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Cleanthes says in his Hymn:--
"For all things good and
bad to One thou formest,
So that One everlasting reason governs
all."
See Bishop Butler's Sermons. Sermon XV., "Upon the Ignorance
of
Man."
The origin of evil is an old question. Achilles tells
Priam (Iliad,
24, 527) that Zeus has two casks, one filled with good things,
and the
other with bad, and that he gives to men out of each according to
his
pleasure; and so we must be content, for we cannot alter the will
of
Zeus. One of the Greek commentators asks how must we reconcile
this
doctrine with what we find in the first book of the Odyssey, where
the
king of the gods says, Men say that evil comes to them from us, but
they
bring it on themselves through their own folly. The answer is
plain
enough even to the Greek commentator. The poets make both Achilles
and
Zeus speak appropriately to their several characters. Indeed, Zeus
says
plainly that men do attribute their sufferings to their gods, but
they
do it falsely, for they are the cause of their own
sorrows.
[Illustration: THE APPIAN WAY, ROME]
Epictetus in his
Enchiridion (c. 27) makes short work of the question of
evil. He says, "As a
mark is not set up for the purpose of missing it,
so neither does the nature
of evil exist in the universe." This will
appear obscure enough to those who
are not acquainted with Epictetus,
but he always knows what he is talking
about. We do not set up a mark in
order to miss it, though we may miss it.
God, whose existence Epictetus
assumes, has not ordered all things so that
his purpose shall fail.
Whatever there may be of what we call evil, the
nature of evil, as he
expresses it, does not exist; that is, evil is not a
part of the
constitution or nature of things. If there were a principle of
evil
([Greek: arche]) in the constitution of things, evil would no longer
be
evil, as Simplicius argues, but evil would be good. Simplicius (c.
34,
[27]) has a long and curious discourse on this text of Epictetus, and
it
is amusing and instructive.
One passage more will conclude this
matter. It contains all that the
emperor could say (ii. 11): "To go from
among men, if there are gods, is
not a thing to be afraid of, for the gods
will not involve thee in evil;
but if indeed they do not exist, or if they
have no concern about human
affairs, what is it to me to live in a universe
devoid of gods or devoid
of providence? But in truth they do exist, and they
do care for human
things, and they have put all the means in man's power to
enable him not
to fall into real evils. And as to the rest, if there was
anything evil,
they would have provided for this also, that it should be
altogether in
a man's power not to fall into it. But that which does not make
a man
worse, how can it make a man's life worse? But neither
through
ignorance, nor having the knowledge but not the power to guard
against
or correct these things, is it possible that the nature of the
universe
has overlooked them; nor is it possible that it has made so great
a
mistake, either through want of power or want of skill, that good
and
evil should happen indiscriminately to the good and the bad. But
death
certainly and life, honor and dishonor, pain and pleasure, all
these
things equally happen to good and bad men, being things which make
us
neither better nor worse. Therefore they are neither good nor
evil."
The Ethical part of Antoninus' Philosophy follows from his
general
principles. The end of all his philosophy is to live conformably
to
Nature, both a man's own nature and the nature of the universe.
Bishop
Butler has explained what the Greek philosophers meant when they
spoke
of living according to Nature, and he says that when it is explained,
as
he has explained it and as they understood it, it is "a manner
of
speaking not loose and undeterminate, but clear and distinct,
strictly
just and true." To live according to Nature is to live according to
a
man's whole nature, not according to a part of it, and to reverence
the
divinity within him as the governor of all his actions. "To the
rational
animal the same act is according to nature and according to
reason"[A]
(vii. 11). That which is done contrary to reason is also an act
contrary
to nature, to the whole nature, though it is certainly conformable
to
some part of man's nature, or it could not be done. Man is made
for
action, not for idleness or pleasure. As plants and animals do the
uses
of their nature, so man must do his (v. 1).
[A] This is what
Juvenal means when he says (xiv. 321),--
"Nunquam aliud Natura aliud
Sapientia dicit."
Man must also live conformably to the universal nature,
conformably to
the nature of all things of which he is one; and as a citizen
of a
political community he must direct his life and actions with
reference
to those among whom, among other purposes, he lives.[A] A man must
not
retire into solitude and cut himself off from his fellow-men. He must
be
ever active to do his part in the great whole. All men are his kin,
not
only in blood, but still more by participating in the same
intelligence
and by being a portion of the same divinity. A man cannot really
be
injured by his brethren, for no act of theirs can make him bad, and
he
must not be angry with them nor hate them: "For we are made
for
co-operation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like the rows of
the
upper and lower teeth. To act against one another then is contrary
to
nature; and it is acting against one another to be vexed and to
turn
away" (ii. 1).
[A] See viii. 52; and Persius iii.
