OTHER EVIDENCES OF CHRIST'S DIVINITY
Archdeacon Wilson
gives two reasons for accepting the doctrines of Christ's divinity and
Resurrection as true. The first of these reasons is, the success of the
Christian religion; the second is, the evolution of the Christlike type of
character.
If the success of the Christian religion proves that Christ
was God, what does the success of the Buddhist religion prove? What does
the success of the Mohammedan religion prove?
Was Buddha God? Was
Mahomet God?
The archdeacon does not believe in any miracles but those of
his own religion. But if the spread of a faith proves its miracles to
be true, what can be said about the spread of the Buddhist and
Mohammedan religions?
Islam spread faster and farther than
Christianity. So did Buddhism. To-day the numbers of these religions are
somewhat as follows:
Buddhist: 450 millions.
Christians: 375
millions, of which only 180 millions are Protestants.
Hindus: 200
millions.
Mohammedans: 160 millions.
It will be seen that the
Buddhist religion is older than Christianity, and has more followers. What
does that prove?
But as to the reasons for the great growth of these two
religions I will say more by and by. At present I merely repeat that the
Buddhist faith owed a great deal to the fact that King Asoka made it the
State religion of a great kingdom, and that Christianity owes a great deal to
the fact that Constantine adopted it as the State religion of the Roman
Empire.
We come now to the archdeacon's second argument: that the
divinity of Christ is proved by the evolution of the Christlike type of
character.
And here the archdeacon makes a most surprising statement, for
he says that type of character was unknown on this globe until Christ
came.
Then how are we to account for King Asoka?
The King Asoka of
the Rock Edicts was as spiritual, as gentle, as pure, and as loving as the
Christ of the Gospels.
The King Asoka of the Rock Edicts was wiser, more
tolerant, more humane than the Christ of the Gospels.
Nowhere did
Christ or the Fathers of His Church forbid slavery; nowhere did they forbid
religious intolerance; nowhere did they forbid cruelty to animals.
The
type of character displayed by the rock inscriptions of King Asoka was a
higher and sweeter type than the type of character displayed by the Jesus of
the Gospels.
Does this prove that King Asoka or his teacher, Buddha, was
divine? Does it prove that the Buddhist faith is the only true faith? I shall
treat this question more fully in another chapter.
Another
Christian argument is the claim that the faithfulness of the Christian
martyrs proves Christianity to be true. A most amazing argument. The fact
that a man dies for a faith does not prove the faith to be true; it proves
that he believes it to be true--a very different thing.
The Jews
denied the Christian faith, and died for their own. Does that prove that
Christianity was not true? Did the Protestant martyrs prove Protestantism
true? Then the Catholic martyrs proved the reverse.
The Christians
martyred or murdered millions, many millions, of innocent men and women. Does
_that_ prove that Christ was divine? No: it only proves that Christians could
be fanatical, intolerant, bloody, and cruel.
And now, will you ponder
these words of Arthur Lillie, M.A., the author of _Buddha and Buddhism_?
Speaking of the astonishing success of the Buddhist missionaries, Mr. Lillie
says:
This success was effected by moral means alone, for
Buddhism _is the one religion guiltless of coercion_.
Christians
are always boasting of the wonderful good works wrought by their religion.
They are silent about the horrors, infamies, and shames of which it has been
guilty.
Buddhism is the only religion with no blood upon its hands. I
submit another very significant quotation from Mr. Lillie:
I will
write down a few of the achievements of this inactive Buddha and the army of
Bhikshus that he directed:
1. The most formidable priestly tyranny
that the world had ever seen crumbled away before his attack, and the
followers of Buddha were paramount in India for a thousand
years.
2. The institution of caste was assailed and
overthrown.
3. Polygamy was for the first time assailed and
overturned.
4. Woman, from being considered a chattel and a beast of
burden, was for the first time considered man's equal, and allowed to
develop her spiritual life.
5. All bloodshed, whether with
the knife of the priest or the sword of the conqueror, was rigidly
forbidden.
6. Also, for the first time in the religious history of
mankind, the awakening of the spiritual life of the individual was
substituted for religion by body corporate.
7. The principle
of religious propagandism was for the first time introduced with its
two great instruments, the missionary and the preacher.
