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The last reflection of the Stoic philosophy that I have observed
is in
Simplicius' Commentary on the Enchiridion of Epictetus. Simplicius
was
not a Christian, and such a man was not likely to be converted at a
time
when Christianity was grossly corrupted. But he was a really
religious
man, and he concludes his commentary with a prayer to the Deity
which no
Christian could improve. From the time of Zeno to Simplicius, a
period
of about nine hundred years, the Stoic philosophy formed the
characters
of some of the best and greatest men. Finally it became extinct,
and we
hear no more of it till the revival of letters in Italy.
Angelo
Poliziano met with two very inaccurate and incomplete manuscripts
of
Epictetus' Enchiridion, which he translated into Latin and dedicated
to
his great patron Lorenzo de' Medici, in whose collection he had
found
the book. Poliziano's version was printed in the first Bale edition
of
the Enchiridion, A.D. 1531 (apud And. Cratandrum). Poliziano
recommends
the Enchiridion to Lorenzo as a work well suited to his temper,
and
useful in the difficulties by which he was surrounded.
Epictetus
and Antoninus have had readers ever since they were first
printed. The little
book of Antoninus has been the companion of some
great men. Machiavelli's Art
of War and Marcus Antoninus were the two
books which were used when he was a
young man by Captain John Smith, and
he could not have found two writers
better fitted to form the character
of a soldier and a man. Smith is almost
unknown and forgotten in
England, his native country, but not in America,
where he saved the
young colony of Virginia. He was great in his heroic mind
and his deeds
in arms, but greater still in the nobleness of his character.
For a
man's greatness lies not in wealth and station, as the vulgar
believe,
nor yet in his intellectual capacity, which is often associated
with
the meanest moral character, the most abject servility to those in
high
places, and arrogance to the poor and lowly; but a man's true
greatness
lies in the consciousness of an honest purpose in life, founded on
a
just estimate of himself and everything else, on
frequent
self-examination, and a steady obedience to the rule which he knows
to
be right, without troubling himself, as the emperor says he should
not,
about what others may think or say, or whether they do or do not do
that
which he thinks and says and does.
THE
PHILOSOPHY
OF
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONIUS
It has been said
that the Stoic philosophy first showed its real value
when it passed from
Greece to Rome. The doctrines of Zeno and his
successors were well suited to
the gravity and practical good sense of
the Romans; and even in the
Republican period we have an example of a
man, M. Cato Uticensis, who lived
the life of a Stoic and died
consistently with the opinions which he
professed. He was a man, says
Cicero, who embraced the Stoic philosophy from
conviction; not for the
purpose of vain discussion, as most did, but in order
to make his life
conformable to the Stoic precepts. In the wretched times
from the death
of Augustus to the murder of Domitian, there was nothing but
the Stoic
philosophy which could console and support the followers of the
old
religion under imperial tyranny and amidst universal corruption.
There
were even then noble minds that could dare and endure, sustained by
a
good conscience and an elevated idea of the purposes of man's
existence.
Such were Paetus Thrasae, Helvidius Priscus, Cornutus, C.
Musonius
Rufus,[A] and the poets Persius and Juvenal, whose energetic
language
and manly thoughts may be as instructive to us now as they might
have
been to their contemporaries. Persius died under Nero's bloody
reign;
but Juvenal had the good fortune to survive the tyrant Domitian and
to
see the better times of Nerva, Trajan, and Hadrian.[B] His best
precepts
are derived from the Stoic school, and they are enforced in his
finest
verses by the unrivalled vigor of the Latin language.
[A] I
have omitted Seneca, Nero's preceptor. He was in a sense
a Stoic, and he
has said many good things in a very fine way.
There is a judgment of
Gellius (xii. 2.) on Seneca, or rather a
statement of what some people
thought of his philosophy, and it
is not favorable. His writings and his
life must be taken
together, and I have nothing more to say of him here.
The
reader will find a notice of Seneca and his philosophy
in
"Seekers after God," by the Rev. P. W. Farrar. Macmillan
and
Co.
[B] Ribbeck has labored to prove that those Satires,
which
contain philosophical precepts, are not the work of the
real,
but of a false Juvenal, a Declamator. Still the verses
exist,
and were written by somebody who was acquainted with the
Stoic
doctrines.
The best two expounders of the later Stoical
philosophy were a Greek
slave and a Roman emperor. Epictetus, a Phrygian
Greek, was brought to
Rome, we know not how, but he was there the slave and
afterwards the
freedman of an unworthy master, Epaphroditus by name, himself
a freedman
and a favorite of Nero. Epictetus may have been a hearer of C.
Musonius
Rufus, while he was still a slave, but he could hardly have been
a
teacher before he was made free. He was one of the philosophers
whom
Domitian's order banished from Rome. He retired to Nicopolis in
Epirus,
and he may have died there. Like other great teachers he wrote
nothing,
and we are indebted to his grateful pupil Arrian for what we have
of
Epictetus' discourses. Arrian wrote eight books of the discourses
of
Epictetus, of which only four remain and some fragments. We have
also
from Arrian's hand the small Enchiridion or Manual of the chief
precepts
of Epictetus. This is a valuable commentary on the Enchiridion
by
Simplicius, who lived in the time of the emperor
Justinian.[A]
[A] There is a complete edition of Arrian's Epictetus
with the
commentary of Simplicius by J. Schweighaeuser, 6 vols.
8vo.
1799, 1800. There is also an English translation of
Epictetus
by Mrs. Carter.
Antoninus in his first book (i. 7), in
which he gratefully commemorates
his obligations to his teachers, says that
he was made acquainted by
Junius Rusticus with the discourses of Epictetus,
whom he mentions also
in other passages (iv. 41; xi. 34, 36). Indeed, the
doctrines of
Epictetus and Antoninus are the same, and Epictetus is the
best
authority for the explanation of the philosophical language of
Antoninus
and the exposition of his opinions. But the method of the
two
philosophers is entirely different. Epictetus addressed himself to
his
hearers in a continuous discourse and in a familiar and simple
manner.