66
Further he says: "Take pleasure in one thing and rest in it in
passing
from one social act to another social act, thinking of God" (vi.
7).
Again: "Love mankind. Follow God" (vii. 31). It is the characteristic
of
the rational soul for a man to love his neighbor (xi. 1).
Antoninus
teaches in various passages the forgiveness of injuries, and we
know
that he also practised what he taught. Bishop Butler remarks that
"this
divine precept to forgive injuries and to love our enemies, though to
be
met with in Gentile moralists, yet is in a peculiar sense a precept
of
Christianity, as our Saviour has insisted more upon it than on any
other
single virtue." The practice of this precept is the most difficult
of
all virtues. Antoninus often enforces it and gives us aid
towards
following it. When we are injured, we feel anger and resentment, and
the
feeling is natural, just, and useful for the conservation of society.
It
is useful that wrong-doers should feel the natural consequences of
their
actions, among which is the disapprobation of society and the
resentment
of him who is wronged. But revenge, in the proper sense of that
word,
must not be practised. "The best way of avenging thyself," says
the
emperor, "is not to become like the wrong-doer." It is plain by
this
that he does not mean that we should in any case practise revenge;
but
he says to those who talk of revenging wrongs, Be not like him who
has
done the wrong. Socrates in the Crito (c. 10) says the same in
other
words, and St. Paul (Ep. to the Romans, xii. 17). "When a man has
done
thee any wrong, immediately consider with what opinion about good
or
evil he has done wrong. For when thou hast seen this, thou wilt pity
him
and wilt neither wonder nor be angry" (vii. 26). Antoninus would
not
deny that wrong naturally produces the feeling of anger and
resentment,
for this is implied in the recommendation to reflect on the
nature of
the man's mind who has done the wrong, and then you will have
pity
instead of resentment; and so it comes to the same as St. Paul's
advice
to be angry and sin not; which, as Butler well explains it, is not
a
recommendation to be angry, which nobody needs, for anger is a
natural
passion, but it is a warning against allowing anger to lead us into
sin.
In short the emperor's doctrine about wrongful acts is this:
wrong-doers
do not know what good and bad are: they offend out of ignorance,
and in
the sense of the Stoics this is true. Though this kind of ignorance
will
never be admitted as a legal excuse, and ought not to be admitted as
a
full excuse in any way by society, there may be grievous injuries,
such
as it is in a man's power to forgive without harm to society; and if
he
forgives because he sees that his enemies know not what they do, he
is
acting in the spirit of the sublime prayer, "Father, forgive them,
for
they know not what they do."
The emperor's moral philosophy was
not a feeble, narrow system, which
teaches a man to look directly to his own
happiness, though a man's
happiness or tranquillity is indirectly promoted by
living as he ought
to do. A man must live conformably to the universal
nature, which means,
as the emperor explains it in many passages, that a
man's actions must
be conformable to his true relations to all other human
beings, both as
a citizen of a political community and as a member of the
whole human
family. This implies, and he often expresses it in the most
forcible
language, that a man's words and actions, so far as they affect
others,
must be measured by a fixed rule, which is their consistency with
the
conservation and the interests of the particular society of which he
is
a member, and of the whole human race. To live conformably to such
a
rule, a man must use his rational faculties in order to discern
clearly
the consequences and full effect of all his actions and of the
actions
of others: he must not live a life of contemplation and reflection
only,
though he must often retire within himself to calm and purify his
soul
by thought,[A] but he must mingle in the work of man and be a
fellow
laborer for the general good.
[A] Ut nemo in sese tentat
descendere, nemo.--_Persius_, iv.
21.
A man should have an object
or purpose in life, that he may direct all
his energies to it; of course a
good object (ii. 7). He who has not one
object or purpose of life, cannot be
one and the same all through his
life (xi. 21). Bacon has a remark to the
same effect, on the best means
of "reducing of the mind unto virtue and good
estate; which is, the
electing and propounding unto a man's self good and
virtuous ends of his
life, such as may be in a reasonable sort within his
compass to attain."
He is a happy man who has been wise enough to do this
when he was young
and has had the opportunities; but the emperor seeing well
that a man
cannot always be so wise in his youth, encourages himself to do it
when
he can, and not to let life slip away before he has begun. He who
can
propose to himself good and virtuous ends of life, and be true to
them,
cannot fail to live conformably to his own interest and the
universal
interest, for in the nature of things they are one. If a thing is
not
good for the hive, it is not good for the bee (vi. 54).
One
passage may end this matter. "If the gods have determined about me
and about
the things which must happen to me, they have determined well,
for it is not
easy even to imagine a deity without forethought; and as
to doing me harm,
why should they have any desire towards that? For what
advantage would result
to them from this or to the whole, which is the
special object of their
providence? But if they have not determined
about me individually, they have
certainly determined about the whole at
least; and the things which happen by
way of sequence in this general
arrangement I ought to accept with pleasure
and to be content with them.
