Mental Evolution in Man 23

Mental Evolution in Man 23

“Of words formed by imitation of sounds, the language shows barely a

trace. The mewing of the cat evidently suggested the word _mea_, which

signified both ‘cat’ and ‘furs.’ For the other vocables which make up

this speech, no origin can be conjectured. We can merely notice that in

some of the words the liking which children and some races of men have

for the repetition of sounds is apparent. Thus we have _migno-migno_,

signifying ‘water, wash, bath;’ _go-go_, ‘delicacies, as sugar, candy,

or dessert,’ and _waia-waiar_, ‘black, darkness, or a negro.’ There

is, as will be seen from these examples, no special tendency to

the monosyllabic form. _Gummigar_, we are told, signifies ‘all the

substantials of the table, such as bread, meat, vegetables, &c.;’ and

the same word is used to designate the cook. The boy, it is added, does

not use this word, but uses _gna-migna_, which the girl considers as

a mistake. From which we may gather that even at their tender age the

form of their language had become with them an object of thought; and

we may infer, moreover, that the language was not invented solely by

the girl, but that both the children contributed to frame it.

 

“Of miscellaneous words may be mentioned _gar_, ‘horse;’ _deer_,

‘money of any kind;’ _beer_, ‘literature, books, or school;’ _peer_,

‘ball;’ _bau_, ‘soldier, music;’ _odo_, ‘to send for, to go out, to

take away;’ _keh_, ‘to soil;’ _pa-ma_, ‘to go to sleep, pillow, bed.’

The variety of acceptations which each word was capable of receiving

is exemplified in many ways. Thus _feu_ might become an adjective, as

_ne-pa-feu_, ‘not warm.’ The verb _odo_ had many meanings, according to

its position or the words which accompanied it. _Ma odo_, ‘I (want to)

go out;’ _gar odo_, ‘send for the horse;’ _too odo_, ‘all gone.’ _Gaan_

signified God; and we are told—When it rains, the children often run

to the window, and call out, _Gaan odo migno-migno, feu odo_, which

means, ‘God take away the rain, and send the sun’—_odo_ before the

object meaning ‘to take away,’ and after the object, ‘to send.’ From

this remark and example we learn, not merely that the language had—as

all real languages must have—its rules of construction, but that these

were sometimes different from the English rules. This also appears in

the form _mea waia-waiaw_, ‘dark furs’ (literally, ‘furs dark’), where

the adjective follows its substantive.

 

“The odd and unexpected associations which in all languages govern

the meaning of words are apparent in this brief vocabulary. We can

gather from it that the parents were Catholics, and punctual in church

observances. The words _papa_ and _mamma_ were used separately in

their ordinary sense; but when linked together in the compound term

_papa-mamma_, they signified (according to the connection, we may

presume), ‘church,’ ‘prayer-book,’ ‘cross,’ ‘priest,’ ‘to say their

prayers.’ _Bau_ was ‘soldier;’ but, we are told, from seeing the bishop

in his mitre and vestments, thinking he was a soldier, they applied the

word _bau_ to him. _Gar odo_ properly signified ‘send for the horse;’

but as the children frequently saw their father, when a carriage was

wanted, write an order and send it to the stable, they came to use the

same __EXPRESSION__ (_gar odo_) for pencil and paper.

 

“There is no appearance of inflection, properly speaking, in the

language; and this is only what might be expected. Very young children

rarely use inflected forms in any language. The English child of three

or four years says, ‘Mary cup,’ for ‘Mary’s cup;’ and ‘Dog bite Harry’

will represent every tense and mood. It is by no means improbable that,

if the children had continued to use their own language for a few years

longer, inflections would have been developed in it, as we see that

peculiar forms of construction and novel compounds—which are the germs

of inflection—had already made their appearance.

 

“These two recorded instances of child-languages have led to further

inquiries, which, though pursued only for a brief period, and in a

limited field, have shown that cases of this sort are by no means

uncommon.”

 

The author then proceeds to furnish other corroborative instances; but

the above quotations are, I think, sufficient for my purposes.[88] For

they show (1) that the spontaneous and to all appearances arbitrary

word-making, which is more or less observable in all children when

first beginning to speak, may, under favourable circumstances, proceed

to an astonishing degree of fulness and efficiency; (2) that although

the words, or articulate signs, thus invented are sometimes of a

plainly onomatopoetic origin, as a general rule they are not so; (3)

that the words are far from being always monosyllabic; (4) that they

admit of becoming sufficiently numerous and varied to constitute a not

inefficient language, without as yet having advanced to the inflexional

stage; and (5) that the syntax of this language presents obvious points

of resemblance to that of the gesture-languages of mankind previously

considered.