To that
list we may add that Buddhism abolished slavery and religious persecution;
taught temperance, chastity, and humanity; and invented the higher morality
and the idea of the brotherhood of the entire human race.
What does
_that_ prove? It seems to me to prove that Archdeacon Wilson is
mistaken.
THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION WHAT IS
CHRISTIANITY?
What _is_ Christianity? When I began to discuss
religion in the _Clarion_ I thought I knew what Christianity was. I thought
it was the religion I had been taught as a boy in Church of England
and Congregationalist Sunday schools. But since then I have read
many books, and pamphlets, and sermons, and articles intended to
explain what Christianity is, and I begin to think there are as many kinds
of Christianity as there are Christians. The differences are numerous
and profound: they are astonishing. That must be a strange revelation of
God which can be so differently interpreted.
Well, I cannot describe
all these variants, nor can I reduce them to a common denominator. The most I
can pretend to offer is a selection of some few doctrines to which all or
many Christians would subscribe.
1. All Christians believe in a
Supreme Being, called God, who created all beings. They all believe
that He is a good and loving God, and our Heavenly Father.
2.
Most Christians believe in Free Will.
3. All Christians believe that
Man has sinned and does sin against God.
4. All Christians believe
that Jesus Christ is in some way necessary to Man's "salvation," and
that without Christ Man will be "lost."
But when we ask for the
meaning of the terms "salvation" and "lost" the Christians give
conflicting or divergent answers.
5. All Christians believe in the
immortality of the soul. And I think they all, or nearly all, believe
in some kind of future punishment or reward.
6. Most
Christians believe that Christ was God.
7. Most Christians believe
that after crucifixion Christ rose from the dead and ascended into
Heaven.
8. Most Christians believe, or think they believe, in the
efficacy of prayer.
9. Most Christians believe in a Devil;
but he is a great many different kinds of a Devil.
Of these
beliefs I should say:
1. As to God. If there is no God, or if God is not
a loving Heavenly Father, who answers prayer, Christianity as a religion
cannot stand.
I do not pretend to say whether there is or is not a God,
but I deny that there is a loving Heavenly Father who answers
prayer.
2 and 3. If there is no such thing as Free Will Man could not
sin against God, and Christianity as a religion will not stand.
I deny
the existence of Free Will, and possibility of Man's sinning against
God.
4. If Jesus Christ is not necessary to Man's "salvation,"
Christianity as a religion will not stand.
I deny that Christ is
necessary to Man's salvation from Hell or from Sin.
5. I do not assert
or deny the immortality of the soul. I know nothing about the soul, and no
man is or ever was able to tell me more than I know.
Of the remaining
four doctrines I will speak in due course.
I spoke just now of the
religion I was taught in my boyhood, some forty years ago. As that religion
seems to be still very popular I will try to express it as briefly as I
can.
Adam was the first man, and the father of the human race. He was
created by God, in the likeness of God: that is to say, he was made
"perfect."
But, being tempted of the Devil, Adam sinned: he fell. God was
so angry with Adam for his sin that He condemned him and all his descendants
for five thousand years to a Hell of everlasting fire.
After
consigning all the generations of men for five thousand years to horrible
torment in Hell, God sent His Son, Jesus Christ, down on earth to die, and to
go Hell for three days, as an atonement for the sin of Adam.
After
Christ rose from the dead all who believed on Him and were baptised would go
to Heaven. All who did not believe on Him, or were not baptised, would go to
Hell, and burn for ever in a lake of fire.
That is what we were taught in
our youth; and that is what millions of Christians believe to-day. That is
the old religion of the Fall, of "Inherited Sin," of "Universal Damnation,"
and of atonement by the blood of Christ.
There is a new religion now,
which shuts out Adam and Eve, and the serpent, and the hell of fire, but
retains the "Fall," the "Sin against God," and the "Atonement by
Christ."
But in the new Atonement, as I understand, or try to understand
it, Christ is said to be God Himself, come down to win back to Himself
Man, who had estranged himself from God, or else God (as Christ) died to
save Man, not from Hell, but from Sin.
All these theories, old and
new, seem to me impossible.
I will deal first, in a short way, with the
new theories of the Atonement.
If Christ died to save Man from sin,
how is it that nineteen centuries after His death the world is full of
sin?