Antoninus wrote down his reflections for his own use only, in
short,
unconnected paragraphs, which are often obscure.
The Stoics
made three divisions of philosophy,--Physic ([Greek:
phusikon]), Ethic
([Greek: ethikon]), and Logic ([Greek: logikon])
(viii. 13). This division,
we are told by Diogenes, was made by Zeno of
Citium, the founder of the Stoic
sect, and by Chrysippus; but these
philosophers placed the three divisions in
the following order,--Logic,
Physic, Ethic. It appears, however, that this
division was made before
Zeno's time, and acknowledged by Plato, as Cicero
remarks (Acad. Post.
i. 5). Logic is not synonymous with our term Logic in
the narrower sense
of that word.
Cleanthes, a Stoic, subdivided the
three divisions and made
six,--Dialectic and Rhetoric, comprised in Logic;
Ethic and Politic;
Physic and Theology. This division was merely for
practical use, for all
Philosophy is one. Even among the earliest Stoics
Logic, or Dialectic,
does not occupy the same place as in Plato: it is
considered only as an
instrument which is to be used for the other divisions
of Philosophy.
An exposition of the earlier Stoic doctrines and of their
modifications
would require a volume. My object is to explain only the
opinions of
Antoninus, so far as they can be collected from his
book.
According to the subdivision of Cleanthes, Physic and Theology
go
together, or the study of the nature of Things, and the study of
the
nature of the Deity, so far as man can understand the Deity, and of
his
government of the universe. This division or subdivision is not
formally
adopted by Antoninus, for, as already observed, there is no method
in
his book; but it is virtually contained in it.
Cleanthes also
connects Ethic and Politic, or the study of the
principles of morals and the
study of the constitution of civil society;
and undoubtedly he did well in
subdividing Ethic into two parts. Ethic
in the narrower sense and Politic;
for though the two are intimately
connected, they are also very distinct, and
many questions can only be
properly discussed by carefully observing the
distinction. Antoninus
does not treat of Politic. His subject is Ethic, and
Ethic in its
practical application to his own conduct in life as a man and as
a
governor. His Ethic is founded on his doctrines about man's nature,
the
Universal Nature, and the relation of every man to everything else.
It
is therefore intimately and inseparably connected with Physic, or
the
Nature of Things, and with Theology, or the Nature of the Deity.
He
advises us to examine well all the impressions on our minds
([Greek:
phantasiai]) and to form a right judgment of them, to make just
conclusions,
and to inquire into the meanings of words, and so far to
apply Dialectic; but
he has no attempt at any exposition of Dialectic,
and his philosophy is in
substance purely moral and practical. He says
(viii. 13), "Constantly and, if
it be possible, on the occasion of every
impression on the soul,[A] apply to
it the principles of Physic, of
Ethic, and of Dialectic:" which is only
another way of telling us to
examine the impression in every possible way. In
another passage (iii.
11) he says, "To the aids which have been mentioned,
let this one still
be added: make for thyself a definition or description of
the object
([Greek: to phantaston]) which is presented to thee, so as to
see
distinctly what kind of a thing it is in its substance, in its
nudity,
in its complete entirety, and tell thyself its proper name, and
the
names of the things of which it has been compounded, and into which
it
will be resolved." Such an examination implies a use of Dialectic,
which
Antoninus accordingly employed as a means toward establishing
his
Physical, Theological, and Ethical principles.
[A] The
original is [Greek: epi pases phantasias]. We have no word
which
expresses [Greek: phantasia], for it is not only the sensuous
appearance
which comes from an external object, which object is
called [Greek: to
phantaston], but it is also the thought or feeling
or opinion which is
produced even when there is no
corresponding external object before us.
Accordingly everything
which moves the soul is [Greek: phantaston], and
produces a
[Greek: phantasia].
In this extract Antoninus says
[Greek: physiologein, pathologein,
dialektikeuesthai]. I have translated
[Greek: pathologein] by using
the word Moral (Ethic), and that is the
meaning here.
There are several expositions of the Physical, Theological,
and Ethical
principles, which are contained in the work of Antoninus; and
more
expositions than I have read. Ritter (Geschichte der Philosophie,
iv.
241), after explaining the doctrines of Epictetus, treats very
briefly
and insufficiently those of Antoninus. But he refers to a short
essay,
in which the work is done better.[A] There is also an essay on
the
Philosophical Principles of M. Aurelius Antoninus by J.M.
Schultz,
placed at the end of his German translation of Antoninus
(Schleswig,
1799). With the assistance of these two useful essays and his
own
diligent study, a man may form a sufficient notion of the principles
of
Antoninus; but he will find it more difficult to expound them to
others.
Besides the want of arrangement in the original and of connection
among
the numerous paragraphs, the corruption of the text, the obscurity
of
the language and the style, and sometimes perhaps the confusion in
the
writer's own ideas--besides all this, there is occasionally an
apparent
contradiction in the emperor's thoughts, as if his principles
were
sometimes unsettled, as if doubt sometimes clouded his mind. A man
who
leads a life of tranquillity and reflection, who is not disturbed
at
home and meddles not with the affairs of the world, may keep his mind
at
ease and his thoughts in one even course. But such a man has not
been
tried. All his Ethical philosophy and his passive virtue might turn
out
to be idle words, if he were once exposed to the rude realities of
human
existence. Fine thoughts and moral dissertations from men who have
not
worked and suffered may be read, but they will be forgotten.
No
religion, no Ethical philosophy is worth anything, if the teacher
has
not lived the "life of an apostle," and been ready to die "the death
of
a martyr." "Not in passivity (the passive effects) but in activity
lie
the evil and the good of the rational social animal, just as his
virtue
and his vice lie not in passivity, but in activity" (ix. 16).