But if they determine about nothing--which it is
wicked to believe, or
if we do believe it, let us neither sacrifice nor pray
nor swear by
them, nor do anything else which we do as if the gods were
present and
lived with us; but if however the gods determine about none of
the
things which concern us, I am able to determine about myself, and I
can
inquire about that which is useful: and that is useful to every
man
which is conformable to his own constitution ([Greek: kataskeue])
and
nature. But my nature is rational and social; and my city and
country,
so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome; but so far as I am a man, it is
the
world. The things then which are useful to these cities are alone
useful
to me" (vi. 44).
It would be tedious, and it is not necessary,
to state the emperor's
opinions on all the ways in which a man may profitably
use his
understanding towards perfecting himself in practical virtue.
The
passages to this purpose are in all parts of his book, but as they
are
in no order or connection, a man must use the book a long time before
he
will find out all that is in it. A few words may be added here. If
we
analyze all other things, we find how insufficient they are for
human
life, and how truly worthless many of them are. Virtue alone
is
indivisible, one, and perfectly satisfying. The notion of Virtue
cannot
be considered vague or unsettled, because a man may find it difficult
to
explain the notion fully to himself, or to expound it to others in
such
a way as to prevent cavilling. Virtue is a whole, and no more
consists
of parts than man's intelligence does; and yet we speak of
various
intellectual faculties as a convenient way of expressing the
various
powers which man's intellect shows by his works. In the same way we
may
speak of various virtues or parts of virtue, in a practical sense,
for
the purpose of showing what particular virtues we ought to practice
in
order to the exercise of the whole of virtue, that is, as man's
nature
is capable of.
The prime principle in man's constitution is
social. The next in order
is not to yield to the persuasions of the body,
when they are not
conformable to the rational principle, which must govern.
The third is
freedom from error and from deception. "Let then the ruling
principle
holding fast to these things go straight on, and it has what is its
own"
(vii. 55). The emperor selects justice as the virtue which is the
basis
of all the rest (x. 11), and this had been said long before his
time.
It is true that all people have some notion of what is meant by
justice
as a disposition of the mind, and some notion about acting in
conformity
to this disposition; but experience shows that men's notions
about
justice are as confused as their actions are inconsistent with the
true
notion of justice. The emperor's notion of justice is clear enough,
but
not practical enough for all mankind. "Let there be freedom
from
perturbations with respect to the things which come from the
external
cause; and let there be justice in the things done by virtue of
the
internal cause, that is, let there be movement and action terminating
in
this, in social acts, for this is according to thy nature" (ix. 31).
In
another place (ix. 1) he says that "he who acts unjustly
acts
impiously," which follows of course from all that he says in
various
places. He insists on the practice of truth as a virtue and as a
means
to virtue, which no doubt it is: for lying even in indifferent
things
weakens the understanding; and lying maliciously is as great a
moral
offense as a man can be guilty of, viewed both as showing an
habitual
disposition, and viewed with respect to consequences. He couples
the
notion of justice with action. A man must not pride himself on
having
some fine notion of justice in his head, but he must exhibit his
justice
in act, like St. James' notion of faith. But this is
enough.
The Stoics, and Antoninus among them, call some things
beautiful
([Greek: kala]) and some ugly ([Greek: aischra]), and as they are
beautiful
so they are good, and as they are ugly so they are evil, or bad
(ii. 1).
All these things, good and evil, are in our power, absolutely, some
of
the stricter Stoics would say; in a manner only, as those who would
not
depart altogether from common sense would say; practically they are to
a
great degree in the power of some persons and in some circumstances,
but
in a small degree only in other persons and in other circumstances.
The
Stoics maintain man's free will as to the things which are in his
power;
for as to the things which are out of his power, free will
terminating
in action is of course excluded by the very terms of the
expression. I
hardly know if we can discover exactly Antoninus' notion of the
free
will of man, nor is the question worth the inquiry. What he does
mean
and does say is intelligible. All the things which are not in our
power
([Greek: aproaireta]) are indifferent: they are neither good nor
bad,
morally. Such are life, health, wealth, power, disease, poverty,
and
death. Life and death are all men's portion. Health, wealth,
power,
disease, and poverty happen to men, indifferently to the good and to
the
bad; to those who live according to nature and to those who do
not.[A]
"Life," says the emperor, "is a warfare and a stranger's sojourn,
and
after fame is oblivion" (ii. 17). After speaking of those men who
have
disturbed the world and then died, and of the death of philosophers
such
as Heraclitus and Democritus, who was destroyed by lice, and of
Socrates
whom other lice (his enemies) destroyed, he says: "What means all
this?
