The Casement Report 7

The Casement Report 7

The state of affairs then which actually exists, and is established in

the Independent State, is such that there is really no need, as far as

the State itself is concerned, to dwell longer on the theory set forth

in the note which deals in turn with the rights of the State, with those

of _bonâ fide_ occupiers, and those of the natives.

 

Still this theory calls for the attention of the Powers in view of the

serious difficulties which would arise were it to be implicitly

accepted.

 

The note lays down the three following propositions:--

 

“The State has the right to partition the State lands among _bonâ fide_

occupants.”

 

“The natives will, as the land is so divided out amongst _bonâ fide_

occupiers, lose their right of roaming over it and collecting the

natural fruits which it produces.”

 

“Until unoccupied land is reduced into individual occupation, and so

long as the produce can only be collected by the native, the native

should be free to dispose of that produce as he pleases.”

 

There is no single one of these propositions but apparently excludes the

other two, and, as a matter of fact, such contradictions amount to a

denial of the right to grant Concessions.

 

If _bonâ fide_ occupiers ever existed they have become proprietors;

occupation, where it can be exercised, is under all legislative codes,

one of the methods by which property can be acquired, and in the Congo

State titles of ownership deriving from it have been legally registered.

If the land has never been legally occupied, it is without an owner, or,

rather the State is the owner: the State can allot it to a third party,

for whom such allotment is a complete and absolute title. In either case

it is hard to see how the fruits of the soil can be reserved for any but

the owner on the pretext that the latter is not able to collect the

produce of his property.

 

By a curious contradiction it is observed in the note that, as a

consequence of the allotment of lands by the State, the natives “lose

their right of collecting the natural fruits,” and, on the other hand,

that they retain the right of disposing of these fruits “until

unoccupied land is reduced into individual occupation.” It is difficult

to understand what is meant by a right which belongs to the natives or

not according to the action of a third party. Either they lost their

rights on the lands being allotted, and in that case they have lost them

entirely and completely, or else they have retained them, and are

entitled to retain them, although “the land is reduced into individual

occupation.”

 

Again, what are we to understand by the __EXPRESSION__s “_bonâ fide_”

occupiers and “individual occupation?” Who is to determine whether the

occupier has brought his lands into a state of individual occupation,

whether he is able to collect their produce, or whether it is still for

the native to do so? In any case, such a question is essentially one to

be settled by municipal law.

 

The note is, moreover, incomplete in another respect. It states that

where the land has not yet been worked by those who have a right to it,

the option of working should belong to the native. Rights would thus be

given to the natives to the prejudice of the Government or of white

concessionnaires, but the note does not explain how nor by whom the

wrong thus caused would be repaired or made good. Though the system thus

advocated cannot be applied in the Congo State, as there are no longer

any unappropriated lands there, attention should be called to the

statement in the interest of white men established in the conventional

basin. If it is right to treat the negro well, it is none the less just

not to despoil the white man, who, in the interest of all, must remain

the dominant race.

 

From an economic point of view, it would be very regrettable if, in

spite of the rights regularly acquired by white men, the domain lands

were, even temporarily, handed over to the natives. Such a course would

involve a return to their former condition of abandonment, when the

natives left them unproductive, for the collection of rubber, the

plantation of coffee, cocoa, tobacco, &c., date from the day when the

State itself took the initiative: the export trade was insignificant

before the impetus it received from Government enterprise. Such a course

would furthermore certainly involve the neglect of rational methods of

work, of planting and of replanting--measures which the State and the

Concessionary Companies have assumed as an obligation with a view to

securing the preservation of the natural riches of the country.

 

Never in the Congo, so far as we know, have requests to buy natural

produce been addressed to the rightful owners. Up to now the only

attempts made have been to buy the produce which has been stolen, and

the State, as was its duty, has had those guilty of these unlawful

attempts prosecuted.

 

It is not true, as has been asserted, that the policy of the State has

killed trade; it has, on the contrary, created the materials which trade

deals in and keeps up the supply; it is thanks to the State that, on the

Antwerp market--and soon even in the Congo where the possibility of

establishing trade depôts is being considered--5,000 tons of rubber

collected in the Congo can be annually put on sale to all and sundry

without privilege or monopoly, while formerly, in 1887, for instance,

the rubber export amounted to hardly 30 tons. It is the State which,

after having created, at its own expense, the material of trade,

carefully preserves the source of it by means of planting and

replanting.

