Mental Evolution in Man 62

Mental Evolution in Man 62

Now, this is admitted by all my opponents who understand the psychology

of the subject. Moreover, they allow that if once this chasm of

predication were bridged, there would be no further chasm to cross. For

it is universally acknowledged that, from the simplest judgment which

it is possible to make—and, therefore, from the simplest proposition

which it is possible to construct—human intelligence displays an

otherwise uninterrupted ascent through all the grades of excellence

which it afterwards presents. Here, therefore, we had carefully to

consider the psychology of predication. And the result of our analysis

was to show that the distinctively human faculty in question really

occurs further back than at the place where a mind is first able to

construct the formal proposition “A is B.” It occurs at the place

where a mind is first able to bestow a name, known as such,—to call

A _A_, and B _B_, with a cognizance that in so doing it is performing

an act of conceptual classification. Therefore, unless we extend the

term “judgment” so as to embrace such an act of conceptual naming (as

well as the act of expressing a relation between things conceptually

named), we must conclude that “the simplest element of thought” is not

a judgment, but a concept. It is needless again to go over the ground

of this proof; for, although in the course of it I had to point out

certain inexcusable errors in psychological analysis on the part of

some of my opponents, the proof itself is too complete to admit of any

question.

 

Thus, then, we were brought back to our original distinction between

a concept and a recept. But now we were in a position to show that,

just as in the matter of conducting “inferences,” so in the matter

of making signs, there is an order of ideation that is receptual as

well as one that is conceptual. And, more particularly, even in that

kind of sign-making which consists in the bestowing of names, ideation

of the receptual order may be concerned without any assistance at

all from ideation of the conceptual order. In other words, there are

names and names. Not every name that is bestowed need necessarily

be expressive of a concept, any more than every “inference” that is

conducted need necessarily be the result of self-conscious thought. Not

only young children before they attain to self-conscious thought, but

even talking birds habitually name objects, qualities, actions, and

states. Nevertheless, while giving abundant evidence of this fact, I

was careful to point out that thus far no argumentative implications

of any importance were involved. That a young child and a talking

bird should be able thus to learn the names of objects, qualities,

&c., by imitation—or even to invent arbitrary names of their own—is

psychologically of no more significance than the fact that both the

child and the bird will similarly employ gesture-signs or vocal tones

whereby to express the simple logic of their recepts. Nevertheless,

it is needful in some way to distinguish this non-conceptual kind of

naming from that kind which is peculiar to man after he has attained

self-consciousness, and thus is able, not only to name, but to _know

that he names_—not only to call A _A_, but to _think A as his symbol

of_ A. Now, in order to mark this distinction, I have assigned the term

_denotation_ to naming of the receptual kind, and applied the term

_denomination_ to naming of the conceptual kind. When a parrot calls a

dog “Bow-wow” (as a parrot, like a child, can easily be taught to do),

it may be said in a sense to be naming the dog; but obviously it is not

_predicating_ any characters as belonging to a dog, or performing any

act of _judgment_ with regard to a dog—as is the case, for example,

with a naturalist who, by means of his name _Canis_, conceptually

assigns that animal to a particular zoological genus. Although the

parrot may never utter the name “Bow-wow” save when it sees a dog,

this fact is attributable to the laws of association acting only in

the receptual sphere: it furnishes no shadow of a reason for supposing

that the bird ever thinks about the dog as a dog, or sets the concept

Dog before its mind as a separate object of thought. Therefore, none

of my opponents can afford to deny that in one sense of the word there

may be names without concepts: whether as gestures or as words (“vocal

gestures”), there may be signs of things without these signs presenting

any vestige of predicative value. Now, it is in order not to prejudice

the case of my opponents, and thus clearly to mark out the field of

discussion, that I have instituted the distinction between names as

receptual and conceptual, or denotative and denominative.

 

This distinction having been clearly understood, the next point was

that both kinds of names admit of connotative extension—denotative

names within the receptual sphere, and denominative within the

conceptual. That is to say, when a name has been applied to one thing,

its use may be extended to another thing, which is seen to belong to

the same class or kind. The degree to which such connotative extension

of a name may take place depends, of course, on the degree in which the

mind is able to take cognizance of resemblances or analogies. Hence

the process can go much further in the conceptual sphere than it does

in the receptual. But the important point is that it unquestionably

takes place in the latter within certain limits. Nor is this anything

more than we should antecedently expect. For in the lengthy account

and from the numerous facts which I gave of the receptual intelligence

of brutes, it was abundantly proved that long before the differential

engine of conception has come to the assistance of mind, mind is

able to reach a high level in the distinguishing of resemblances or

analogies by means of receptual discrimination alone. Consequently, it

is inevitable that non-conceptual or denotative names should undergo a

connotative extension, within whatever limits these powers of merely

receptual discrimination impose. And, as a matter of fact, we found

that such is the case. A talking bird will extend its denotative name

from one dog in particular to any other dog which it may happen to see;