Thou hast embarked, thou hast made the voyage, thou art come to
shore;
get out. If indeed to another life, there is no want of gods, not
even
there. But if to a state without sensation, thou wilt cease to be
held
by pains and pleasures, and to be a slave to the vessel which is as
much
inferior as that which serves it is superior: for the one
is
intelligence and Deity; the other is earth and corruption" (iii. 3).
It
is not death that a man should fear, but he should fear never
beginning
to live according to nature (xii. 1). Every man should live in such
a
way as to discharge his duty, and to trouble himself about nothing
else.
He should live such a life that he shall always be ready for death,
and
shall depart content when the summons comes. For what is death?
"A
cessation of the impressions through the senses, and of the pulling
of
the strings which move the appetites, and of the discursive movements
of
the thoughts, and of the service to the flesh" (vi. 28). Death is
such
as generation is, a mystery of nature (iv. 5). In another passage,
the
exact meaning of which is perhaps doubtful (ix. 3), he speaks of
the
child which leaves the womb, and so he says the soul at death leaves
its
envelope. As the child is born or comes into life by leaving the
womb,
so the soul may on leaving the body pass into another existence which
is
perfect. I am not sure if this is the emperor's meaning. Butler
compares
it with a passage in Strabo (p. 713) about the Brachmans' notion
of
death being the birth into real life and a happy life, to those who
have
philosophized; and he thinks Antoninus may allude to this
opinion.[B]
[A] "All events come alike to all: there is one event to
the
righteous and to the wicked: to the good and to the clean
and
to the unclean," &c. (Ecclesiastes, ix. v. 2); and (v.
3),
"This is an evil among all things that are done under the
sun,
that there is one event unto all." In what sense "evil"
is
meant here seems rather doubtful. There is no doubt about
the
emperor's meaning. Compare Epictetus, Enchiridion, c. i.,
&c.;
and the doctrine of the Brachmans (Strabo p. 713, ed.
Cas.):
[Greek: agathon de e kakon meden einai ton
sumbainonton
anthropois].
[B] Seneca (Ep. 102) has the same,
whether an expression of his
own opinion, or merely a fine saying of
others employed to
embellish his writings, I know not. After speaking of
the child
being prepared in the womb to live this life, he adds, "Sic
per
hoc spatium, quod ab infantia patet in senectutem, in
alium
naturae sumimur partum. Alia origo nos expectat, alius
rerum
status." See Ecclesiastes, xii. 7; and Lucan, i.
457:--
"Longae, canitis si cognita,
vitae
Mors media est."
Antoninus' opinion of a future
life is nowhere clearly expressed. His
doctrine of the nature of the soul of
necessity implies that it does not
perish absolutely, for a portion of the
divinity cannot perish. The
opinion is at least as old as the time of
Epicharmus and Euripides; what
comes from earth goes back to earth, and what
comes from heaven, the
divinity, returns to him who gave it. But I find
nothing clear in
Antoninus as to the notion of the man existing after death
so as to be
conscious of his sameness with that soul which occupied his
vessel of
clay. He seems to be perplexed on this matter, and finally to
have
rested in this, that God or the gods will do whatever is best,
and
consistent with the university of things.
Nor, I think, does he
speak conclusively on another Stoic doctrine,
which some Stoics
practised,--the anticipating the regular course of
nature by a man's own act.
The reader will find some passages in which
this is touched on, and he may
make of them what he can. But there are
passages in which the emperor
encourages himself to wait for the end
patiently and with tranquillity; and
certainly it is consistent with all
his best teaching that a man should bear
all that falls to his lot and
do useful acts as he lives. He should not
therefore abridge the time of
his usefulness by his own act. Whether he
contemplates any possible
cases in which a man should die by his own hand, I
cannot tell; and the
matter is not worth a curious inquiry, for I believe it
would not lead
to any certain result as to his opinion on this point. I do
not think
that Antoninus, who never mentions Seneca, though he must have
known all
about him, would have agreed with Seneca when he gives as a reason
for
suicide, that the eternal law, whatever he means, has made
nothing
better for us than this, that it has given us only one way of
entering
into life and many ways of going out of it. The ways of going out
indeed
are many, and that is a good reason for a man taking care of
himself.[A]
[A] See Plinius H.N. ii., c. 7; Seneca, De Provid. c. 6;
and
Ep. 70: "Nihil melius aeterna lex," &c.