The
emperor Antoninus was a practical moralist. From his youth he followed
a
laborious discipline, and though his high station placed him above
all
want or the fear of it, he lived as frugally and temperately as
the
poorest philospher. Epictetus wanted little, and it seems that he
always
had the little that he wanted and he was content with it, as he had
been
with his servile station! But Antoninus after his accession to
the
empire sat on an uneasy seat. He had the administration of an
empire
which extended from the Euphrates to the Atlantic, from the
cold
mountains of Scotland to the hot sands of Africa; and we may
imagine,
though we cannot know it by experience, what must be the trials,
the
troubles, the anxiety, and the sorrows of him who has the
world's
business on his hands, with the wish to do the best that he can, and
the
certain knowledge that he can do very little of the good which
he
wishes.
[A] De Marco Aurelio Antonino ... ex ipsius
Commentariis.
Scriptio Philologica. Instituit Nicolaus Bachius,
Lipsiae,
1826.
In the midst of war, pestilence, conspiracy,
general corruption, and
with the weight of so unwieldy an empire upon him, we
may easily
comprehend that Antoninus often had need of all his fortitude to
support
him. The best and the bravest men have moments of doubt and of
weakness;
but if they are the best and the bravest, they rise again from
their
depression by recurring to first principles, as Antoninus does.
The
emperor says that life is smoke, a vapor, and St. James in his
Epistle
is of the same mind; that the world is full of envious,
jealous,
malignant people, and a man might be well content to get out of it.
He
has doubts perhaps sometimes even about that to which he holds
most
firmly. There are only a few passages of this kind, but they
are
evidence of the struggles which even the noblest of the sons of men
had
to maintain against the hard realities of his daily life. A poor
remark
it is which I have seen somewhere, and made in a disparaging way,
that
the emperor's reflections show that he had need of consolation
and
comfort in life, and even to prepare him to meet his death. True that
he
did need comfort and support, and we see how he found it. He
constantly
recurs to his fundamental principle that the universe is wisely
ordered,
that every man is a part of it and must conform to that order which
he
cannot change, that whatever the Deity has done is good, that
all
mankind are a man's brethren, that he must love and cherish them and
try
to make them better, even those who would do him harm. This is
his
conclusion (ii. 17): "What then is that which is able to conduct a
man?
One thing and only one, Philosophy. But this consists in keeping
the
divinity within a man free from violence and unharmed, superior to
pains
and pleasures, doing nothing without a purpose nor yet falsely and
with
hypocrisy, not feeling the need of another man's doing or not
doing
anything; and besides, accepting all that happens and all that
is
allotted, as coming from thence, wherever it is, from whence he
himself
came; and finally waiting for death with a cheerful mind as
being
nothing else than a dissolution of the elements of which every
living
being is compounded. But if there is no harm, to the elements
themselves
in each continually changing into another, why should a man have
any
apprehension about the change and dissolution of all the
elements
[himself]? for it is according to nature; and nothing is evil that
is
according to nature."
The Physic of Antoninus is the knowledge of
the Nature of the Universe,
of its government, and of the relation of man's
nature to both. He names
the universe ([Greek: he ton hylon ousia], vi.
1),[A] "the universal
substance," and he adds that "reason" ([Greek: logos])
governs the
universe. He also (vi. 9) uses the terms "universal nature" or
"nature
of the universe." He (vi. 25) calls the universe "the one and all,
which
we name Cosmos or Order" ([Greek: kosmos]). If he ever seems to
use
these general terms as significant of the All, of all that man can
in
any way conceive to exist, he still on other occasions
plainly
distinguishes between Matter, Material things ([Greek: hyle,
hylikon]),
and Cause, Origin, Reason ([Greek: aitia, aitiodes, logos]).[B]
This is
conformable to Zeno's doctrine that there are two original
principles
([Greek: archai]) of all things, that which acts ([Greek: to
poioun])
and that which is acted upon ([Greek: to paschon]). That which is
acted
on is the formless matter ([Greek: hyle]): that which acts is the
reason
([Greek: logos]), God, who is eternal and operates through all
matter,
and produces all things. So Antoninus (v. 32) speaks of the
reason
([Greek: logos])which pervades all substance ([Greek: ousia]),
and
through all time by fixed periods (revolutions) administers the
universe
([Greek: to pan]). God is eternal, and Matter is eternal. It is God
who
gives form to matter, but he is not said to have created
matter.
According to this view, which is as old as Anaxagoras, God and
matter
exist independently, but God governs matter. This doctrine is simply
the
expression of the fact of the existence both of matter and of God.
The
Stoics did not perplex themselves with the in-soluble question of
the
origin and nature of matter.[C] Antoninus also assumes a beginning
of
things, as we now know them; but his language is sometimes very
obscure.
I have endeavored to explain the meaning of one difficult passage
(vii.
75, and the note).
[A] As to the word [Greek: ousia], the
reader may see the
Index. I add here a few examples of the use of the
word;
Antoninus has (v. 24), [Greek: he sumpasa ousia],
"the
universal substance." He says (xii. 30 and iv. 40), "there
is
one common substance" ([Greek: ousia]), distributed
among
countless bodies. In Stobaeus (tom. 1, lib. 1, tit. 14)
there
is this definition, [Greek: ousian de phasin ton onton
hapanton
ten proten hylen]. In viii. II, Antoninus speaks of [Greek:
to
ousiodes kai hyulikon], "the substantial and the material;"
and
(vii. 10) he says that "everything material" ([Greek:
enulon])
disappears in the substance of the whole ([Greek: te ton
holon
ousia]). The [Greek: ousia] is the generic name of that
existence
which we assume as the highest or ultimate, because we
conceive
no existence which can be coordinated with it and none
above
it. It is the philosopher's "substance:" it is the
ultimate
expression for that which we conceive or suppose to be
the
basis, the being of a thing. "From the Divine, which
is
substance in itself, or the only and sole substance, all
and
everything that is created exists" (Swedenborg, Angelic
Wisdom,
198).