 

It must not be forgotten either that the Congo State has been obliged to

rely on its own resources. It was forced to utilize its domain in the

public interest. All the receipts of the domain go into the Treasury, as

also the dividends of the shares which the State holds in exchange for

Concessions granted. It has only been by fully utilizing its domain

lands, and pledging the greater part of their revenues, that it has been

able to raise loans, and encourage the construction of railways by

guarantees of interest, thus realizing one of the means most advocated

by the Brussels Conference for promoting civilization in Central

Africa. Nor has it hesitated to mortgage its domain lands with this

object.

 

The Berlin Act is not opposed to such a course, for it never proscribed

the rights of property as there is now an _ex post facto_ attempt to

make out, an attempt tending, consciously or not, to the ruin of the

whole conventional basin of the Congo.

 

It will not escape the notice of the Powers that the English note, by

suggesting a reference to the Court at The Hague, tends to bring into

consideration as cases for arbitration questions of sovereignty and

internal administration as questions for arbitration which, according to

prevailing doctrines, are excluded from arbitral decisions. As far as

the present case is concerned, it must be assumed that the suggestion of

referring the matter to the Court at The Hague has a general meaning, if

it is true that, in the opinion of the English Chambers of Commerce,

“the principles and practice introduced into the administration of the

affairs of the French Congo, the Congo Free State, and other areas in

the conventional basin of the Congo being [_sic_] in direct opposition

to the Articles of the Act of Berlin, 1885.” The Government of the Congo

State have never ceased advocating arbitration as a mode of settling

questions which are of an international nature, and can thus be suitably

treated, as, for instance, the divergencies of opinion which have arisen

in connexion with the lease of the territories of the Bahr-el-Ghazal.

 

The Government of the Congo State, after careful examination of the

English note, remain convinced that, in view of its vagueness, and the

complete lack of evidence, which is implicitly admitted, there is no

tribunal in the world, supposing there were one possessing competent

jurisdiction, which could, far from pronouncing a condemnation, take any

decision other than to refuse action on mere supposition.

 

If the Congo State is attacked, England may admit that she, more than

any other nation, has been the object of attacks and accusations of

every kind, and the list would be long of the campaigns which have at

various times, and even quite recently, been directed against her

colonial administration. She has certainly not escaped criticism in

regard to her numerous and bloody wars against native populations, nor

the reproach of oppressing natives and invading their liberty. Has she

not been blamed in regard to the long insurrections in Sierra Leone; to

the disturbed state of Nigeria, where quite recently, according to the

English newspapers, military measures of repression cost, on one single

occasion, the lives of 700 natives, of most of their Chiefs, and of the

Sultan; and to the conflict in Somaliland, which is being carried on at

the cost of many lives, without, however, exciting __EXPRESSION__s of regret

in the House of Commons, except on the score of the heavy expense?

 

Seeing that these attacks have left England indifferent, it is somewhat

surprising to find her now attaching such importance to those made on

the Congo State.

 

There is, however, reason to think that the natives of the Congo State

prefer the Government of a small and pacific nation, whose aims remain

as peaceful as its creation which was founded on Treaties concluded with

the natives.

 

(Signed) CHR. DE CUVELIER.

 

_Brussels, September 17, 1903._

 

 

Annexes.[5]

 

I. “Bulletin Officiel de l’État Indépendant du Congo,” Juin 1903.

 

II. Judgments delivered by the Tribunals of French Congo.

 

III. Opinions of Messrs. Van Maldeghem and de Paepe, Van Berchem,

Barboux, and Nys.

 

 

_Translations of Extracts from Annex I._

 

Page 142.

 

In conformity with Articles II and XIII of the Berlin Act, it (the Congo

State) has assured to all flags, without distinction of nationality,

free access to all its interior waters and full and entire freedom of

navigation. The railway, which has been constructed to obviate the

innavigability of the lower river, is open to the traffic of all nations

in conformity with Article XVI.

 

In conformity with Article III, there is no differential treatment

either of ships or goods, and no tax is levied on foreigners which is

not equally borne by nationals.

 

In conformity with Article IV, no transit due has been imposed.