The Letters of Gracchus on the East India Question 1

The Letters of Gracchus on the East India Question 1

The Letters of Gracchus on the East India Question

 

Author: Grachhus

 

LETTER I.

 

GENERAL VIEW OF THE EAST INDIA QUESTION.

 

 

_Tuesday, January 12, 1813._

 

The crisis, at which the affairs of the East India Company are now

arrived, is one which involves the most important interests of the

British Empire. It would be unnecessary to prove a proposition which is

so universally acknowledged and felt. It has happened however, that, in

our approaches towards this crisis, the Public understanding has been

but little addressed upon the subject; so that the appeal which is now

suddenly made to their passions and imaginations, finds them unprepared

with that knowledge of the true circumstances of the case, which can

alone enable them to govern those passions, and control those

imaginations. Let us then endeavour to recover the time which has been

lost, by taking a deliberate view of the circumstances which produce

this crisis.

 

The crisis, is the proximity of the term which may conclude the East

India Company's rights, to the exclusive trade with India and China, and

to the powers of government now exercised by them over the Indian

Empire.

 

The rights of the East India Company are two-fold; and have long been

distinguished as, their _permanent_ rights, and their _temporary_

rights. Those rights are derived to them from distinct Charters, granted

to them at different times by Parliament. By the former, they were

created a _perpetual_ Corporate Society of Merchants, trading to

India[1]. By the latter, they obtained, for a _limited period of time_,

the exclusive right of trading with India and China, and of executing

the powers of government over those parts of the Indian territory, which

were acquired either by conquest or by negotiation. The Charter

conveying the latter limited rights, is that which will expire in the

course of the ensuing year 1814; on the expiration of which, the

exclusive trade to the East will be again open to the British population

at large, and the powers of the India Government will lapse in course

to the Supreme Government of the British Empire, to be provided for as

Parliament in its wisdom may judge it advisable to determine.

 

The renewal of an _expired_ privilege cannot be pursued upon a ground of

_right_. The exclusive Charter of the Company is _a patent_, and their

patent, like every other patent, is limited as to _its duration_. But

though the patentee cannot allege a ground of right for the renewal of

his patent, he may show such strong pretensions, such good claims in

equity, such weighty reasons of expediency for its renewal, as may

ensure its attainment. Such are the claims and the pretensions of the

East India Company to a renewal of their Charter; and as such they have

been promptly and cheerfully received, both by the Government and the

country at large.

 

But the progress of society, during a long course of years, is of a

nature to produce a considerable alteration in the general state of

things; the state of things must, therefore, naturally be called into

consideration, upon the expiration of the term of years which determines

the exclusive Charter of the East India Company; in order to inquire,

whether that Charter should be renewed precisely in the same terms, and

with the same conditions, as before; or whether the actual state of

public affairs demands, that some alteration, some modification, of

terms and conditions, should be introduced into the Charter or System

which is to succeed.

 

The arduous task of this investigation must necessarily fall upon those

persons, who chance to be in the Administration of the Country, at the

latest period to which the arrangements for the renewal of the Charter

can be protracted; and it is hardly possible to imagine a more difficult

and perplexing position, for any Administration. Those persons, if they

have any regard for the duties which they owe to the Public, will

consider themselves as standing _between two interests_; the interest of

those who are about to lose an exclusive right, and the interest of

those who are about to acquire an open and a common one. They will be

disposed to listen, patiently and impartially, to the pretensions of

both parties; of those who pray for the renewal of an exclusive

privilege, and of those who pray that they may not be again wholly

excluded from the right which has reverted. And although they may amply

allow the preference which is due to the former petitioners, yet they

will endeavour to ascertain, whether the latter may not, with safety to

the public interest, receive some enlargement of the benefits, which the

opportunity opens to them, and from which they have been so long

excluded.

 

While they thus look alternately to each of these interests, and are

engaged in striving to establish a reconciliation between the two, it

will be neither equitable nor liberal for one of the interested parties

to throw out a doubt to the Public, whether they do this "from a

consciousness of strength, and a desire of increasing their own power

and influence, or from a sense of weakness and a wish to strengthen

themselves by the adoption of popular measures[2]." And the author of

the doubt may find himself at length obliged to determine it, by an

awkward confession, that Ministers do not do it "with any view of

augmenting their own patronage and power[3]."