[B] I remark, in order to anticipate any
misapprehension, that
all these general terms involve a contradiction.
The "one and
all," and the like, and "the whole," imply limitation. "One"
is
limited; "all" is limited; the "whole" is limited. We
cannot
help it. We cannot find words to express that which we
cannot
fully conceive. The addition of "absolute" or any other
such
word does not mend the matter. Even the word God is used
by
most people, often unconsciously, in such a way that
limitation
is implied, and yet at the same time words are added which
are
intended to deny limitation. A Christian martyr, when he
was
asked what God was, is said to have answered that God has
no
name like a man; and Justin says the same (Apol. ii. 6),
"the
names Father, God, Creator, Lord, and Master are not names,
but
appellations derived from benefactions and acts."
(Compare
Seneca, De Benef. iv. 8.) We can conceive the existence of
a
thing, or rather we may have the idea of an existence,
without
an adequate notion of it, "adequate" meaning coextensive
and
coequal with the thing. We have a notion of limited
space
derived from the dimensions of what we call a material
thing,
though of space absolute, if I may use the term, we have
no
notion at all; and of infinite space the notion is the
same--no
notion at all; and yet we conceive it in a sense, though I
know
not how, and we believe that space is infinite, and we
cannot
conceive it to be finite.
[C] The notions of matter and
of space are inseparable. We
derive the notion of space from matter and
form. But we have no
adequate conception either of matter or space.
Matter in its
ultimate resolution is as unintelligible as what men call
mind,
spirit, or by whatever other name they may express the
power
which makes itself known by acts. Anaxagoras laid down
the
distinction between intelligence [Greek: nous] and matter,
and
he said that intelligence impressed motion on matter, and
so
separated the elements of matter and gave them order; but
he
probably only assumed a beginning, as Simplicius says, as
a
foundation of his philosophical teaching. Empedocles said,
"The
universe always existed." He had no idea of what is
called
creation. Ocellus Lucanus (i, § 2) maintained that the
Universe
([Greek: to pan]) was imperishable and uncreated.
Consequently
it is eternal. He admitted the existence of God; but
his
theology would require some discussion. On the contrary,
the
Brachmans, according to Strabo (p. 713, ed. Cas.), taught
that
the universe was created and perishable; and the creator
and
administrator of it pervades the whole. The author of the
book
of Solomon's Wisdom says (xi. 17): "Thy Almighty hand made
the
world of matter without form," which may mean that
matter
existed already.
The common Greek word which we
translate "matter" is [Greek:
hyle]. It is the stuff that things are made
of.
Matter consists of elemental parts ([Greek: stoicheia]) of which
all
material objects are made. But nothing is permanent in form. The
nature
of the universe, according to Antoninus' expression (iv. 36),
"loves
nothing so much as to change the things which are, and to make
new
things like them. For everything that exists is in a manner the seed
of
that which will be. But thou art thinking only of seeds which are
cast
into the earth or into a womb: but this is a very vulgar notion."
All
things then are in a constant flux and change; some things are
dissolved
into the elements, others come in their places; and so the
"whole
universe continues ever young and perfect" (xii. 23).
Antoninus
has some obscure expressions about what he calls "seminal
principles"
([Greek: spermatikoi logoi]). He opposes them to the
Epicurean atoms (vi.
24), and consequently his "seminal principles" are
not material atoms which
wander about at hazard, and combine nobody
knows how. In one passage (iv. 21)
he speaks of living principles, souls
([Greek: psychahi]) after the
dissolution of their bodies being
received into the "seminal principle of the
universe." Schultz thinks
that by "seminal principles Antoninus means the
relations of the various
elemental principles, which relations are determined
by the Deity and by
which alone the production of organized beings is
possible." This may be
the meaning; but if it is, nothing of any value can be
derived from
it.[A] Antoninus often uses the word "Nature" ([Greek: physis]),
and we
must attempt to fix its meaning, The simple etymological sense
of
[Greek: physis] is "production," the birth of what we call Things.
The
Romans used Natura, which also means "birth" originally. But neither
the
Greeks nor the Romans stuck to this simple meaning, nor do we.
Antoninus
says (x. 6): "Whether the universe is [a concourse of] atoms or
Nature
[is a system], let this first be established, that I am a part of
the
whole which is governed by nature." Here it might seem as if nature
were
personified and viewed as an active, efficient power; as
something
which, it not independent of the Deity, acts by a power which is
given
to it by the Deity. Such, if I understand the expression right, is
the
way in which the word Nature is often used now, though it is plain
that
many writers use the word without fixing any exact meaning to it. It
is
the same with the expression Laws of Nature, which some writers may
use
in an intelligible sense, but others as clearly use in no definite
sense
at all. There is no meaning in this word Nature, except that
which
Bishop Butler assigns to it, when he says, "The only distinct meaning
of
that word Natural is Stated, Fixed, or Settled; since what is natural
as
much requires and presupposes an intelligent agent to render it
so,
_i.e._, to effect it continually or at stated times, as what
is
supernatural or miraculous does to effect it at once." This is
Plato's
meaning (De Leg., iv. 715) when he says that God holds the beginning
and
end and middle of all that exists, and proceeds straight on his
course,
making his circuit according to nature (that is by a fixed order);
and
he is continually accompanied by justice, who punishes those who
deviate
from the divine law, that is, from the order or course which
God
observes.
[A] Justin (Apol. ii. 8) has the words [Greek:
kata
spermatikou logou meros], where he is speaking of the
Stoics;
but he uses this expression in a peculiar sense (note II).
The
early Christian writers were familiar with the Stoic terms,
and
their writings show that the contest was begun between
the
Christian expositors and the Greek philosophy. Even in
the
second Epistle of St. Peter (ii. I, v. 4) we find a
Stoic
expression, [Greek: Ina dia touton genesthe theias
koinonoi
physeos.]
