2015년 9월 3일 목요일

The Letters of Gracchus on the East India Question 6

The Letters of Gracchus on the East India Question 6


The regulations, which were adopted for ships importing from India to
the out-ports, are to be found in the Act 9 and 10 William III. c. 44.
s. 69. and were as follows:--
 
 
"Provided always, and it is here enacted, that no Company, or
_particular person or persons_, who shall have a right, in
pursuance of this Act, to trade to the East Indies, or other parts
within the limits aforesaid, shall be allowed to trade, until
_sufficient security_ shall be first given (which the Commissioners
of the Customs in England, or any three or more of them for the
time being, are hereby authorized and required to take, in the
name and to the use of His Majesty, his heirs and successors), that
such Company, or _particular persons_, shall cause all the goods,
wares, merchandise, and commodities, which shall at any time or
times hereafter, during the continuance of this Act, be laden by or
for them, or _any of them_, or for their, or any of their accounts,
in _any ship_ or ships whatsoever, bound from the said East Indies,
or parts within the limits aforesaid, to be brought (without
breaking bulk), to _some port of England or Wales_, and _there be
unladen and put to land_, &c. And that all goods and merchandises
belonging to the Company aforesaid, or _any other traders to the
East Indies_, and which shall be _imported into England or Wales_,
as aforesaid, pursuant to this Act, shall by them be sold openly
and publicly, by inch of candle, _upon their respective accounts_,
and not otherwise."
 
 
Upon this Act of the 9th and 10th of William III. was built, in the
following year, that famous Charter of the Company, upon which they rest
the weight of their pretensions; and that very Charter, as is here
rendered incontestable by the Act itself, comprehended the principle,
_of an Import Trade from India to the_ OUT-PORTS _of the kingdom_.
 
The form and condition of the security which was to be given by the
out-port merchants, will be found in the Act, 6th Anne, c. 3. entitled,
"_An Act for better securing the duties on East India goods_." By that
Act, the security to be given was fixed "at the rate of 2500l. sterling
for every hundred ton their ships or vessels shall be respectively let
for;" and the _only_ restriction imposed upon the import trade from
India was, that it should be brought "_to some port in Great Britain_."
 
Thus, then, any man who looks but a little beyond the objects which lie
accidentally before his eyes, may see, that the measure now suggested by
Government, instead of being a wild and airy speculation, a theoretical
innovation, a _new_, untried, and dangerous experiment, on which we have
no ground to reason from experience (as it has been ignorantly and
falsely asserted), is nothing more than reverting to an _ancient_
principle, involved in the Company's applauded Charter of the 10th of
William the Third, and to the practice of our forefathers in the
brightest period of our domestic history; a period, in which the British
Constitution received its last perfection, and from which the present
power and greatness of the British Empire, in the East and in the West,
dates its origin.
 
Having sufficiently proved and established this _great fact_, let us
next inquire, what history reveals to us, of _the consequences_ of that
import trade to the out-ports, that can tend, in any degree, to justify,
or give support to, the Company, in determining to resort to an
alternative which, they acknowledge, will subvert the system of Indian
Government (and thereby shake the Constitution at home), rather than
_renew the measure_ of a regulated trade to the out-ports.
 
We have not to deduce these consequences from _abstract hypothesis_, but
from _historical testimony_; let us, then, observe what that testimony
unfolds. No evil, of any kind whatever, resulted to the incorporated, or
Joint Stock Company, from the privilege enjoyed by the out ports. On the
contrary, that _Joint Stock Company_, issuing out of the General Society
of Merchants (which, as has been above stated, soon became the English
East India Company), rose above all their competitors, notwithstanding
the power of importing, without limitation, to _any of the ports of the
kingdom_; and such was the rapidity of their progress, that they
overcame the former, or London Company; they obtained a surrender of all
their rights to St. Helena, Bombay, and all their other islands and
settlements in India; they at length received that ancient Company into
their own body; and finally became the United East India Company of the
present day. And so little did the competition and free import of the
general merchants tend to obstruct the growth of the United Company,
even in the age of its _infancy_; and so "superior were the advantages
they derived from trading with a joint-stock (to use the words of one of
the Company's most strenuous champions), that at the time of the union
of the two Companies, out of the whole loan of two millions, only
7000l. then remained the property of the _separate traders of the
General Society_; and this sum also was soon absorbed in the United
Company[4]." If then the Company, starting originally with only a joint
stock, against a competition in the out-ports of the kingdom, with a
power to import to those out-ports, outstripped and overcame all their
competitors; what can they seriously apprehend from a renewal of the
same experiment, in the present momentum of their power, and when they
are able to unite with their joint-stock, the whole of the revenues of
their present empire in the East?
 