Happiness was not
the direct object of a Stoic's life. There is no rule
of life contained in
the precept that a man should pursue his own
happiness. Many men think that
they are seeking happiness when they are
only seeking the gratification of
some particular passion, the strongest
that they have. The end of a man is,
as already explained, to live
conformably to nature, and he will thus obtain
happiness, tranquillity
of mind, and contentment (iii. 12; viii. 1, and other
places). As a
means of living conformably to nature he must study the four
chief
virtues, each of which has its proper sphere: wisdom, or the
knowledge
of good and evil; justice, or the giving to every man his
due;
fortitude, or the enduring of labor and pain; and temperance, which
is
moderation in all things. By thus living conformably to nature the
Stoic
obtained all that he wished or expected. His reward was in his
virtuous
life, and he was satisfied with that. Some Greek poet long ago
wrote:--
"For virtue only of all human things
Takes her reward
not from the hands of others.
Virtue herself rewards the toils of
virtue."
Some of the Stoics indeed expressed themselves in very arrogant,
absurd
terms, about the wise man's self-sufficiency; they elevated him to
the
rank of a deity.[A] But these were only talkers and lecturers, such
as
those in all ages who utter fine words, know little of human
affairs,
and care only for notoriety. Epictetus and Antoninus both by precept
and
example labored to improve themselves and others; and if we
discover
imperfections in their teaching, we must still honor these great men
who
attempted to show that there is in man's nature and in the
constitution
of things sufficient reason for living a virtuous life. It is
difficult
enough to live as we ought to live, difficult even for any man to
live
in such a way as to satisfy himself, if he exercises only in a
moderate
degree the power of reflecting upon and reviewing his own conduct;
and
if all men cannot be brought to the same opinions in morals
and
religion, it is at least worth while to give them good reasons for
as
much as they can be persuaded to accept.
[A] J. Smith in his
Select Discourses on "the Excellency and
Nobleness of True Religion" (c.
vi.) has remarked on this
Stoical arrogance. He finds it in Seneca and
others. In Seneca
certainly, and perhaps something of it in Epictetus;
but it is
not in Antoninus.
THE
THOUGHTS
OF
MARCUS AURELIUS
ANTONIUS.
I.
From my grandfather Verus[A] [I
learned] good morals and the government
of my temper.
2. From the
reputation and remembrance of my father,[B] modesty and a
manly
character.
3. From my mother,[C] piety and beneficence, and abstinence,
not only
from evil deeds, but even from evil thoughts; and further,
simplicity in
my way of living, far removed from the habits of the
rich.
4. From my great-grandfather,[D] not to have frequented public
schools,
and to have had good teachers at home, and to know that on such
things a
man should spend liberally.
[A] Annius Verus was his
grandfather's name. There is no verb
in this section connected with the
word "from," nor in the
following sections of this book; and it is not
quite certain
what verb should be supplied. What I have added may express
the
meaning here, though there are sections which it will not
fit.
If he does not mean to say that he learned all these
good
things from the several persons whom he mentions, he means
that
he observed certain good qualities in them, or received
certain
benefits from them, and it is implied that he was the
better
for it, or at least might have been: for it would be a
mistake
to understand Marcus as saying that he possessed all
the
virtues which he observed in his kinsmen and teachers.
[B]
His father's name was Annius Verus.
[C] His mother was Domitia
Calvilla, named also Lucilla.
[D] Perhaps his mother's grandfather,
Catilius Severus.
5. From my governor, to be neither of the green nor of
the blue party at
the games in the Circus, nor a partisan either of the
Parmularius or the
Scutarius at the gladiators' fights; from him too I
learned endurance of
labor, and to want little, and to work with my own
hands, and not to
meddle with other people's affairs, and not to be ready to
listen to
slander.
6. From Diognetus,[A] not to busy myself about
trifling things, and not
to give credit to what was said by miracle-workers
and jugglers about
incantations and the driving away of daemons and such
things; and not to
breed quails [for fighting], nor to give myself up
passionately to such
things; and to endure freedom of speech; and to have
become intimate
with philosophy; and to have been a hearer, first of
Bacchius, then of
Tandasis and Marcianus; and to have written dialogues in my
youth; and
to have desired a plank bed and skin, and whatever else of the
kind
belongs to the Grecian discipline.
[A] In the works of
Justinus there is printed a letter to one
Diognetus, whom the writer
names "most excellent." He was a
Gentile, but he wished very much to know
what the religion of
the Christians was, what God they worshipped, and
how this
worship made them despise the world and death, and
neither
believe in the gods of the Greeks nor observe the
superstition
of the Jews; and what was this love to one another which
they
had, and why this new kind of religion was introduced now
and
not before. My friend Mr. Jenkins, rector of Lyminge in
Kent,
has suggested to me that this Diognetus may have been the
tutor
of M. Antoninus.
