The Letters of Gracchus on the East India Question 7
But Parliament has never, directly nor indirectly, made itself a
_collateral security_ to the Proprietors, for the payment of a dividend
of 10½ percent. The aids, at different times granted by Parliament,
have proceeded from a mixed principle, of _equity_ and of _liberal
support_. Of _equity_, in so far as the embarrassments of the Company
have been occasioned by political events; of _liberal support_, in so
far as those embarrassments may have been caused by disappointment in
trade. If the Proprietors should not discriminate between these two
principles which have actuated Parliament, but claim the whole of the
succours afforded, upon a ground of _positive right_, they might impose
upon Parliament the necessity of requiring the East India Company to
bring their affairs to a final settlement; in order that it may be
accurately determined, how far the Public are equitably pledged to the
Proprietors, and how far the Proprietors must be left to settle their
own accounts with the Company alone. And it is possible, that the result
might not afford that confidence of a well-secured dividend of ten and a
half per cent., which an OLD PROPRIETOR considers it an attack upon
private property even to question.
Such an issue, however, does not appear to be very likely to occur,
unless the Managers of the East India Company's concerns, from any
ill-advised determination in their counsels, should take some steps, by
which their affairs should be abruptly brought to a settlement: in which
event, any disappointment or loss sustained by the Proprietors will be
chargeable upon those Managers, who thus desert their duty to their
Constituents; and not on the Public, or the Government. The Managers of
the East India Company, having so clear and responsible a duty binding
upon them, ought to be most scrupulous of failing in that duty, through
any capricious or speculative "_adherence to points not essential to
their existence_;" for, if they should sacrifice the interest of the
Proprietors by now attempting to convert their _temporary grants_ into a
_perpetual right_; although the disappointed Proprietors may arraign the
Public, yet the Public at large will, with justice, impeach the Managers
of the East India Company.
In order to open the eyes of the Proprietors to the simple fact of their
actual position, their attention was called by Gracchus, on the 13th
inst. to the consideration, whether the Company, loaded with a debt of
42,000,000l. and being unable to discharge the sum of four millions
becoming due, could reasonably expect, that if Parliament should now
come to their immediate relief, it would engage itself, _in all future
time_, for the payment of a dividend of ten and a half per cent.;
especially, if, upon any contingent winding up of the Company's affairs,
called for by their own pertinacity, their remaining resources should be
found inadequate to secure that dividend to the Proprietors? And the
possible case was suggested, of some guardian of the public purse
deeming it equitable, that in the event of Parliament being disposed to
come to the relief of the Proprietors, under such circumstances, the
latter should be called upon, on their part, to submit to some condition
of accommodation.
"An OLD PROPRIETOR" discovers in this argument of caution, only _a
direct menace_ from the Executive Government to the purses of the
Proprietors;--a plain and intelligible _threat_, that payment of their
just claims shall be withheld; and he "thanks God, that he lives in a
country, where such language will be treated with merited scorn." This
OLD PROPRIETOR should have known, that Government has never declined to
settle any accounts with the East India Company, which had been properly
authenticated: under present circumstances, it is not to be expected,
that Government should incur the responsibility of applying the public
money to discharge claims which have not been sufficiently investigated.
So far, however, is Government from having evinced any disposition to
throw unnecessary difficulties in the way of the Company's pecuniary
arrangements, that, in the midst of the present contest with the
Directors, it has granted to the Company a suspension of the payment of
between 8 and 900,000l. of tea duties, which the Company had actually
received from the buyers of the tea. It is perhaps not generally known,
that the Company formerly paid the duties upon tea upon its being
imported and landed; by which means the amount of duties was immediately
drawn into the Exchequer. To accommodate the Company, a change of
practice was allowed by Government, and the Company have been permitted
to sell their teas, in the first instance, without the interference of
the Officers of the Customs, upon condition of the Company afterwards
remitting the gross amount of duties to the Board of Revenue. Thus they
actually make their own profits upon the tea, and receive into their own
hands the Government duties, before they are called upon to pay them.
The duties actually so received by the Company, amount to the sum above
stated; and the _Old Proprietor_ will probably deem it no slight proof
of a wish on the part of Government to render an accommodation to the
Company, that, during the pending discussion, it has made arrangements
for allowing the Company an extended period, for transferring the very
considerable sum of which they have actually received the beneficial
use.