 

It is thus that the Ministers of the Crown have conducted themselves, in

the embarrassing crisis into which they have fallen. Fully sensible of

the just and honourable pretensions which the East India Company have

established in the course of their long, important, and distinguished

career, they have consented to recommend to Parliament, _to leave the

whole system of Indian Government and Revenue to the Company_, under the

provisions of the Act of 1793; together with _the exclusive trade to

China_, as they have hitherto possessed them; but, at the same time,

considering the present state of the world, and its calamitous effects

upon the commercial interest in general, they are of opinion, that some

participation in the Indian trade, thus reverting, might possibly be

conceded, under due regulations, to British merchants not belonging to

the East India Company; which would not impair the interests either of

the Public or of the Company.

 

In this moderate opinion, they are fully justified, by the consent of

the Company, to admit the Merchants of the out-ports to a share in the

Indian trade. And thus far, all is amicable. But the out-port Merchants

having represented to Government, that the condition, hitherto annexed

to a Licensed Import Trade,--of bringing back their Indian Cargoes to

the port of London, and of disposing of them solely in the Company's

sales, in Leadenhall Street,--would defeat the object of the concession;

and that the delay, embarrassment, and perplexity, which such an

arrangement would create, would destroy the simple plan of their

venture; and having therefore desired, that they might be empowered to

return with their cargoes to the ports from whence they originally

sailed, and to which all their interests are confined; Government, being

convinced of the justice of the representation, have proposed that the

Import Trade may be yielded to the Out-ports, _under proper

regulations_, as well as the Export Trade. To this demand the Court of

Directors peremptorily refuse their consent; and upon this _only point_

the parties are now at issue. This question alone, retards the final

arrangements for the renewal of their Charter.

 

Yet it is this point, which one of the parties interested affirms, to be

"a question of the last importance to the safety of the British Empire

in India, and of the British Constitution at home;" and therefore

undertakes to resist it, with all the determination which the importance

of so great a stake would naturally inspire. But, when we compare the

real measure in question with the menacing character which is thus

attempted to be attached to it, we at once perceive something so

extravagantly hyperbolical, something so disproportionate, that it at

once fixes the judgment; and forces upon it a suspicion, that there is

more of policy and design, than of truth and sincerity in the assertion.

That objections to the measure might arise, capable of distinct

statement and exposition, is a thing conceivable; and, these being

stated, it would be a subject for consideration, how far they were

removable. But to assert, in a round period, that the safety of the

empire in Europe and Asia is fundamentally affected in the requisition,

that a ship proceeding from Liverpool or Bristol to India, might return

from India to Liverpool or Bristol, instead of to the Port of London,

is calculated rather to shake, than to establish, confidence in those

who make the assertion. Yet this is the question which the country is

now called upon to consider, as one tending to convulse the British

Constitution. Surely, if the foundations of the empire in both

hemispheres have nothing more to threaten them, than whether the

out-port shipping shall carry their cargoes home to their respective

ports, or repair to the dock-yards in the port of London, the most timid

politician may dismiss his alarms and resume his confidence. When the

East India Company, by conceding a regulated Export Trade, have at once

demonstrated the absurdity of all the predictions which foretold, in

that Trade, the overthrow of the Indian Empire; we may confidently

believe, that the Import Trade will prove as little destructive, and

that its danger will be altogether as chimerical as the former.

 

Whether the Court of Directors endeavour to fix that menacing character

upon the proposed Import Trade, as a bar against any further

requisition, is a question which will naturally occur to any

dispassionate person, who is not immediately and personally interested

in the conditions of the Charter; and he will be strongly inclined to

the affirmative in that question, when he finds, that the reason which

they have alleged for their resistance, is their apprehension of the

increased activity which the practice of smuggling would acquire, from

the free return of the out-port ships from India to their respective

ports. It is not a little extraordinary, that they should so strenuously

urge this argument against those persons, who, while they propose the

measure, are themselves responsible for the good management and

protection of the revenue; and who must therefore be supposed to feel

the necessity of providing means and regulations, adapted to the measure

which they propose. The Ministers of the Crown have not failed to inform

the Court of Directors, that, in consequence of the communications which

they have had with the Commissioners of the Customs and Excise upon the

subject, they find that the Directors have greatly over-rated the danger

which they profess to entertain; and they acquaint them, that new

regulations will be provided to meet the new occasion; and that the

out-port ships and cargoes will be subject to forfeiture upon the

discovery of any illicit articles on board. Yet the Court of Directors

still persist in declaring, that the hazard of _smuggling_ is _the

reason_ why they will not grant to the out-ports an import trade; and