and a young child, after having done this, will extend the denotative

name still further, so as to include images, and eventually pictures,

of dogs. Hence, if the receptual intelligence of a parrot were somewhat

more advanced than it happens to be, we can have no doubt that it would

do the same: the only reason why in this matter it parts company with

a child so soon as it does, is because its receptual intelligence is

not sufficiently developed to perceive the resemblance of images and

pictures to the objects which they are intended to represent. But the

receptual intelligence of a dog is higher than that of a parrot, and

some dogs are able to perceive resemblances of this kind. Therefore

if dogs, like parrots, had happened to be able to articulate, and so

to learn the use of denotative names, there can be no doubt that they

would have accompanied the growing child through a somewhat further

reach of connotative utterance than is the case with the only animals

which present the anatomical conditions required for the imitation of

articulate sounds. Both dogs and monkeys are able, in an extraordinary

degree, to _understand_ these sounds: that is to say, they can learn

the meanings of an astonishing number of denotative names, and also

be taught to apprehend a surprisingly large extension of connotative

significance. Consequently, if they could but _imitate_ these sounds,

after the manner of a parrot, it is certain that they would greatly

distance the parrot in this matter of receptual connotation.

 

But, lastly, we are not shut up to any such hypothetical case. For

the growing child itself furnishes us with evidence upon the point,

which is no less cogent than would be the case if dogs and monkeys were

able to talk. For, without argumentative suicide, none of my opponents

can afford to suggest that, up to the age when self-consciousness

dawns, the young child is capable of conceptual connotation; yet it is

unquestionable that up to that age a continuous growth of connotation

has been taking place, which, beginning with the level that it shares

with a parrot, is eventually able to construct what I have called

“receptual propositions,” the precise nature of which I will summarise

in a subsequent paragraph. The evidence which I have given of this

connotative extension of denotative names by children before the age

at which self-consciousness supervenes—and, therefore, _prior to

the very condition which is required for conceptual ideation_—is, I

think, overwhelming. And I do not see how its place in my argument

can be gainsaid by any opponent, except at the cost of ignoring my

distinction between connotation as receptual and conceptual. Yet

to do this would be to surrender his whole case. Either there is a

distinction, or else there is not a distinction, between connotation

that is receptual, and connotation that is conceptual. If there is no

distinction, all argument is at an end: the brute and the man are one

in kind. But I allow that there is a distinction, and I acknowledge

that the distinction resides where it is alleged to reside by my

opponents—namely, in the presence or absence of self-consciousness

on the part of a mind which bestows a name. Or, to revert to my own

terminology, it is the distinction between denotation and denomination.

 

Now, in order to analyze this distinction, it became needful further

to distinguish between the highest level of receptual ideation that

is attained by any existing brute, and those further developments of

receptual ideation which are presented by the growing child, after it

parts company with all existing brutes, but before it assumes even

the lowest stage of conceptual ideation—_i.e._ prior to the dawn of

self-consciousness. This subordinate distinction I characterized by the

terms “lower recepts” and “higher recepts.” Already I had instituted

a distinction between “lower concepts” and “higher concepts,” meaning

by the former the conceptual naming of recepts, and by the latter a

similar naming of other concepts. So that altogether four large and

consecutive territories were thus marked out: (1) Lower Recepts, which

are co-extensive with the psychology of existing animals, including

a very young child; (2) Higher Recepts, which occupy a psychological

area between the recepts of animals and the first appearance of

self-consciousness in man; (3) Lower Concepts, which are concerned only

with the self-conscious naming of recepts; (4) Higher Concepts, which

have to do with the self-conscious classification of other concepts

known as such, and the self-conscious naming of such ideal integrations

as may result therefrom.

 

Now, if all this is true of naming, clearly it must also be true of

judging. If there is a stage of pre-conceptual naming (denotation),

there must also be a stage of pre-conceptual judgment, of which such

naming is the __EXPRESSION__. No doubt, in strictness, the term judgment

should be reserved for conceptual thought (denomination); but, in order

to avoid an undue multiplication of terms, I prefer thus to qualify the

existing word “judgment.” Such, indeed, has already been the practice

among psychologists, who speak of “intuitive judgments” as occurring

even in acts of perception. All, therefore, that I propose to do is to

institute two additional classes of non-conceptual judgment—namely,

lower receptual and higher receptual, or, more briefly, receptual and

pre-conceptual. If one may speak of an “intuitive,” “unconscious,” or

“perceptual” judgment (as when we mistake a hollow bowl for a sphere),

much more may we speak of a receptual judgment (as when a sea-bird

dives from a height into water, but will not do so upon land), or a

pre-conceptual judgment (as when a young child will extend the use of

a denotative name without any denominative conception). In all, then,

we have four phases of ideation to which the term judgment may be thus

either literally or metaphorically applied—namely, the perceptual,

receptual, pre-conceptual, and conceptual. Of these the last only

is judgment, properly so called. Therefore I do not say that a brute

really judges when, without any self-conscious thought, it brings

together certain reminiscences of its past experience in the form

of recepts, and translates for us the result of its ideation by the

performance of what Mr. Mivart calls “practical inferences.” Neither

do I say that a brute really judges when, still without self-conscious

thought, it learns correctly to employ denotative names. Nay, I should

deny that a brute really judges even if, after it is able to denotate

separately two different recepts (as is done by a talking bird), it

were to name these two recepts simultaneously when thus combined in an

act of “practical inference.” Although there would then be the outward semblance of a proposition, we should not be strictly right in calling it a proposition. It would, indeed, be the _statement of a truth perceived_; but not the statement of a truth perceived _as true_.