When we look at the motions of the planets, the
action of what we call
gravitation, the elemental combination of unorganized
bodies and their
resolution, the production of plants and of living bodies,
their
generation, growth, and their dissolution, which we call their death,
we
observe a regular sequence of phenomena, which within the limits
of
experience present and past, so far as we know the past, is fixed
and
invariable. But if this is not so, if the order and sequence
of
phenomena, as known to us, are subject to change in the course of
an
infinite progression,--and such change is conceivable,--we have
not
discovered, nor shall we ever discover, the whole of the order
and
sequence of phenomena, in which sequence there may be involved
according
to its very nature, that is, according to its fixed order,
some
variation of what we now call the Order or Nature of Things. It is
also
conceivable that such changes have taken place,--changes in the order
of
things, as we are compelled by the imperfection of language to
call
them, but which are no changes; and further it is certain that
our
knowledge of the true sequence of all actual phenomena, as for
instance
the phenomena of generation, growth, and dissolution, is and ever
must
be imperfect.
We do not fare much better when we speak of Causes
and Effects than when
we speak of Nature. For the practical purposes of life
we may use the
terms cause and effect conveniently, and we may fix a distinct
meaning
to them, distinct enough at least to prevent all misunderstanding.
But
the case is different when we speak of causes and effects as of
Things.
All that we know is phenomena, as the Greeks called them, or
appearances
which follow one another in a regular order, as we conceive it,
so that
if some one phenomenon should fail in the series, we conceive that
there
must either be an interruption of the series, or that something
else
will appear after the phenomenon which has failed to appear, and
will
occupy the vacant place; and so the series in its progression may
be
modified or totally changed. Cause and effect then mean nothing in
the
sequence of natural phenomena beyond what I have said; and the
real
cause, or the transcendent cause, as some would call it, of
each
successive phenomenon is in that which is the cause of all things
which
are, which have been, and which will be forever. Thus the word
Creation
may have a real sense if we consider it as the first, if we can
conceive
a first, in the present order of natural phenomena; but in the
vulgar
sense a creation of all things at a certain time, followed by
a
quiescence of the first cause and an abandonment of all sequences
of
Phenomena to the laws of Nature, or to the other words that people
may
Use, is absolutely absurd.[A]
[A] Time and space are the
conditions of our thought; but time
infinite and space infinite cannot be
objects of thought,
except in a very imperfect way. Time and space must
not in any
way be thought of when we think of the Deity. Swedenborg
says,
"The natural man may believe that he would have no thought,
if
the ideas of time, of space, and of things material were
taken
away; for upon those is founded all the thought that man
has.
But let him know that the thoughts are limited and confined
in
proportion as they partake of time, of space, and of what
is
material; and that they are not limited and are extended,
in
proportion as they do not partake of those things; since
the
mind is so far elevated above the things corporeal and
worldly"
(Concerning Heaven and Hell, 169).
[Illustration: THE
TEMPLE OF PALLAS]
Now, though there is great difficulty in understanding
all the
passages of Antoninus, in which he speaks of Nature, of the changes
of
things and of the economy of the universe, I am convinced that his
sense
of Nature and Natural is the same as that which I have stated; and as
he
was a man who knew how to use words in a clear way and with
strict
consistency, we ought to assume, even if his meaning in some passages
is
doubtful, that his view of Nature was in harmony with his fixed
belief
in the all-pervading, ever present, and ever active energy of God.
(ii.
4; iv. 40; x. 1; vi. 40; and other passages. Compare Seneca, De
Benef.,
iv. 7. Swedenborg, Angelic Wisdom, 349-357.)
There is much in
Antoninus that is hard to understand, and it might be
said that he did not
fully comprehend all that he wrote; which would
however be in no way
remarkable, for it happens now that a man may write
what neither he nor
anybody can understand. Antoninus tells us (xii. 10)
to look at things and
see what they are, resolving them into the
material [Greek: hyle], the casual
[Greek: aition], and the relation
[Greek: anaphora], or the purpose, by which
he seems to mean something
in the nature of what we call effect, or end. The
word Caus ([Greek:
aitia]) is the difficulty. There is the same word in the
Sanscrit
(hetu); and the subtle philosophers of India and of Greece,
and
the less subtle philosophers of modern times, have all used this
word,
or an equivalent word, in a vague way. Yet the confusion sometimes
may
be in the inevitable ambiguity of language rather than in the mind
of
the writer, for I cannot think that some of the wisest of men did
not
know what they intended to say. When Antoninus says (iv. 36),
"that
everything that exists is in a manner the seed of that which will
be,"
he might be supposed to say what some of the Indian philosophers
have
said, and thus a profound truth might be converted into a
gross
absurdity. But he says, "in a manner," and in a manner he said true;
and
in another manner, if you mistake his meaning, he said false. When
Plato
said, "Nothing ever is, but is always becoming" ([Greek:
aei
gignetai]), he delivered a text, out of which we may derive
something;
for he destroys by it not all practical, but all speculative
notions of
cause and effect. The whole series of things, as they appear to
us, must
be contemplated in time, that is in succession, and we conceive
or
suppose intervals between one state of things and another state
of
things, so that there is priority and sequence, and interval, and
Being,
and a ceasing to Be, and beginning and ending. But there is nothing
of
the kind in the Nature of Things. It is an everlasting continuity
(iv.
45; vii. 75). When Antoninus speaks of generation (x. 26), he speaks
of
one cause ([Greek: aitia]) acting, and then another cause taking up
the
work, which the former left in a certain state, and so on; and we
might
perhaps conceive that he had some notion like what has been called
"the
self-evolving power of nature;" a fine phrase indeed, the full import
of
which I believe that the writer of it did not see, and thus he
laid
himself open to the imputation of being a follower of one of the
Hindu
sects, which makes all things come by evolution out of nature or
matter,
or out of something which takes the place of Deity, but is not Deity.