If God (the All-powerful God, who loves us better than an earthly
father loves his children) wished to forgive us the sin Adam committed
ages before we were born, why did He not forgive us without dying, or
causing His Son to die, on a cross?
If Christ is essential to a good
life on earth, how is it that many who believe in Him lead bad lives, while
many of the best men and women of this and former ages either never heard of
Christ or did not follow Him?
As to the theory that Christ (or God) died
to win back Man to Himself, it does not harmonise with the facts.
Man
never did estrange himself from God. All history shows that Man
has persistently and anxiously sought for God, and has served Him,
according to his light, with a blind devotion even to death and
crime.
Finally, Man never did, and never could, sin against God. For Man
is what God made him; could only act as God enabled him, or constructed
him to act, and therefore was not responsible for his act, and could not
sin against God.
If God is responsible for Man's existence, God is
responsible for Man's act. Therefore Man cannot sin against God.
But I
shall deal more fully with the subject of Free Will, and of the need for
Christ as our Saviour, in another part of this book.
Let us now turn
to the old idea of the Fall and the Atonement.
First, as to Adam and the
Fall and inherited sin. Evolution, historical research, and scientific
criticism have disposed of Adam. Adam was a myth. Hardly any educated
Christians now regard him as an historic person.
But--no Adam, no
Fall; no Fall, no Atonement; no Atonement, no Saviour. Accepting Evolution,
how can we believe in a Fall? _When_ did Man fall? Was it before he ceased to
be a monkey, or after? Was it when he was a tree man, or later? Was it in the
Stone Age, or the Bronze Age, or in the Age of Iron?
There never _was_
any "Fall." Evolution proves a long slow _rise_.
And if there never was a
Fall, why should there be any Atonement?
Christians accepting the theory
of evolution have to believe that God allowed the sun to form out of the
nebula, and the earth to form from the sun, that He allowed Man to develop
slowly from the speck of protoplasm in the sea. That at some period of Man's
gradual evolution from the brute, God found Man guilty of some sin, and
cursed him. That some thousands of years later God sent His only Son down
upon the earth to save Man from Hell.
But evolution shows Man to be,
even now, an imperfect creature, an unfinished work, a building still
undergoing alterations, an animal still evolving.
Whereas the
doctrines of "the Fall" and the Atonement assume that he was from the first a
finished creature, and responsible to God for his actions.
This old
doctrine of the Fall, and the Curse, and the Atonement is against reason as
well as against science.
The universe is boundless. We know it to contain
millions of suns, and suppose it to contain millions of millions of suns. Our
sun is but a speck in the universe. Our earth is but a speck in the solar
system.
Are we to believe that the God who created all this boundless
universe got so angry with the children of the apes that He condemned them
all to Hell for two score centuries, and then could only appease His rage
by sending His own Son to be nailed upon a cross? Do you believe that?
Can you believe it?
No. As I said before, if the theory of evolution
be true, there was nothing to atone for, and nobody to atone. _Man has never
sinned against God._ In fact, the whole of this old Christian doctrine is a
mass of error. There was no creation. There was no Fall. There was no
Atonement. There was no Adam, and no Eve, and no Eden, and no Devil, and no
Hell.
If God is all-powerful, He had power to make Man by nature
incapable of sin. But if, having the power to make Man incapable of sin, God
made Man so weak as to "fall," then it was God who sinned against Man, and
not Man against God.
For if I had power to train a son of mine to
righteousness, and I trained him to wickedness, should I not sin against my
son?
Or if a man had power to create a child of virtue and intellect,
but chose rather to create a child who was by nature a criminal or an
idiot, would not that man sin against his child?
And do you believe
that "our Father in Heaven, our All-powerful God, who is Love," would first
create man fallible, and then punish him for falling?
And if He did so
create and so punish man, could you call that just or merciful?
And if
God is our "maker," who but He is responsible for our make-up?
And if He
alone is responsible, how can Man have sinned against God?
I maintain
that besides being unhistorical and unreasonable, the old doctrine of the
Atonement is unjust and immoral.
The doctrine of the Atonement is not
just nor moral, because it implies that man should not be punished or
rewarded according to his own merit or demerit, but according to the merit of
another.
Is it just, or is it moral, to make the good suffer for the
bad?