7. From Rusticus[A] I received the
impression that my character required
improvement and discipline; and from
him I learned not to be led astray
to sophistic emulation, nor to writing on
speculative matters, nor to
delivering little hortatory orations, nor to
showing myself off as a man
who practises much discipline, or does benevolent
acts in order to make
a display; and to abstain from rhetoric, and poetry,
and fine writing;
and not to walk about in the house in my outdoor dress, nor
to do other
things of the kind; and to write my letters with simplicity, like
the
letter which Rusticus wrote from Sinuessa to my mother; and with
respect
to those who have offended me by words, or done me wrong, to be
easily
disposed to be pacified and reconciled, as soon as they have shown
a
readiness to be reconciled; and to read carefully, and not to
be
satisfied with a superficial understanding of a book; nor hastily
to
give my assent to those who talk overmuch; and I am indebted to him
for
being acquainted with the discourses of Epictetus, which he
communicated
to me out of his own collection.
[A] Q. Junius
Rusticus was a Stoic philosopher, whom Antoninus
valued highly, and often
took his advice (Capitol. _M. Antonin_.
iii).
Antoninus says,
[Greek: tois Epikteteiois hypomnemasin] which
must not be translated,
"the writings of Epictetus," for
Epictetus wrote nothing. His pupil
Arrian, who has preserved
for us all that we know of Epictetus, says,
[Greek: tauta
epeirathen hypomnemata emauto diaphylaxai tes ekeinou
dianoias]
(_Ep. ad. Gell_.)
8. From Apollonius[A] I learned
freedom of will and undeviating
steadiness of purpose; and to look to nothing
else, not even for a
moment, except to reason; and to be always the same, in
sharp pains, on
the occasion of the loss of a child, and in long illness; and
to see
clearly in a living example that the same man can be both most
resolute
and yielding, and not peevish in giving his instruction; and to have
had
before my eyes a man who clearly considered his experience and his
skill
in expounding philosophical principles as the smallest of his
merits;
and from him I learned how to receive from friends what are
esteemed
favors, without being either humbled by them or letting them
pass
unnoticed.
[A] Apollonius of Chalcis came to Rome in the time
of Pius to
be Marcus' preceptor. He was a rigid Stoic.
9. From
Sextus,[A] a benevolent disposition, and the example of a
family governed in
a fatherly manner, and the idea of living conformably
to nature; and gravity
without affectation, and to look carefully after
the interests of friends,
and to tolerate ignorant persons, and those
who form opinions without
consideration:+ he had the power of readily
accommodating himself to all, so
that intercourse with him was more
agreeable than any flattery; and at the
same time he was most highly
venerated by those who associated with him: and
he had the faculty both
of discovery and ordering, in an intelligent and
methodical way, the
principles necessary for life; and he never showed anger
or any other
passion, but was entirely free from passion, and also most
affectionate;
and he could express approbation without noisy display, and he
possessed
much knowledge without ostentation.
10. From Alexander[B]
the grammarian, to refrain from fault-finding, and
not in a reproachful way
to chide those who uttered any barbarous or
solecistic or strange-sounding
expression; but dexterously to introduce
the very expression which ought to
have been used, and in the way of
answer or giving confirmation, or joining
in an inquiry about the thing
itself, not about the word, or by some other
fit suggestion.
11. From Fronto[C] I learned to observe what envy and
duplicity and
hypocrisy are in a tyrant, and that generally those among us
who are
called Patricians are rather deficient in paternal
affection.
12. From Alexander the Platonic, not frequently nor without
necessity to
say to any one, or to write in a letter, that I have no leisure;
nor
continually to excuse the neglect of duties required by our relation
to
those with whom we live, by alleging urgent occupations.
13. From
Catulus[D] not to be indifferent when a friend finds fault,
even if he should
find fault without reason, but to try to restore him
to his usual
disposition; and to be ready to speak well of teachers, as
it is reported of
Domitius and Athenodotus; and to love my children
truly.
[A]
Sextus of Chaeronea, a grandson of Plutarch, or nephew, as
some say; but
more probably a grandson.
[B] Alexander was a Grammaticus, a native
of Phrygia. He wrote
a commentary on Homer; and the rhetorician Aristides
wrote a
panegyric on Alexander in a funeral oration.
[C] M.
Cornelius Fronto was a rhetorician, and in great favor
with Marcus. There
are extant various letters between Marcus
and Fronto.
[D]
Cinna Catulus, a Stoic philosopher.
14. From my brother[A] Severus, to
love my kin, and to love truth, and
to love justice; and through him I
learned to know Thrasea, Helvidius,
Cato, Dion, Brutus;[B] and from him I
received the idea of a polity in
which there is the same law for all, a
polity administered with regard
to equal rights and equal freedom of speech,
and the idea of a kingly
government which respects most of all the freedom of
the governed; I
learned from him also + consistency and undeviating
steadiness in my
regard for philosophy; and a disposition to do good, and to
give to
others readily, and to cherish good hopes, and to believe that I
am
loved by my friends; and in him I observed no concealment of
his
opinions with respect to those whom he condemned, and that his
friends
had no need to conjecture what he wished or did not wish, but it
was
quite plain.