I
would have all men think as they please, or as they can, and I
only
claim the same freedom which I give. When a man writes anything, we
may
fairly try to find out all that his words must mean, even if the
result
is that they mean what he did not mean; and if we find
this
contradiction, it is not our fault, but his misfortune. Now Antoninus
is
perhaps somewhat in this condition in what he says (x. 26), though
he
speaks at the end of the paragraph of the power which acts, unseen
by
the eyes, but still no less clearly. But whether in this passage (x.
26)
lie means that the power is conceived to be in the different
successive
causes ([Greek: aitiai]), or in something else, nobody can tell.
From
other passages, however, I do collect that his notion of the
phenomena
of the universe is what I have stated. The Deity works unseen, if
we may
use such language, and perhaps I may, as Job did, or he who wrote
the
book of Job. "In him we live and move and are," said St. Paul to
the
Athenians; and to show his hearers that this was no new doctrine,
he
quoted the Greek poets. One of these poets was the Stoic
Cleauthes,
whose noble hymn to Zeus, or God, is an elevated expression of
devotion
and philosophy. It deprives Nature of her power, and puts her under
the
immediate government of the Deity.
"Thee all this heaven, which
whirls around the earth,
Obeys, and willing follows where thou
leadest.
Without thee, God, nothing is done on earth,
Nor in the ethereal
realms, nor in the sea,
Save what the wicked through their folly
do."
Antoninus' conviction of the existence of a divine power and
government
was founded on his perception of the order of the universe.
Like
Socrates (Xen. Mem., iv. 3, 13, etc.) he says that though we cannot
see
the forms of divine powers, we know that they exist because we see
their
works.
"To those who ask, Where hast thou seen the gods, or how
dost thou
comprehend that they exist and so worshipest them? I answer, in
the
first place, that they may be seen even with the eyes; in the
second
place, neither have I seen my own soul, and yet I honor it. Thus
then
with respect to the gods, from what I constantly experience of
their
power, from this I comprehend that they exist, and I venerate
them."
(xii. 28, and the note. Comp. Aristotle de Mundo, c. 6; Xen. Mem. i.
4,
9; Cicero, Tuscul. i. 28, 29; St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, i.
19,
20; and Montaigne's Apology for Raimond de Sebonde, ii. c. 12.) This
is
a very old argument, which has always had great weight with most
people,
and has appeared sufficient. It does not acquire the least
additional
strength by being developed in a learned treatise. It is as
intelligible
in its simple enunciation as it can be made. If it is rejected,
there is
no arguing with him who rejects it: and if it is worked out
into
innumerable particulars, the value of the evidence runs the risk
of
being buried under a mass of words.
Man being conscious that he is
a spiritual power, or that he has such a
power, in whatever way he conceives
that he has it--for I wish simply to
state a fact--from this power which he
has in himself, he is led, as
Antoninus says, to believe that there is a
greater power, which, as the
old Stoics tell us, pervades the whole universe
as the intellect[A]
([Greek: nous]) pervades man. (Compare Epictetus'
Discourses, i. 14;
and Voltaire a Mad^e. Necker, vol. lxvii., p. 278, ed.
Lequien.)
[A] I have always translated the word [Greek:
nous],
"intelligence" or "intellect." It appears to be the word
used
by the oldest Greek philosophers to express the notion
of
"intelligence" as opposed to the notion of "matter." I
have
always translated the word [Greek: logos] by "reason,"
and
[Greek: logikos] by the word "rational," or perhaps
sometimes
"reasonable," as I have translated [Greek: noeros] by the
word
"intellectual." Every man who has thought and has read
any
philosophical writings knows the difficulty of finding words
to
express certain notions, how imperfectly words express
these
notions, and how carelessly the words are often used.
The
various senses of the word [Greek: logos] are enough to
perplex
any man. Our translators of the New Testament (St. John, c.
1.)
have simply translated [Greek: ho logos] by "the word," as
the
Germans translated it by "das Wort;" but in their
theological
writings they sometimes retain the original term Logos.
The
Germans have a term Vernunft, which seems to come nearest
to
our word Reason, or the necessary and absolute truths which
we
cannot conceive as being other than what they are. Such
are
what some people have called the laws of thought,
the
conceptions of space and of time, and axioms or
first
principles, which need no proof and cannot be proved or
denied.
Accordingly the Germans can say, "Gott ist die
hochste
Vernunft," the Supreme Reason. The Germans have also a
word
Verstand, which seems to represent our word
"understanding,"
"intelligence," "intellect," not as a thing absolute
which
exists by itself, but as a thing connected with an
individual
being, as a man. Accordingly it is the capacity of
receiving
impressions (Vorstellungen, [Greek: phantasiai],) and
forming
from them distinct ideas (Begriffe), and
perceiving
differences. I do not think that these remarks will help
the
reader to the understanding of Antoninus, or his use of
the
words [Greek: nous] and [Greek: logos]. The emperor's
meaning
must be got from his own words, and if it does not
agree
altogether with modern notions, it is not our business to
force
it into agreement, but simply to find out what his meaning
is,
if we can.
Justinus (ad Diognetum, c. vii.) says that the
omnipotent,
all-creating, and invisible God has fixed truth and the
holy,
incomprehensible Logos in men's hearts; and this Logos is
the
architect and creator of the Universe. In the first Apology
(c.
xxxii.), he says that the seed ([Greek: sperma]) from God
is
the Logos, which dwells in those who believe in God. So
it
appears that according to Justinus the Logos is only in
such
believers. In the second Apology (c. viii.) he speaks of
the
seed of the Logos being implanted in all mankind; but those
who
order their lives according to Logos, such as the Stoics,
have
only a portion of the Logos ([Greek: kata spermatikou
logou
meros]), and have not the knowledge and contemplation of
the
entire Logos, which is Christ. Swedenborg's remarks
(Angelic
Wisdom, 240) are worth comparing with Justinus. The
modern
philosopher in substance agrees with the ancient; but he
is
more precise.
