2015년 11월 9일 월요일

Mental Evolution in Man 68

Mental Evolution in Man 68



Or, to vary the metaphor, this probability has been as a torrent,
gaining in strength and volume as it is successively fed by facts and
principles poured into it by the advance of many sciences.
 
Of course it is always easy to withhold assent from a probability,
however strong: “My belief,” it may be said, “is not to be wooed; it
shall only be compelled.” Indeed, a man may even pride himself on the
severity of his requirements in this respect; and in popular writings
we often find it taken for granted that any scientific doctrine is
then only entitled to be regarded as scientific when it has been
demonstrated. But in science, as in other things, belief ought to be
proportionate to evidence; and although for this very reason we should
ever strive for the attainment of better evidence, scientific caution
of such a kind must not be confused with a merely ignorant demand
for impossible evidence. Actually to demonstrate the transition from
non-conceptual to conceptual ideation in the race, as it is every day
demonstrated in the individual, would plainly require the impossible
condition that conceptual thought should have observed its own origin.
To demand any demonstrative proof of the transition in the race would
therefore be antecedently absurd. But if, as Bishop Butler says,
“probability is the very guide of life,” assuredly no less is it the
very guide of science; and here, I submit, we are in the presence of
a probability so irresistible that to withhold from it the embrace of
conviction would be no longer indicative of scientific caution, but of
scientific incapacity. For if, as I am assuming, we already accept the
theory of evolution as applicable throughout the length and breadth of
the realm organic, it appears to me that we have positively _better_
reasons for accepting it as applicable to the length and breadth of
the realm mental. In other words, looking to all that has now been
said, I cannot help feeling that there is actually better evidence of
a psychological transition from the brute to the man, than there is of
a morphological transition from one organic form to another, in any
of the still numerous instances where the intermediate links do not
happen to have been preserved. Thus, for example, in my opinion an
evolutionist of to-day who seeks to constitute the human mind a great
exception to the otherwise uniform principle of genetic continuity, has
an even more hopeless case than he would have were he to argue that a
similar exception ought to be made with regard to the structure of the
worm-like creature Balanoglossus.
 
If this comparison should appear to betray any extravagant estimate
on my part of the cogency of the evidence which has thus far been
presented, I will now in conclusion ask it to be remembered that
my case is not yet concluded. For hitherto I have almost entirely
abstained from considering the mental condition of _savages_. The
reason why this important branch of my subject has not been touched
is because I reserve it for the next instalment of my work. But when
we leave the groundwork of psychological principles on which up to
this point we have been engaged, and advance to the wider field of
anthropological research in general, we shall find much additional
evidence of a more concrete kind, which almost uniformly tends to
substantiate the conclusions already gained. The corroboration thus
afforded is indeed, to my thinking, superfluous; and, therefore,
will not be adduced in this connection. Nevertheless, while tracing
the principles of mental evolution from the lowest levels which are
actually occupied by existing man, we shall find that no small light
is incidentally thrown upon the demonstrably still more primitive
intelligence of pre-historic man. Thus shall we find that we are
led back by continuous stages to a state of still human ideation,
which brings us into contact almost painfully close with that of the
higher apes. This, indeed, is a side of the general question which my
opponents are prone to ignorejust as they ignore the parallel side
which has to do with the psychogenesis of a child. And, of course,
when they thus ignore both the child and the savage, so as directly to
contrast the adult psychology of civilized man with that of the lower
animals, it is easy to show an enormous difference. But where the
question is as to whether this is a difference of degree or of kind,
the absurdity of disregarding the intermediate phases which present
themselves to actual observation is surely too obvious for comment.
At all events I think it may be safely promised, that when we come to
consider the case of savages, and through them the case of pre-historic
man, we shall find that, in the great interval which lies between such
grades of mental evolution and our own, we are brought far on the way
towards bridging the psychological distance which separates the gorilla
from the gentleman.
 
 
 
 
INDEX.
 
 
A
 
Abstraction. _See_ Ideas
 
Addison, Mrs. K., on sign-making by a jackdaw, 97
 
Adjectives, appropriately used by parrots, 129, 130, 152;
early use of, by children, 219;
not differentiated in early forms of speech, 295 _et seq._;
origin of Aryan, 306;
and in language generally, 385-86.
 
