were tending sheep on the
plains.”
The object and purpose of these barbarities was obvious: it was to
excite reprisals on the part of the Mussulman population, which would
afford a pretext to the enemies of the empire to fill Europe with an
outcry against Turkish barbarity and fanaticism. The same policy,
heralded by the same acts, ruthlessly pursued later on, did produce the
desired effect, and Bulgarian atrocities became a proverb and byword in
the world; but on this occasion the energy of Midhat, and the patience
and forbearance of the Mussulman population, defeated the purpose of
the conspirators. Midhat, immediately on receiving the above telegram,
embarked two companies of regulars on board a steamer and despatched
them to Sistovo, whither he accompanied them himself. He found the
whole population, Christian and Mussulman, in a state of the greatest
excitement, and his first care was to calm the effervescence and to
inspire confidence in the energy and resolution of the authorities.
The plan of the insurgents was to push on as rapidly as they could to
the Balkans, increasing their forces as they went along by the native
levies which had been organised by the committees for this purpose,
until they reached the monastery of Kapanbova, where a large _dépôt_ of
arms had been collected, and which was intended to be the headquarters
of the insurrection.
The presence of four battalions of regulars at Capriova prevented
the execution of this plan, and after suffering several defeats in
the field, the bands dispersed in various directions, closely pursued
by the troops and the local levies that had joined them. Midhat now
instituted a special tribunal, composed of six Mussulmans and six
Christian judges, to try the rebel prisoners, and the evidence given by
the prisoners themselves, clearly demonstrated that the invading bands
had been equipped and sent out by the Slav Committees of Bucharest
and Kichenew, and were acting in unison with corresponding committees
established throughout the province. By the unanimous vote of this
tribunal, sentences of death were passed on the leaders, and penal
servitude and minor punishment, according to their status and degree of
culpability, on all the rebels taken in arms. By these energetic means
the insurrection was effectually stamped out and tranquillity restored
to the province.
An outcry, however, was quickly raised in the European Press against
the “methods of barbarism” adopted to repress the insurrection, and the
Pasha was accused of ultra severity against Christian insurgents and
reprehensible leniency towards Mussulman offenders.
So far from this latter accusation having any real foundation, the
very composition of the special tribunal appointed to deal with
these troubles was a guarantee of its impartiality. Moreover, the
following fact will afford an example of the impunity enjoyed by the
Mahomedan criminals. In the course of these troubles two dead bodies of
Christians were found in a field near Biscara; a judicial investigation
was immediately ordered on the spot, and the result was that the
evidence pointed to a sergeant of _gendarmerie_, a Mussulman of the
name of Mehemet Tchavouch, as having committed the murder. Pressed
by questions Mehemet made a full confession, and he was thereupon
condemned to death and forthwith executed.
Midhat now turned his attention to the best means of anticipating
and guarding against similar raids and insurrections in the future.
He knew well that the central revolutionary committees at Bucharest
and Kichenew would not disarm, but would simply watch for a more
favourable opportunity to put their plans into execution. To garrison
the whole frontier with regular troops would expose the province
to large expenditure, and the troops, when called upon to act, to
calumny and misrepresentation. He accordingly conceived the plan of
organising a local militia of 40,000 men, recruited from all classes
of the population, Christian and Mussulman alike, to whom the defence
of their own localities should be entrusted, and they were to be
indemnified if called upon to act beyond the boundaries of their
district. By this means a cheap and effective force was provided
against all contingencies, and at the same time the confidence reposed
in the loyalty of the population generally received a conspicuous
demonstration. The defence of the line of the Danube was secured
in a similar manner. A succession of guard‐houses was established
throughout the length of the river, and their defence confided to a
river‐guard recruited equally from the Christian and Mussulman riverine population.
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