[A] The word brother may not be genuine.
Antoninus had no
brother. It has been supposed that he may mean some
cousin.
Schultz in his translation omits "brother," and says that
this
Severus is probably Claudius Severus, a peripatetic.
[B]
We know, from Tacitus (_Annal._ xiii., xvi. 21; and other
passages), who
Thrasea and Helvidius were. Plutarch has written
the lives of the two
Catos, and of Dion and Brutus. Antoninus
probably alludes to Cato of
Utica, who was a Stoic.
15. From Maximus[A] I learned self-government,
and not to be led aside
by anything; and cheerfulness in all circumstances,
as well as in
illness; and a just admixture in the moral character of
sweetness and
dignity, and to do what was set before me without complaining.
I
observed that everybody believed that he thought as he spoke, and
that
in all that he did he never had any bad intention; and he never
showed
amazement and surprise, and was never in a hurry, and never put
off
doing a thing, nor was perplexed nor dejected, nor did he ever laugh
to
disguise his vexation, nor, on the other hand, was he ever passionate
or
suspicious. He was accustomed to do acts of beneficence, and was
ready
to forgive, and was free from all falsehood; and he presented
the
appearance of a man who could not be diverted from right, rather than
of
a man who had been improved. I observed, too, that no man could
ever
think that he was despised by Maximus, or ever venture to think
himself
a better man. He had also the art of being humorous in an
agreeable
way.+
[A] Claudius Maximus was a Stoic philosopher, who
was highly
esteemed also by Antoninus Pius, Marcus' predecessor.
The
character of Maximus is that of a perfect man. (See viii.
25.)
16. In my father[A] I observed mildness of temper, and
unchangeable
resolution in the things which he had determined after due
deliberation;
and no vain-glory in those things which men call honors; and a
love of
labor and perseverance; and a readiness to listen to those who
had
anything to propose for the common weal; and undeviating firmness
in
giving to every man according to his deserts; and a knowledge
derived
from experience of the occasions for vigorous action and for
remission.
And I observed that he had overcome all passion for boys; and
he
considered himself no more than any other citizen;[B] and he
released
his friends from all obligation to sup with him or to attend him
of
necessity when he went abroad, and those who had failed to
accompany
him, by reason of any urgent circumstances, always found him the
same. I
observed too his habit of careful inquiry in all matters
of
deliberation, and his persistency, and that he never stopped
his
investigation through being satisfied with appearances which
first
present themselves; and that his disposition was to keep his
friends,
and not to be soon tired of them, nor yet to be extravagant in
his
affection; and to be satisfied on all occasions, and cheerful; and
to
foresee things a long way off, and to provide for the smallest
without
display; and to check immediately popular applause and all flattery;
and
to be ever watchful over the things which were necessary for
the
administration of the empire, and to be a good manager of
the
expenditure, and patiently to endure the blame which he got for
such
conduct; and he was neither superstitious with respect to the gods,
nor
did he court men by gifts or by trying to please them, or by
flattering
the populace; but he showed sobriety in all things, and firmness,
and
never any mean thoughts or action, nor love of novelty. And the
things
which conduce in any way to the commodity of life, and of which
fortune
gives an abundant supply, he used without arrogance and without
excusing
himself; so that when he had them, he enjoyed them without
affectation,
and when he had them not, he did not want them. No one could
ever say of
him that he was either a sophist or a [home-bred] flippant slave
or a
pedant; but every one acknowledged him to be a man ripe, perfect,
above
flattery, able to manage his own and other men's affairs. Besides
this,
he honored those who were true philosophers, and he did not
reproach
those who pretended to be philosophers, nor yet was he easily led
by
them. He was also easy in conversation, and he made himself
agreeable
without any offensive affectation. He took a reasonable care of
his
body's health, not as one who was greatly attached to life, nor out
of
regard to personal appearance, nor yet in a careless way, but so
that
through his own attention he very seldom stood in need of
the
physician's art or of medicine or external applications. He was
most
ready to give without envy to those who possessed any
particular
faculty, such as that of eloquence or knowledge of the law or of
morals,
or of anything else; and he gave them his help, that each might
enjoy
reputation according to his deserts; and he always acted conformably
to
the institutions of his country, without showing any affectation
of
doing so. Further, he was not fond of change nor unsteady, but he
loved
to stay in the same places, and to employ himself about the same
things;
and after his paroxysms of headache he came immediately fresh
and
vigorous to his usual occupations. His secrets were not many, but
very
few and very rare, and these only about public matters; and he
showed
prudence and economy in the exhibition of the public spectacles and
the
construction of public buildings, his donations to the people, and
in
such things, for he was a man who looked to what ought to be done,
not
to the reputation which is got by a man's acts. He did not take the
bath
at unseasonable hours; he was not fond of building houses, nor
curious
about what he ate, nor about the texture and color of his clothes,
nor
about the beauty of his slaves.[C] His dress came from Lorium, his
villa
on the coast, and from Lanuvium generally.[D] We know how he behaved
to
the toll-collector at Tusculum who asked his pardon; and such was
all
his behavior. There was in him nothing harsh, nor implacable,
nor
violent, nor, as one may say, anything carried to the sweating
point;
but he examined all things severally, as if he had abundance of
time,
and without confusion, in an orderly way, vigorously and
consistently.
