The life of Midhat Pasha 26

The life of Midhat Pasha 26

“When the Imperial Cabinet examines the question as to whether the

moment had arrived to take up arms against the Porte, some doubts

as to the urgency of this measure might exist in the minds of those

who had not sufficiently meditated on the effects of the sanguinary

reforms that the Ottoman Chief had just executed with terrible

energy. But now the experience that we have just had ought to unite

everybody in favour of the line then adopted. The Emperor has put

the Turkish system to the proof, and His Majesty has found in it a

commencement of material and moral organisation which hitherto it has

never possessed. If the Sultan has been enabled to oppose to us a

more lively and sustained resistance whilst he had scarcely collected

the elements of his new plans of reform and improvement, how much

more formidable should we have found him if he had had time to give

them more consistency and solidity?...”

 

 

The whole policy of Russia towards Turkey is contained in the above

despatch. The Cabinets of the Powers did not immediately answer Prince

Gortchakoff’s Circular of the 19th January. General Ignatieff took a

circular journey round Europe and felt the pulses of its Governments.

On the 13th March, Count Schouvaloff handed to Lord Derby the draft

Protocol which it was proposed to submit to the signature of the

Great Powers, so as “to terminate the incident.” In this interview,

the Russian Ambassador urged in favour of this course the unfortunate

result that would ensue if shades of difference of opinion were to

manifest themselves in the replies of the various Cabinets to the

Russian Circular, which might be a determining cause to induce Russia

to seek for a solution _either by means of a direct understanding with

the Porte_, or by force of arms.

 

Lord Derby does not seem to have requested the Russian Ambassador

to explain the above oracular utterance. There was more in it than

he perhaps imagined. Another remarkable __EXPRESSION__ fell from Count

Schouvaloff at this interview, and one which shows that he did not

give himself the trouble, in his interview with the English Minister,

to maintain even the appearance of consistency. “_As a period of some

months would not be sufficient to accomplish these reforms_, it would

be preferable,” etc. But this was Mr Disraeli’s and Lord Derby’s

contention, though not sustained, for postponing diplomatic action, and

the Turkish Ministers were never tired of urging it as a good and valid

reason for deferring the Conference altogether.

 

 

The Protocol that was signed at London on the 31st March 1877 was

certainly, as compared with the Protocol of the Conference, a very

colourless document. After recapitulating certain recent diplomatic

acts and taking cognisance of certain others, in view of certain

indications, “the Powers propose _to watch carefully_ by means of

their Representatives at Constantinople, and their local agents, the

manner in which the promises of the Ottoman Government are carried into

effect.” It concluded by saying: “If their hopes should once more be

disappointed, and if the conditions of the Christian subjects of the

Sultan should not be improved in a manner to prevent the return of

the complications which periodically disturb the peace of the East,

they think it right to declare that such a state of things would be

incompatible with their interests and those of Europe in general. In

such case, they reserve to themselves the right to consider, in common,

the means which they may deem best fitted to secure the well‐being of

the Christian population and the interests of the general peace.”

 

This Protocol was accompanied by two remarkable declarations, annexed

to the Minutes of the Meeting at the Foreign Office at which the

Protocol was signed—the one on the part of the Russian Ambassador, the

other on that of the English Minister.

 

The latter was to the effect that, in the event of the object for

which the Protocol had been signed, viz., reciprocal disarmament and

peace, not being attained, the Protocol in question should be regarded

as null and void.

 

The declaration by the Russian Ambassador was in the following terms:—

 

“If peace with Montenegro is concluded, and the Porte accepts the

advice of Europe and shows itself ready to replace its forces on a

peace footing, and seriously to undertake the reforms mentioned in

the Protocol, let it send to St Petersburg a special envoy to treat

of disarmament, to which his Majesty the Emperor would also, on his

part, consent. If massacres similar to those which have occurred

in Bulgaria take place, this would necessarily put a stop to the

measures of demobilization.”

 

 

The Porte thought fit, perhaps unnecessarily, inasmuch as its adhesion

to the Protocol was not required, to make on the 9th April 1877 a

most elaborate and spirited answer to the position taken up by the

signatories of that document.