Is it just or moral to forgive one man his sin because another
is sinless? Such a doctrine--the doctrine of Salvation for Christ's
sake, and after a life of crime--holds out inducements to
sin.
Repentance is only good because it is the precursor of reform. But
no repentance can merit pardon, nor atone for wrong. If, having done
wrong, I repent, and afterwards do right, that is good. But to be sorry and
not to reform is not good.
If I do wrong, my repentance will not
cancel that wrong. An act performed is performed for ever.
If I cut a
man's hand off, I may repent, and he may pardon me. But neither my remorse
nor his forgiveness will make the hand grow again. And if the hand could grow
again, the wrong I did would still have been done.
That is a stern
morality, but it is moral. Your doctrine of pardon "for Christ's sake" is not
moral. God acts unjustly when He pardons for Christ's sake. Christ acts
unjustly when He asks that pardon be granted for his sake. If one man injures
another, the prerogative of pardon should belong to the injured man. It is
for him who suffers to forgive.
If your son injure your daughter, the
pardon must come from her. It would not be just for you to say: "He has
wronged you, and has made no atonement, but I forgive him." Nor would it be
just for you to forgive him because another son of yours was willing to be
punished in his stead. Nor would it be just for that other son to come
forward, and say to you, and not to his injured sister, "Father, forgive him
for my sake."
He who wrongs a fellow-creature wrongs himself as well,
and wrongs both for all eternity. Let this awful thought keep us just. It is
more moral and more corrective than any trust in the vicarious atonement of
a Saviour.
Christ's Atonement, or any other person's atonement, cannot
_justly_ be accepted. For the fact that Christ is willing to suffer for
another man's sin only counts to the merit of Christ, and does not in any
way diminish the offence of the sinner. If I am bad, does it make my
offence the less that another man is so much better?
If a just man had
two servants, and one of them did wrong, and if the other offered to endure a
flogging in expiation of his fault, what would the just man do?
To
flog John for the fault of James would be to punish John for being better
than James. To forgive James because John had been unjustly flogged would be
to assert that because John was good, and because the master had acted
unjustly, James the guilty deserved to be forgiven.
This is not only
contrary to reason and to justice: it is also a very false
sentiment.
DETERMINISM
CAN MAN SIN AGAINST
GOD?
I have said several times that Man could not and cannot sin
against God.
This is the theory of Determinism, and I will now explain
it.
_If God is responsible for Man's existence, God is responsible for
Man's acts._
The Christian says God is our Maker. God _made_
Man.
Who is responsible for the quality or powers of a thing that is
made?
The thing that is made cannot be responsible, for it did not
make itself. But the maker is responsible, for he _made_ it.
As Man
did not make himself, and had neither act, nor voice, nor suggestion, nor
choice in the creation of his own nature, Man cannot be held answerable for
the qualities or powers of his nature, and therefore cannot be held
responsible for his acts.
If God made Man, God is responsible for the
qualities and powers of Man's nature, and therefore God is responsible for
Man's acts.
Christian theology is built upon the sandy foundation of the
doctrine of Free Will. The Christian theory may be thus expressed:
God
gave Man a will to choose. Man chose evil, therefore Man is wicked, and
deserves punishment.
The Christian says God _gave_ Man a will. The will,
then, came from God, and was not made nor selected by Man.
And this
Will, the Christian says, is the "power to choose."
Then, this "power to
choose" is of God's making and of God's gift.
Man has only one will,
therefore he has only one "power of choice." Therefore he has no power of
choice but the power God gave him. Then, Man can only choose by means of that
power which God gave him, and he cannot choose by any other
means.
Then, if Man chooses evil, he chooses evil by means of the power
of choice God gave him.
Then, if that power of choice given to him by
God makes for evil, it follows that Man must choose evil, since he has no
other power of choice.
Then, the only power of choice God gave Man is
a power that will choose evil.
Then, Man is unable to choose good
because his only power of choice will choose evil.
Then, as Man did
not make nor select his power of choice, Man cannot be blamed if that power
chooses evil.
Then, the blame must be God's, who gave Man a power of
choice that would choose evil.
Then, Man cannot sin against God, for
Man can only use the power God gave him, and can only use that power in the
way in which that power will work.