And that might be applied to him which is recorded of
Socrates,[E] that
he was able both to abstain from, and to enjoy, those
things which many
are too weak to abstain from, and cannot enjoy without
excess. But to be
strong enough both to bear the one and to be sober in the
other is the
mark of a man who has a perfect and invincible soul, such as he
showed
in the illness of Maximus.
[A] He means his adoptive
father, his predecessor, the Emperor
Antoninus Pius. Compare vi.
30.
[B] He uses the word [Greek: koinonoemosune]. See
Gataker's
note.
[C] This passage is corrupt, and the exact
meaning is
uncertain.
[D] Lorium was a villa on the coast
north of Rome, and there
Antoninus was brought up, and he died there.
This also is
corrupt.
[E] Xenophon, Memorab. i. 3,
15.
17. To the gods I am indebted for having good grandfathers,
good
parents, a good sister, good teachers, good associates, good kinsmen
and
friends, nearly everything good. Further, I owe it to the gods that
I
was not hurried into any offence against any of them, though I had
a
disposition which, if opportunity had offered, might have led me to
do
something of this kind; but, through their favor, there never was such
a
concurrence of circumstances as put me to the trial. Further, I
am
thankful to the gods that I was not longer brought up with
my
grandfather's concubine, and that I preserved the flower of my
youth,
and that I did not make proof of my virility before the proper
season,
but even deferred the time; that I was subjected to a ruler and
father
who was able to take away all pride from me, and to bring me to
the
knowledge that it is possible for a man to live in a palace
without
wanting either guards or embroidered dresses, or torches and
statues,
and such-like show; but that it is in such a man's power to
bring
himself very near to the fashion of a private person, without being
for
this reason either meaner in thought, or more remiss in action,
with
respect to the things which must be done for the public interest in
a
manner that befits a ruler. I thank the gods for giving me such
a
brother,[A] who was able by his moral character to rouse me to
vigilance
over myself, and who at the same time pleased me by his respect
and
affection; that my children have not been stupid nor deformed in
body;
that I did not make more proficiency in rhetoric, poetry, and the
other
studies, in which I should perhaps have been completely engaged, if
I
had seen that I was making progress in them; that I made haste to
place
those who brought me up in the station of honor, which they seemed
to
desire, without putting them off with hope of my doing it some
other
time after, because they were then still young; that I knew
Apollonius,
Rusticus, Maximus; that I received clear and frequent impressions
about
living according to nature, and what kind of a life that is, so that,
so
far as depended on the gods, and their gifts, and help,
and
inspirations, nothing hindered me from forthwith living according
to
nature, though I still fall short of it through my own fault,
and
through not observing the admonitions of the gods, and, I may
almost
say, their direct instructions; that my body has held out so long
in
such a kind of life; that I never touched either Benedicta or
Theodotus,
and that, after having fallen into amatory passions, I was cured,
and,
though I was often out of humor with Rusticus, I never did anything
of
which I had occasion to repent; that, though it was my mother's fate
to
die young, she spent the last years of her life with me; that,
whenever
I wished to help any man in his need, or on any other occasion, I
was
never told that I had not the means of doing it; and that to myself
the
same necessity never happened, to receive anything from another; that
I
have such a wife,[B] so obedient, and so affectionate, and so
simple;
that I had abundance of good masters for my children; and that
remedies
have been shown to me by dreams, both others, and against
bloodspitting
and giddiness[C]...; and that, when I had an inclination to
philosophy,
I did not fall into the hands of any sophist, and that I did not
waste
my time on writers [of histories], or in the resolution of
syllogisms,
or occupy myself about the investigation of appearances in the
heavens;
for all these things require the help of the gods and
fortune.
Among the Quadi at the Granua.[D]
[A] The emperor had
no brother except L. Verus, his brother by
adoption.
[B] See
the _Life of Antoninus_.
[C] This is corrupt.
[D] The
Quadi lived in the southern part of Bohemia and
Moravia; and Antoninus
made a campaign against them. (See the
_Life_.) Granua is probably the
river Graan, which flows into the Danube. |
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