But it may be asked, if no better success is likely to attend the
commercial speculations of the out-ports, why is so strong an effort
made, to admit them to a share in the India trade? The answer is
obvious. When Mr. Dundas, in the year 1800, so forcibly expressed his
opinion against any such admission, he did not ground that opinion upon
a question of _ports_, but of _commercial capital_. He considered the
capital of the Company as sufficient for all the advantage which the
Public, in the aggregate, could derive from the India Trade; and he
maintained, that the aggregate interest of the Public would suffer from
any measure, tending "to divert any larger proportion of the commercial
capital of the country from a more advantageous and more profitable
use." But the circumstances of the world are become materially altered,
since the period of 1800. The commercial capital, of which Mr. Dundas
then reasoned, is deprived of that advantageous and profitable
employment which his argument supposed, and is therefore without
application or direction; from whence it has resulted, that the
operation of commerce is interrupted, and its activity suspended. The
allowing that capital to be partially directed to the markets of India,
would therefore, under present circumstances, have the great national
advantage, of recovering the activity and spirit of commerce, and of
encouraging an extensive public interest which is at present
disappointed, if not dormant; and, whenever a more prosperous state of
things should return, the capital so engaged for a time, would, from the
nature of commerce, unquestionably recall itself, and seek again a more
profitable market, if any such should open. In the mean time, the East
India Company, adding to their joint-stock all the revenues of India,
need hardly know, because they could not _feel_, that they had any
competitors in the markets of India. And, as the Executive Government
was able to guard the out-ports against smuggling in the period of _the
infancy_ of the Company, they might and ought to feel a perfect
confidence, that the same authority can guard them equally now, in the
present period of _their maturity_.
 
Thus, since history renders it indisputable, that an import trade from
India to the out-ports of the kingdom has been heretofore exercised
under Acts of Parliament, and that it may be perfectly compatible with
the highest prosperity of the East India Company; since the Executive
Government can guard it against smuggling at the present day, as well as
in the reigns of King William and Queen Anne; and since a great and
urgent national interest reasonably demands it, both from Parliament and
the Company; the present moment furnishes a most fit occasion for the
Company to consider, Mr. Dundas's solemn call upon "their wisdom,
policy, and liberality," made by him to them in the year 1800; and also,
his weighty admonition, that "_if any thing can endanger their monopoly,
it is_ AN UNNECESSARY ADHERENCE TO POINTS NOT ESSENTIAL TO THEIR
EXISTENCE."
 
It has been called _illiberal_, to question the motives of the
Directors, in refusing their consent to an import trade to the
out-ports. But, with the facts of history, which have been here
produced, staring us and them in the face, it would be impossible not to
question those motives. No man can entertain a higher respect for the
East India Company, as a body politic and corporate, or contemplate with
higher admiration the distinguished career which it has run, than
Gracchus; but, at the same time, no one is better persuaded of the
operation of _policy_, in a body circumstanced as they are. And it is
more especially necessary to watch that policy, and to be free to
interpret _political motives_, at the present crisis, because, at the
eve of the expiration of the Company's _last_ Charter, in 1793, certain
rights were anxiously alleged on their behalf, in a work entitled, "_A
Short History of the East India Company_, &c." rights absolutely
unmaintainable, and utterly incompatible with the sovereignty of the
Empire, and the freedom of the Constitution; and the allegations then
made, appear now to assume the form of _a practical assertion_. To those
alleged rights, therefore, it will be advisable early to call the
attention of Parliament and of the nation.
 
GRACCHUS.
 
FOOTNOTE:
 
[4] A Short History of the East India Company.
 
 
 
 
LETTER VII.
 
 
_Wednesday, Jan. 27, 1813._
 
There is an irritability manifested at the present moment, by those who
are intimately united in interest with the East India Company, which
appears strongly indicative of an unhealthy case. It is well known, that
the revenues of the Company, far from being able to contribute to the
revenues of the State that augmentation which was made the condition of
the Company's present Charter, have, from causes which the Directors
could not control, been so deficient, that they have been obliged, at
different times, to apply to Parliament for pecuniary aid; that they are
burdened with a debt of not less than forty-two millions; and that they
are _now_ unable to discharge their engagements, without again coming to

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