The word "will" is a misleading
word. What is will? Will is not a faculty, like the faculty of speech or
touch. The word will is a symbol, and means the balance between two motives
or desires.
Will is like the action of balance in a pair of scales. It is
the weights in the scales that decide the balance. So it is the motives
in the mind that decide the will. When a man chooses between two acts we
say that he "exercises his will"; but the fact is, that one motive weighs
down the other, and causes the balance of the mind to lean to the weightier
reason. There is no such thing as an exterior will outside the man's brain,
to push one scale down with a finger. Will is abstract,
not concrete.
A man always "wills" in favour of the weightier motive.
If he loves the sense of intoxication more than he loves his self-respect, he
will drink. If the reasons in favour of sobriety seem to him to outweigh
the reasons in favour of drink, he will keep sober.
Will, then, is a
symbol for the balance of motives. Motives are born of the brain. Therefore
will depends upon the action of the brain.
God made the brain; therefore
God is responsible for the action of the brain; therefore God is responsible
for the action of the will.
Therefore Man is not responsible for the
action of the will. Therefore Man cannot sin against God.
Christians
speak of the will as if it were a kind of separate soul, a "little cherub who
sits up aloft" and gives the man his course.
Let us accept this idea of
the will. Let us suppose that a separate soul or faculty called the will
governs the mind. That means that the "little cherub" governs the
man.
Can the man be justly blamed for the acts of the cherub?
No.
Man did not make the cherub, did not select the cherub, and is obliged to
obey the cherub.
God made the cherub, and gave him command of the man.
Therefore God alone is responsible for the acts the man performs in obedience
to the cherub's orders.
If God put a beggar on horseback, would the
horse be blamable for galloping to Monte Carlo? The horse must obey the
rider. The rider was made by God. How, then, can God blame the
horse?
If God put a "will" on Adam's back, and the will followed the
beckoning finger of Eve, whose fault was that?
The old Christian
doctrine was that Adam was made perfect, and that he fell. (How could the
"perfect" fall?)
Why did Adam fall? He fell because the woman tempted
him.
Then Adam was not strong enough to resist the woman. Then, the woman
had power to overcome Adam's will. As the Christian would express it,
"Eve had the stronger will."
Who made Adam? God made him. Who made
Eve? God made her. Who made the Serpent? God made the Serpent.
Then,
if God made Adam weak, and Eve seductive, and the Serpent subtle, was that
Adam's fault or God's?
Did Adam choose that Eve should have a stronger
will than he, or that the Serpent should have a stronger will than Eve? No.
God fixed all those things.
God is all-powerful. He could have made
Adam strong enough to resist Eve. He could have made Eve strong enough to
resist the Serpent. He need not have made the Serpent at all.
God is
all-knowing. Therefore, when He made Adam and Eve and the Serpent He knew
that Adam and Eve _must_ fall. And if God knew they _must_ fall, how could
Adam help falling, and how _could_ he justly be blamed for doing what he
_must_ do?
God made a bridge--built it _Himself_, of His own materials,
to His own design, and knew what the bearing strain of the bridge
was.
If, then, God put upon the bridge a weight equal to double the
bearing strain, how could God justly blame the bridge for falling?
The
doctrine of Free Will implies that God knowingly made the Serpent subtle, Eve
seductive, and Adam weak, and then damned the whole human race because a
bridge He had built to fall did not succeed in standing.
Such a theory is
ridiculous; but upon it depends the entire fabric of Christian
theology.
For if Man is not responsible for his acts, and therefore
cannot sin against God, there is no foundation for the doctrines of the Fall,
the Sin, the Curse, or the Atonement.
If Man cannot sin against God,
and if God is responsible for all Man's acts, the Old Testament is not true,
the New Testament is not true, the Christian religion is not true.
And
if you consider the numerous crimes and blunders of the Christian Church, you
will always find that they grew out of the theory of Free Will, and the
doctrines of Man's sin against God, and Man's responsibility and
"wickedness."
St. Paul said, "As in Adam all men fell, so in Christ are
all made whole." If Adam did not fall St. Paul was mistaken.
Christ is
reported to have prayed on the cross, "Father, forgive them, for they know
not what they do."
That looks as if Jesus knew that the men were not
responsible for their acts, and did not know any better. But if they knew not
what they did, why should God be asked to _forgive_ them?