 

It pointed out that the efforts of the Powers were exclusively directed

to what they considered the well‐being of one portion only of the

Sultan’s subjects, whereas the reforms which the new Constitution

aimed at introducing did not bear a special or exclusive character in

regard to province, race, creed or language. That the small account

which the Powers seemed to have taken both of the great principles of

equality and justice which the Turkish Government sought to introduce

into the internal administration, and of its rights of independence and

sovereignty, was deeply to be regretted. That Turkey as an independent

State could not submit “to be placed under any surveillance, whether

collective or not.” That the Treaty of Paris explicitly declared the

principle of non‐intervention. That Treaty which binds the other high

contracting parties as well as Turkey, cannot be abolished by a

Protocol in which Turkey has taken no part. And as for the last clause,

the Government of the Sultan saw in it “a proceeding of intimidation

calculated to deprive their action of all merit of spontaneity, and a

source of grave complication for the present as well as for the future.”

 

With reference to the declaration of the Russian Ambassador annexed to

the Protocol, the Porte very pointedly remarked that “as regards the

disorders which might break out in Turkey and arrest the demobilization

of the Russian army, the Sultan’s Government, while resenting the

offensive terms in which this idea has been expressed, believes that

Europe is convinced that the disorders which have disturbed the

tranquillity of the provinces were due to external agitation; that

the Imperial Government cannot be held responsible for them, and that

consequently the Russian Government will not be justified _in making

the demobilization of its armies depend on such contingencies_.”

 

This last paragraph pointed out a serious practical difficulty that

confronted the Ottoman Government with reference to the proposal

for demobilization. Russia was supposed to be able to mobilise her

armies in eight days: at any rate, it was a question of days with her.

Turkey, on account of her geographical position, and the nature of

her organisation, required several months to effect this object. If,

therefore, after making the greatest sacrifices in order to collect her

forces, she were now to dismiss them to their distant homes, and Russia

were allowed, on a pretext indicated by herself, to remobilise her own

army, Turkey would be caught at the greatest possible disadvantage, and

would then be completely at the mercy of her unscrupulous opponent. And

nothing would be easier than for Russia, employing the means at which

she had shown herself an adept, to excite troubles which would give her

the very justification which she sought for a systematic attack on the

now defenceless Ottoman Empire. The Porte had had experience of this

very same line of action and of argument in respect to Servia. On the

2nd November 1876, Sir H. Elliot writes to Lord Derby that “General

Ignatieff told me this morning that he has been directed by his

Government to inform the Porte that they would consider any excesses

committed by the Turkish troops as a violation of the armistice;

and one of the secretaries of the Russian Embassy was desired this

afternoon to tell me, further, that the General had orders at once to

leave Constantinople upon any violation of it occurring,” and he adds,

“a ready pretext for a rupture appears thus to be prepared.”[19]

 

On the 19th April 1877, Prince Gortchakoff issued another Circular

announcing a declaration of war against the Ottoman Empire, and

concluding with the following most remarkable sentence: “In assuming

this task, our august Master fulfils a duty imposed upon him by the

interests of Russia, whose _peaceful development is hindered by the

permanent disturbances of the East_.”

 

Commentary would spoil this choice bit. The lamb was troubling the

stream.

 

On the 1st May, Lord Derby made a most caustic and merciless reply to

the Russian Circular.

 

After pointing out that the Porte had never wavered “in affirming its

intention of carrying out the reforms already promised,” which was the

avowed object of the Powers, and that by patience and moderation on

both sides these objects might still have been attained, and that it

was the presence of large Russian forces on the frontiers of Turkey,

“menacing its safety, rendering disarmament impossible, and exciting a

feeling of apprehension and fanaticism among the Mussulman population,”

that constituted a material obstacle to internal pacification and

reform. It went on to say, that the course on which the Russian

Government had entered involved graver and more serious considerations.

It was in contravention of the stipulation of the Treaty of Paris

of 30th March, 1856, by which Russia and the other signatory Powers

engaged, each on its own part, to respect the independence and the

territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and further, that they

had, as late as 1871, signed a declaration at the Conference of London,

affirming it to be “an essential principle of the law of nations

that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a Treaty,

nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the

Contracting Parties by means of an amicable arrangement.” It concluded

by saying, in reference to the pretension that Russia was acting in the

interest of Great Britain and of the other Powers, that it felt bound

to state in a manner equally formal and public that the decision of the

Russian Government was not one that could have their concurrence or

approval. Nothing could be more logical or reasonable, but it was not logic or

reason that could keep the Russian armies on their side of the Pruth.