God exists then, but what do we know of his
nature? Antoninus says that
the soul of man is an efflux from the divinity.
We have bodies like
animals, but we have reason, intelligence, as the gods.
Animals have
life ([Greek: psyche]) and what we call instincts or natural
principles
of action: but the rational animal man alone has a rational,
intelligent
soul ([Greek: psyche logike noera]). Antoninus insists on
this
continually: God is in man,[A] and so we must constantly attend to
the
divinity within us, for it is only in this way that we can have
any
knowledge of the nature of God. The human soul is in a sense a
portion
of the divinity, and the soul alone has any communication with
the
Deity; for as he says (xii. 2): "With his intellectual part alone
God
touches the intelligence only which has flowed and been derived
from
himself into these bodies." In fact he says that which is hidden
within
a man is life, that is, the man himself. All the rest is
vesture,
covering, organs, instrument, which the living man, the real[B]
man,
uses for the purpose of his present existence. The air is
universally
diffused for him who is able to respire; and so for him who is
willing
to partake of it the intelligent power, which holds within it
all
things, is diffused as wide and free as the air (viii. 54). It is
by
living a divine life that man approaches to a knowledge of
the
divinity.[C] It is by following the divinity within [Greek: daimon]
or
[Greek: theos], as Antonius calls it, that man comes nearest to
the
Deity, the supreme good; for man can never attain to perfect
agreement
with his internal guide ([Greek: to hegemonikon]). "Live with the
gods.
And he does live with the gods who constantly shows to them that his
own
soul is satisfied with that which is assigned to him, and that it
does
all the daemon ([Greek: daimon]) wishes, which Zeus hath given to
every
man for his guardian and guide, a portion of himself. And this daemon
is
every man's understanding and reason" (v. 27).
[A] Comp. Ep. to
the Corinthians, i. 3, 17, and James iv. 8,
"Drawnigh to God and he will
draw nigh to you."
[B] This is also Swedenborg's doctrine of the
soul. "As to what
concerns the soul, of which it is said that it shall
live after
death, it is nothing else but the man himself, who lives in
the
body, that is, the interior man, who by the body acts in
the
world and from whom the body itself lives" (quoted by
Clissold,
p. 456 of "The Practical Nature of the Theological Writings
of
Emanuel Swedenborg, in a Letter to the Archbishop of
Dublin
(Whately)," second edition, 1859; a book which
theologians
might read with profit). This is an old doctrine of the
soul,
which has been often proclaimed, but never better
expressed
than by the "Auctor de Mundo," c. 6, quoted by Gataker in
his
"Antoninus," p. 436. "The soul by which we live and have
cities
and houses is invisible, but it is seen by its works; for
the
whole method of life has been devised by it and ordered, and
by
it is held together. In like manner we must think also
about
the Deity, who in power is most mighty, in beauty most
comely,
in life immortal, and in virtue supreme: wherefore though he
is
invisible to human nature, he is seen by his very works."
Other
passages to the same purpose are quoted by Gataker (p.
382).
Bishop Butler has the same as to the soul: "Upon the
whole,
then, our organs of sense and our limbs are
certainly
instruments, which the living persons, ourselves, make use
of
to perceive and move with." If this is not plain enough,
be
also says: "It follows that our organized bodies are no
more
ourselves, or part of ourselves, than any other matter
around
us." (Compare Anton, x. 38).
[C] The reader may consult
Discourse V., "Of the existence and
nature of God," in John Smith's
"Select Discourses." He has
prefixed as a text to this Discourse, the
striking passage of
Agapetus, Paraenes. § 3: "He who knows himself will
know God;
and he who knows God will be made like to God; and he will
be
made like to God, who has become worthy of God; and he
becomes
worthy of God, who does nothing unworthy of God, but thinks
the
things that are his, and speaks what he thinks, and does
what
he speaks." I suppose that the old saying, "Know
thyself,"
which is attributed to Socrates and others, had a
larger
meaning than the narrow sense which is generally given to
it.
(Agapetus, ed. Stephan. Schoning, Franeker, 1608. This
volume
contains also the Paraeneses of Nilus.)
There is in man,
that is in the reason, the intelligence, a superior
faculty which if it is
exercised rules all the rest. This is the ruling
faculty ([Greek: to
hegemonikon]), which Cicero (De Natura Deorum, ii.
11) renders by the Latin
word Principatus, "to which nothing can or
ought to be superior." Antoninus
often uses this term and others which
are equivalent. He names it (vii. 64)
"the governing intelligence." The
governing faculty is the master of the soul
(v. 26). A man must
reverence only his ruling faculty and the divinity within
him. As we
must reverence that which is supreme in the universe, so we
must
reverence that which is supreme in ourselves; and this is that which
is
of like kind with that which is supreme in the universe (v. 21). So,
as
Plotinus says, the soul of man can only know the divine so far as
it
knows itself. In one passage (xi. 19) Antoninus speaks of a
man's
condemnation of himself when the diviner part within him has
been
overpowered and yields to the less honorable and to the perishable
part,
the body, and its gross pleasures. In a word, the views of Antoninus
on
this matter, however his expressions may vary, are exactly what
Bishop
Butler expresses when he speaks of "the natural supremacy of
reflection
or conscience," of the faculty "which surveys, approves, or
disapproves
the several affections of our mind and actions of our
lives."