But let us
go over the Determinist theory again, for it is most important.
_If
God is responsible for Man's existence, God is responsible for
Man's acts_.
The Christians say Man sinned, and they talk about his
freedom of choice. But they say God made Man, as He made all
things.
Now, if God is all-knowing, He knew before He made Man what Man
would do. He knew that Man could do nothing but what God had enabled him
to do. That he could do nothing but what he was foreordained by God to
do.
If God is all-powerful, He need not have made Man at all. Or He
could have made a man who would be strong enough to resist temptation. Or
He could have made a man who was incapable of evil.
If the
All-powerful God made a man, knowing that man would succumb to the test to
which God meant to subject him, surely God could not justly blame the man for
being no better than God had made him.
If God had never made Man, then
Man never could have succumbed to temptation. God made Man of His own divine
choice, and made him to His own divine desire.
How, then, could God
blame Man for anything Man did?
God was responsible for Man's
_existence_, for God made him. If God had not made him, Man could never have
been, and could never have acted. Therefore all that Man did was the result
of God's creation of Man.
All man's acts were the effects of which his
creation was the cause: and God was responsible for the cause, and therefore
God was responsible for the effects.
Man did not make himself. Man
could not, before he existed, have asked God to make him. Man could not
advise nor control God so as to influence his own nature. Man could only be
what God caused him to be, and do what God enabled or compelled him to
do.
Man might justly say to God: "I did not ask to be created. I did not
ask to be sent into this world. I had no power to select or mould my
nature. I am what You made me. I am where You put me. You knew when You
made me how I should act. If You wished me to act otherwise, why did You
not make me differently? If I have displeased You, I was fore-ordained
to displease You. I was fore-ordained by You to be and to do what I am and
have done. Is it my fault that You fore-ordained me to be and to
do thus?"
Christians say a man has a will to choose. So he has. But
that is only saying that one human thought will outweigh another. A man
thinks with his brain: his brain was made by God.
A tall man can reach
higher than a short man. It is not the fault of the short man that he is
outreached: he did not fix his own height.
It is the same with the will.
A man has a will to jump. He can jump over a five-barred gate; but he cannot
jump over a cathedral.
So with his will in moral matters. He has a will
to resist temptation, but though he may clear a small temptation, he may fall
at a large one.
The actions of a man's will are as mathematically fixed
at his birth as are the motions of a planet in its orbit.
God, who
made the man and the planet, is responsible for the actions
of both.
As the natural forces created by God regulate the influences
of Venus and Mars upon the Earth, so must the natural forces created by God
have regulated the influences of Eve and the Serpent on Adam.
Adam was
no more blameworthy for failing to resist the influence of Eve than the Earth
is blameworthy for deviating in its course around the Sun, in obedience to
the influences of Venus and Mars.
Without the act of God there could have
been no Adam, and therefore no Fall. God, whose act is responsible for Adam's
existence, is responsible for the Fall.
_If God is responsible for
man's existence, God is responsible for all Man's acts._
If a boy
brought a dog into the house and teased it until it bit him, would not his
parents ask the boy, "Why did you bring the dog in at all?"
But if the
boy had trained the dog to bite, and knew that it would bite if it were
teased, and if the boy brought the dog in and teased it until it bit him,
would the parents blame the dog?
And if a magician, like one of those at
the court of Pharaoh, deliberately made an adder out of the dust, knowing the
adder would bite, and then played with the adder until it bit some spectator,
would the injured man blame the magician or the adder?
How, then,
could God blame Man for the Fall?
But you may ask me, with surprise, as
so many have asked me with surprise, "Do you really mean that no man is,
under any circumstances, to be blamed for anything he may say or
do?"
And I shall answer you that I do seriously mean that no man can,
under any circumstances, be justly blamed for anything he may say or do.
That is one of my deepest convictions, and I shall try very hard to
prove that it is just.
But you may say, as many have said: "If no man
can be justly blamed for anything he says or does, there is an end of all law
and order, and society is impossible."
And I shall answer you: "No, on
the contrary, there is a beginning of law and order, and a chance that
society may become civilised."
For it does not follow that because we may
not blame a man we may not condemn his acts. Nor that because we do not blame
him we are bound to allow him to do all manner of mischief.