Adverbs not differentiated in early forms of speech, 306
 
African Bushmen. _See_ Hottentots
 
African languages. _See_ Languages
 
Agglomerative. _See_ Languages
 
Agglutinating. _See_ Languages
 
American languages. _See_ Languages
 
Analytic. _See_ Languages
 
Anatomy, evidence of man’s descent supplied by, 19
 
Animals. _See_ Brutes
 
Animism of primitive man, 275
 
Ants, intelligence of, 52, 53;
sign-making by, 91-95
 
Apes, brain-weight of, 16;
bodily structure of, 19;
counting by, 58, 215;
understanding of words by, 125, 126;
unable to imitate articulate sounds, 153-157;
psychological characters of anthropoid, in relation to the descent
of man, 364-370;
singing, 370, 373-378;
other vocal sounds made by, 374;
erect attitude assumed by, 381, 382
 
Appleyard on language of savages, 349
 
Apposition. _See_ Predication
 
Aristotle, on intelligence of brutes, 12,
and of man, 20;
his classification of the animal kingdom, 79;
his logic based on grammar of the Greek language, 314, 320
 
Articulation, chap. vii.;
classification of different kinds of, 121;
meaningless, 121, 122;
understanding of, 122-129;
by dogs, 128;
use of, with intelligent signification by talking birds, 129-139;
arbitrary use of, by young children, 138-144;
relation of, to tone and gesture, 145-162;
importance of sense of sight to development of, 366, 367;
probable period and mode of genesis of in the race, 370-373
 
Aryan languages. _See_ Languages
 
Aryan race, civilization of, 272;
antiquity of, 273
 
Audouin on a monkey recognizing pictorial representations, 188
 
Axe, discovery of, by neolithic man, 214
 
 
B
 
Barter only used by man, 19
 
Basque language. _See_ Language
 
Bateman, Dr. F., on speech-centre of brain, 134, 135
 
Bates, on intelligence of ants, 92, 93;
on a monkey recognizing pictorial representations, 188.
 
Bats the only mammals capable of flight, 156
 
Bear, intelligence of, 51;
understanding tones of human voice, 124
 
Beattie, Dr., on intelligence of a dog, 100
 
Bees, sign-making by, 90
 
Bell, Professor A. Graham, on teaching a dog to articulate, 128;
on the ideation of deaf-mutes, 150
 
Belt on intelligence of ants, 52, 92
 
Benfry on roots of Sanskrit, 267
 
Berkeley on ideas, 21, 22
 
Binet on analogies between perception and reason, 32
and sensation, 37, 46
 
Bingley on bees understanding tones of human voice, 124
 
Bleek, on origin of pronouns, 302;
on the sentence-words of African Bushmen, 316, 337, 338;
on onomatopœia, 339;
on the clicks of Hottentots and African Bushmen, 373
 
Bonaparte, Prince Lucien, on possible number of articulate sounds, 373
 
Bopp on the origin of speech, 240
 
Bowen, Professor F., on psychology of judgment, 167
 
Boyd Dawkins, Professor, on discovery of axe by neolithic man, 214
 
Bramston, Miss, on intelligence of a dog, 56
 
Brazil, climate and native languages of, 262, 263
 
Brown, Thomas, on generalization, 44
 
Browning, A. H., on intelligence of a dog, 99, 100
 
Brutes, mind of, compared with human, 6-39;
emotions of, 7;
instincts of, 8;
volition of, 8;
intellect of, 9;
Mr. Mivart on psychology of, 10, 177;
as machines, 11;
rationality of, 11, 12;
soul of, 12;
Bishop Butler on immortality of, 12;
instances of intelligence of, 51-63;
ideas of causality in, 58-60;
appreciation of principles by, 60, 61;
sign-making by, 88-102;
understanding of words by, 123-127;
articulation by, 128-138, 152;
reasons why none have become intellectual rivals of man, 154-157;
self-consciousness in relation to, 175-178;
recognizing pictorial representations, 188, 189;
conditions to genesis of self-consciousness manifested by, 195-199;
counting by, 56-58, 214, 215;
psychology of, in relation to the descent of man, 364-384
 
Buffon, on intelligence of brutes, 12, 117;
his parrot, 201

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