mental evolution in men 43

mental evolution in men 43

78. Hunger.

 

79. Yawn.

 

80. Spue.

 

81. Fly.

 

82. Sleep.

 

83. Bristle, dare.

 

84. Be angry, harsh.

 

85. Breathe.

 

86. Speak.

 

87. Seek.

 

88. Hear.

 

89. Smell, sniff.

 

90. Sweat.

 

91. Seethe, boil.

 

92. Dance.

 

93. Leap.

 

94. Creep.

 

95. Stumble.

 

96. Stick.

 

97. Burn.

 

98. Dwell.

 

99. Stand.

 

100. Sink, lie, fail.

 

101. Swing.

 

102. Hang down, lean.

 

103. Rise up, grow.

 

104. Sit.

 

105. Toil.

 

106. Weary, waste, slacken.

 

107. Rejoice, please.

 

108. Desire, love.

 

109. Wake.

 

110. Fear.

 

111. Cool, refresh.

 

112. Stink.

 

113. Hate.

 

114. Know.

 

115. Think.

 

116. Shine.

 

117. Run.

 

118. Move, go.

 

119a. Noise, inarticulate.

 

119b. Noise, musical.

 

120. Do.

 

121. Be.

 

“These 121 concepts constitute the stock-in-trade with which I maintain

that every thought that has ever passed through the mind of India, so

far as it is known to us in its literature, has been expressed. It

would have been easy to reduce that number still further, for there are

several among them which could be ranged together under more general

concepts. But I leave this further reduction to others, being satisfied

as a first attempt with having shown how small a number of seeds may

produce, and has produced, the enormous intellectual vegetation that

has covered the soil of India from the most distant antiquity to the

present day.”[180]

 

Now, the first thing which strikes one on reading this list is, that it

unquestionably justifies the inference of its compiler, namely, “if the

Science of Language has proved anything, it has proved that every term

which is applied to a particular idea or object (unless it be a proper

name) is already a general term.” But the next thing which immediately

strikes one is that the list, surprisingly short as it is, nevertheless

is much too long to admit of being interpreted as, in any intelligible

sense of the words, an inventory of “original concepts”—unless by

“original” we are to understand the ultimate results of philological

analysis. That all these concepts are not “original” in the sense of

representing the ideation of really primitive man, is abundantly proved

by two facts.

 

The first is that fully a third of the whole number might be dispensed

with, and yet leave no important blank in the already limited resources

of the list for the purposes either of communication or reflection. To

yawn, to spew, to vomit, to sweat, and so on, are not forms of activity

of any such vital importance to the needs of a primitive community,

as to demand priority of naming by any aboriginal framers of language.

Moreover, as Professor Max Müller himself elsewhere observes, “even

these 121 concepts might be reduced to a much smaller number, if we

cared to do so. Any one who examines them carefully, will see how easy

it would have been to express to dig by to cut or to strike; to bite

by to cut or to crush; to milk by to squeeze; to glean by to gather;

to steal by to lift.... If we see how many special purposes can be

served by one root, as _I_, to go, or _Pas_, to fasten, the idea that a

dozen of roots might have been made to supply the whole wealth of our

dictionary, appears in itself by no means so ridiculous as is often

supposed.”[181]

 

Again, in the second place, a large proportional number of the words

have reference to a grade of culture already far in advance of that

which has been attained by most existing savages. “Many concepts, such

as to cook, to roast, to measure, to dress, to adorn, belong clearly

to a later phase of civilized life.”[182] It might have been suitably

added that such “concepts” as to dig, to plant, to milk, &c., betoken

a condition of _pastoral_ life, which, as we know from abundant

evidence, is representative of a comparatively high level of social

evolution.[183] But if “many” of these concepts are thus unmistakably

referable to semi-civilized as distinguished from savage life, what

guarantee can we have that the remainder are “original”? Obviously we

can have no such guarantee; but, on the contrary, find the very best,

because _intrinsic_ evidence, that they belong to a more or less high

level of culture, far removed from that of primitive man. In other

words, we must conclude that these 121 concepts are “original” only in

the sense that they do not now admit of further analysis at the hands

of comparative philologists: they are not original in the sense of

bringing us within any measurable distance of the first beginnings of

articulate speech.[184]

 

Nevertheless, they are of the utmost value and significance, in that

they bring us down to a period of presumably restricted ideation,

as compared with the enormous development since attained by various

branches of this Indo-European stock—so far, at least, as the growth

of language can be taken as a fair __EXPRESSION__ of such development.

They are likewise of the highest importance as showing in how

presumably short a period of time (comparatively speaking) so immense

and divergent a growth may proceed from such a simple and germ-like

condition of thought.[185] Lastly, they serve to show in a most

striking manner that the ideas represented, although all of a general

character, are nevertheless of the lowest degree of generality.

Scarcely any of them present us with evidence of reflective thought,

as distinguished from the naming of objects of sense-perception, or

of the simplest forms of activity which are immediately cognizable

as such.[186] In other words, few of these “original concepts”

rise much higher in the scale of ideation than the level to which

I have previously assigned what I have called “named recepts” or

“pre-concepts.” A dumb animal, or an infant, presents a full receptual

appreciation of the majority of actions which the catalogue includes;

and, therefore, so that a society of human beings can speak at all

(_i.e._ presents the power of naming their recepts), it is difficult

to see how they could have avoided a denotation of the more important

recepts which are here concerned.

 

Another most interesting feature of a general kind which the list

presents is, that it is composed exclusively of verbs.[187] This

peculiarity of the ultimate known roots of all languages, which shows

them to have been expressive of actions and states as distinguished

from objects and qualities, is a peculiarity on which Professor Max

Müller lays much stress. But the inference which he draws from the

fact is clearly not justifiable. This inference is that, as every

root expresses “the consciousness of repeated acts, such as scraping,

digging, striking,” &c., the naming of actions, as distinguished from

objects, “must be considered as the first step in the formation of

concepts.” Now, in drawing this inference—and, indeed, throughout

all his works as far as I remember—Professor Max Müller has entirely

overlooked two most important considerations. First, as already

observed, that the roots in question are _demonstrably_ very far

from having been the original material of language as first coined

by primitive man; and, next, that whatever this original material

may have been, from the first there must have been a struggle for