Several
critics have indignantly exclaimed that I make no difference between good men
and bad, that I lump Torquemada, Lucrezia Borgia, Fenelon, and Marcus
Aurelius together, and condone the most awful crimes.
That is a
mistake. I regard Lucrezia Borgia as a homicidal maniac, and Torquemada as a
religious maniac. I do not _blame_ such men and women. But I should not allow
them to do harm.
I believe that nearly all crimes, vices, cruelties, and
other evil acts are due to ignorance or to mental disease. I do not hate the
man who calls me an infidel, a liar, a blasphemer, or a quack. I know that he
is ignorant, or foolish, or ill-bred, or vicious, and I am sorry for
him.
Socrates, as reported by Xenophon, put my case in a nutshell. When
a friend complained to Socrates that a man whom he had saluted had
not saluted him in return, the father of philosophy replied: "It is an
odd thing that if you had met a man ill-conditioned in body you would
not have been angry; but to have met a man rudely disposed in mind
provokes you."
This is sound philosophy, I think. If we pity a man
with a twist in his spine, why should we not pity the man with a twist in his
brain? If we pity a man with a stiff wrist, why not the man with a stiff
pride? If we pity a man with a weak heart, why not the man with the weak
will? If we do not blame a man for one kind of defect, why blame him for
another?
But it does not follow that because we neither hate nor blame a
criminal we should allow him to commit crime.
We do not blame a
rattlesnake, nor a shark. These creatures only fulfil their natures. The
shark who devours a baby is no more sinful than the lady who eats a shrimp.
We do not blame the maniac who burns a house down and brains a policeman, nor
the mad dog who bites a minor poet. But, none the less, we take steps to
defend ourselves against snakes, sharks, lunatics, and mad dogs.
The
_Clarion_ does not hate a cruel sweater, nor a tyrannous landlord, nor a
shuffling Minister of State, nor a hypocritical politician: it pities such
poor creatures. Yet the _Clarion_ opposes sweating and tyranny and hypocrisy,
and does its best to defeat and to destroy them.
If a tiger be hungry he
naturally seeks food. I do not blame the tiger; but if he endeavoured to make
his dinner off our business manager, and if I had a gun, I should shoot the
tiger.
We do not hate nor blame the blight that destroys our roses and
our vines. The blight is doing what we do: he is trying to live. But
we destroy the blight to preserve our roses and our grapes.
So we do
not blame an incendiary. But we are quite justified in protecting life and
property. Dangerous men must be restrained. In cases where they attempt to
kill and maim innocent and useful citizens, as, for instance, by dynamite
outrages, they must, in the last resort, be killed.
"But," you may
say, "the dynamiter knows it is wrong to wreck a street and murder
inoffensive strangers, and yet he does it. Is not that free will? Is he not
blameworthy?"
And I answer that when a man does wrong he does it because
he knows no better, or because he is naturally vicious.
And I hold
that in neither case is he to blame: for he did not make his nature, nor did
he make the influences which have operated on that nature.
Man is a
creature of Heredity and Environment. He is by Heredity what his ancestors
have made him (or what God has made him). Up to the moment of his birth he
has had nothing to do with the formation of his character. As Professor
Tyndall says, "that was done _for_ him, and not _by_ him." From the moment of
his birth he is what his inherited nature, and the influences into which he
has been sent without his consent, have made him.
An omniscient
being--like God--who knew exactly what a man's nature would be at birth, and
exactly the nature of the influences to which he would be exposed after his
birth, could predict every act and word of that man's life.
Given a
particular nature; given particular influences, the result will be as
mathematically inevitable as the speed and orbit of a planet.
Man is what
heredity (or God) and environment make him. Heredity gives him his nature.
That comes from his ancestors. Environment modifies his nature: environment
consists of the operation of forces external to his nature. No man can select
his ancestors; no man can select his environment. His ancestors make his
nature; other men, and circumstances, modify his nature.
Ask any
horse-breeder why he breeds from the best horses, and not from the worst. He
will tell you, because good horses are not bred from bad ones.
Ask any
father why he would prefer that his son should mix with good companions
rather than with bad companions. He will tell you that evil communications
corrupt good manners, and pitch defiles.
Heredity decides how a man shall
be bred; environment regulates what he shall learn. |
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