It should be always remembered, by the Company, and by the Public, as
parties in a great compact, that the privilege of an exclusive trade to
India and China has never been granted to the Company without reserve;
or, as if their possession of that exclusive benefit was, _in itself_,
the most advantageous arrangement for the public interest. The grant has
always proceeded upon a principle, of bargain and covenant; and on the
consideration of a pecuniary, advance, to be made by the Company to the
Public, as the condition for the renewal of _the lease of the public
rights in the India trade_. Upon this principle alone, has the exclusive
trade ever been conceded to the East India Company; either under its
present form, or under any of its former denominations.
To shorten the discussion, however, let the Proprietors and the Company
take the following compressed view, of the probable consequences which
would severally result, from a _compliance with_, or _rejection of_, the
proposition made by Government, as the basis of a new Charter; and let
them consider, in _which of the two_ they foresee the greatest security
for their own future interests.
If, upon maturely weighing the case before them, the Company should
accede to the proposition of Government; and if an arrangement, founded
upon that proposition, should receive the sanction of Parliament;
1. The Company will preserve _the entire China trade_; and this
principal sphere of their commercial profit, will remain undisturbed.
2. They will possess advantages for continuing to carry on the India
trade, so far superior to those of all private competitors, from _their
territorial and commercial revenues_, that, with a moderate exertion of
their activity, they may preserve almost the whole of that trade.
3. They will possess _the regulation and control of the India trade_, so
far as depends upon the Indian Governments; and as those Governments
will continue in the exercise of the executive power, all the private
Merchants, who may repair to the ports and harbours within the extensive
limits of their jurisdiction, will of course _be subject to the
authority of their Government_.
4. They will retain the whole patronage and expenditure of a revenue of
upwards of _Fifteen Millions_ sterling per annum in India, together with
very extensive establishments at home, depending upon that revenue.
5. The accounts between the Public and the Company, being brought to no
sudden and violent crisis of settlement, may be amicably and leisurely
adjusted, with a view to mutual convenience.
On the other hand, should the Company incautiously drop the _substance_
to pursue the _shadow_, and refuse the proposition of Government; and
should Parliament, upon a full and deliberate consideration of the
actual circumstances of the Company, deem it more advisable to bring
their accounts with the Public to a thorough investigation and final
settlement, than to admit the Company's new pretensions to _a perpetual
monopoly_;
1. The Company will lose as much of the China trade as may fall into the
hands of the private merchants, who _think_ they shall be able to sell
tea 85 per cent. cheaper than the Company.
2. They will lose the control of the India commerce, _and will carry on
their traffic in India as subjects_, in common with the private British
merchants.
3. By that loss, voluntarily incurred, they may throw the greatest part
of the trade into the hands of the private traders.
4. They will _lose the patronage of India, and the establishments
depending upon it_; which they will thus compel Parliament, contrary to
the disposition of Government, to place under different arrangements.
5. The accounts between the Public and the Company must be referred for
investigation to Commissioners of Inquiry, to be finally settled and
adjusted.
It is now for the Proprietors, after well considering these two
alternatives, to determine, under _which of the two_ their dividend will
be _most secure_.
With regard to Constitutional objections against taking the Government
of India out of the hands of the Company (upon which objection their
confidence in their present pretensions chiefly reposes), it is
difficult to conceive that the wisdom of Parliament, after the
experience of so many years, is unequal to the task of devising a system
as good as that of the Company, without incurring the evil which those
Constitutional objections suppose. The Company's Government, it must be
recollected, has been a production of chance, and has grown by the
progress of accidental events. It has, indeed, answered far better in
practice than could have been expected, if we consider its origin; and
therefore, it is not desirable that it should be materially altered;
neither is it likely that any such alteration of the system should be
contemplated, unless the indiscretion of the Company should impose upon
Parliament the necessity of resorting to that measure. But it certainly
does not seem to be a measure insuperably difficult, to preserve
whatever is really good in the present system, and even to remedy some
of its defects, without departing from the path of experience, and
resorting to improvements of theory and experiment.
There is one point of view, however, in which such a system would
acquire an evident advantage over that which has hitherto obtained: viz.
that it would, in every Session, be liable to the revision of
Parliament, and to the immediate correction of every error which might
be observed, and to such further continual improvements as experience
might direct; _not being embarrassed by the compact of a Charter_.
GRACCHUS.
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