Much matter might be collected from Antoninus on the notion of
the
Universe being one animated Being. But all that he says amounts to
no
more, as Schultz remarks, than this: the soul of man is most
intimately
united to his body, and together they make one animal, which we
call
man; so the Deity is most intimately united to the world, or
the
material universe, and together they form one whole. But Antoninus
did
not view God and the material universe as the same, any more than
he
viewed the body and soul of man as one. Antoninus has 110
speculations
on the absolute nature of the Deity. It was not his fashion to
waste his
time on what man cannot understand.[A] He was satisfied that God
exists,
that he governs all things, that man can only have an
imperfect
knowledge of his nature, and he must attain this imperfect
knowledge by
reverencing the divinity which is within him, and keeping it
pure.
[A] "God, who is infinitely beyond the reach of our
narrow
capacities" (Locke, Essay concerning the Human
Understanding,
ii. chap. 17).
From all that has been said, it
follows that the universe is
administered by the Providence of God ([Greek:
pronoia]), and that all
things are wisely ordered. There are passages in
which Antoninus
expresses doubts, or states different possible theories of
the
constitution and government of the universe; but he always recurs to
his
fundamental principle, that if we admit the existence of a deity,
we
must also admit that he orders all things wisely and well (iv. 27;
vi.
1; ix. 28; xii. 5; and many other passages). Epictetus says (i. 6)
that
we can discern the providence which rules the world, if we possess
two
things,--the power of seeing all that happens with respect to
each
thing, and a grateful disposition.
But if all things are wisely
ordered, how is the world so full of what
we call evil, physical and moral?
If instead of saying that there is
evil in the world, we use the expression
which I have used, "what we
call evil," we have partly anticipated the
emperor's answer. We see and
feel and know imperfectly very few things in the
few years that we live,
and all the knowledge and all the experience of all
the human race is
positive ignorance of the whole, which is infinite. Now, as
our reason
teaches us that everything is in some way related to and connected
with
every other thing, all notion of evil as being in the universe of
things
is a contradiction; for if the whole comes from and is governed by
an
intelligent being, it is impossible to conceive anything in it
which
tends to the evil or destruction of the whole (viii. 55; x.
6).
Everything is in constant mutation, and yet the whole subsists; we
might
imagine the solar system resolved into its elemental parts, and yet
the
whole would still subsist "ever young and perfect."
All things,
all forms, are dissolved, and new forms appear. All living
things undergo the
change which we call death. If we call death an evil,
then all change is an
evil. Living beings also suffer pain, and man
suffers most of all, for he
suffers both in and by his body and by his
intelligent part. Men suffer also
from one another, and perhaps the
largest part of human suffering comes to
man from those whom he calls
his brothers. Antoninus says (viii. 55),
"Generally, wickedness does no
harm at all to the universe; and particularly,
the wickedness [of one
man] does no harm to another. It is only harmful to
him who has it in
his power to be released from it as soon as he shall
choose." The first
part of this is perfectly consistent with the doctrine
that the whole
can sustain no evil or harm. The second part must be explained
by the
Stoic principle that there is no evil in anything which is not in
our
power. What wrong we suffer from another is his evil, not ours. But
this
is an admission that there is evil in a sort, for he who does wrong
does
evil, and if others can endure the wrong, still there is evil in
the
wrong-doer. Antoninus (xi. 18) gives many excellent precepts
with
respect to wrongs and injuries, and his precepts are practical.
He
teaches us to bear what we cannot avoid, and his lessons may be just
as
useful to him who denies the being and the government of God as to
him
who believes in both. There is no direct answer in Antoninus to
the
objections which may be made to the existence and providence of
God
because of the moral disorder and suffering which are in the
world,
except this answer which he makes in reply to the supposition that
even
the best men may be extinguished by death. He says if it is so, we
may
be sure that if it ought to have been otherwise, the gods would
have
ordered it otherwise (xii. 5). His conviction of the wisdom which we
may
observe in the government of the world is too strong to be disturbed
by
any apparent irregularities in the order of things. That these
disorders
exist is a fact, and those who would conclude from them against
the
being and government of God conclude too hastily. We all admit
that
there is an order in the material world, a Nature, in the sense in
which
that word has been explained, a constitution ([Greek: kataskeue]), what
we
call a system, a relation of parts to one another and a fitness of
the
whole for something. So in the constitution of plants and of
animals
there is an order, a fitness for some end. Sometimes the order, as
we
conceive it, is interrupted, and the end, as we conceive it, is
not
attained. The seed, the plant, or the animal sometimes perishes
before
it has passed through all its changes and done all its uses. It
is
according to Nature, that is a fixed order, for some to perish early
and
for others to do all their uses and leave successors to take
their
place. So man has a corporeal and intellectual and moral
constitution
fit for certain uses, and on the whole man performs these uses,
dies,
and leaves other men in his place. So society exists, and a social
state
is manifestly the natural state of man--the state for which his
nature
fits him, and society amidst innumerable irregularities and
disorders
still subsists; and perhaps we may say that the history of the past
and
our present knowledge give us a reasonable hope that its disorders
will
diminish, and that order, its governing principle, may be more
firmly
established. As order then, a fixed order, we may say, subject
to
deviations real or apparent, must be admitted to exist in the
whole
nature of things, that which we call disorder or evil, as it seems
to
us, does not in any way alter the fact of the general constitution
of
things having a nature or fixed order. Nobody will conclude from
the
existence of disorder that order is not the rule, for the existence
of
order both physical and moral is proved by daily experience and all
past
experience. We cannot conceive how the order of the universe
is
maintained: we cannot even conceive how our own life from day to day
is
continued, nor how we perform the simplest movements of the body,
nor
how we grow and think and act, though we know many of the
conditions
which are necessary for all these functions. Knowing nothing then
of the
unseen power which acts in ourselves except by what is done, we
know
nothing of the power which acts through what we call all time and
all
space; but seeing that there is a nature or fixed order in all
things
known to us, it is conformable to the nature of our minds to
believe
that this universal Nature has a cause which operates continually,
and
that we are totally unable to speculate on the reason of any of those
disorders or evils which we perceive. This I believe is the answer which may be
collected from all that Antoninus has said. |
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