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER VIII.

 

RELATION OF TONE AND GESTURE TO WORDS.

 

 

We have already seen that spoken language differs from the language

of tone and gesture in being, as a system of signs, more purely

conventional. This means that for semiotic purposes articulation is

a higher product of mental evolution than either gesticulation or

intonation. It also means that as an instrument of such evolution

articulate speech is more efficient. The latter point is an important

one, so I shall proceed to deal with it at some length.

 

As noticed in a previous chapter, our system of coinage, bank-notes,

and bills of sale is a more convenient system of signifying value of

labour or of property, than is the more primitive and less conventional

system of actually exchanging the labour or bartering the property;

and our system of arithmetic is similarly more convenient for the

purpose of calculation than is the more natural system of counting

on the fingers. But not only are these more conventional systems

more convenient; they are likewise conducive to a higher development

of business transactions on the one hand, and of calculation on the

other. In the absence of such an improved system of signs, it would

be impossible to conduct as many or such intricate transactions and

calculations as we do conduct. Similarly with speech as distinguished

from gesture. Words, like gestures, are signs of thoughts and feelings;

but in being more conventional they are more pure as signs, and so

admit of being wrought up into a much more convenient or efficient

system, while at the same time they become more constructive in their

influence upon ideation. The great superiority of words over gestures

in both these respects may most easily be shown by the use of a few

examples.

 

I open Colonel Mallery’s book at random, and find the following as the

sign for a barking dog:—

 

“Pass the arched hand forward from the lower part of the face, to

illustrate elongated nose and mouth; then, with both forefingers

extended, remaining fingers and thumbs closed, place them upon either

side of the lower jaw, pointing upwards, to show lower canines, at the

same time accompanying the gesture with an __EXPRESSION__ of withdrawing

the lips so as to show the teeth snarling; then, with the fingers of

the right hand extended and separated throw them quickly forward and

slightly upward (voice or talking).”

 

Here, be it observed, how elaborate is this pictorial method of

designating a dog barking as compared with the use of two words; and

after all it is not so efficient, for the signs were misunderstood

by the Indians to whom they were shown—the meaning assigned to them

being that of a growling bear. What a large expenditure of thought is

required for the devising and the interpretation of such ideograms!

and, when they are formed and understood, how cumbersome do they

appear if contrasted with words! Colonel Mallery, indeed, says of

gesture-language that, “when highly cultivated, its rapidity on

familiar subjects exceeds that of speech, and approaches to that of

thought itself;” but, besides the important limitation “on familiar

subjects,” he adds,—“at the same time it must be admitted that great

increase in rapidity is chiefly obtained by the system of preconcerted

abbreviations before explained, and by the adoption of arbitrary forms,

in which naturalness is sacrificed and conventionality established.”[89]

 

But besides being cumbersome, gesture-language labours under the

more serious defect of not being so precise, and the still more

serious defect of not being so serviceable as spoken language in

the development of abstraction. We have previously seen how words,

being more or less purely conventional as signs, are not tied down,

as it were, to material objects; although they have doubtless all

originated as expressive of sensuous perceptions, not being necessarily

ideographic, they may easily pass into signs of general ideas, and

end by becoming expressive of the highest abstractions. “Words are

thus the easily manipulated counters of thought,” and so, to change

the metaphor, are the progeny of generalization. But gestures, in

being always more or less ideographic, are much more closely chained

to sensuous perceptions; and, therefore, it is only when exercised on

“familiar subjects” that they can fairly be said to rival words as a

means of __EXPRESSION__, while they can never soar into the thinner medium

of high abstraction. No sign-talker, with any amount of time at his

disposal, could translate into the language of gesture a page of Kant.

 

Let it be observed that I am here speaking of gesture-language as we

actually find it. What the latent capabilities of such language may be

is another question, and one with reference to which speculation is

scarcely calculated to prove profitable. Nevertheless, as the subject

is not altogether without importance in the present connection, I may

quote the following brief passage from a recent essay by Professor

Whitney. After remarking that “the voice has won to itself the chief

and almost exclusive part in communication,” he adds:—

 

“This is not in the least because of any closer connection of the

thinking apparatus with the muscles that act to produce audible

sounds than with those that act to produce visible motions; not

because there are natural uttered names for conceptions, any more

than natural gestured names. It is simply a case of ‘survival of the

fittest,’ or analogous to the process by which iron has become the

exclusive material of swords, and gold and silver for money: because,

namely, experience has shown this to be the material best adapted

to this special use. The advantages of the voice are numerous and

obvious. There is first its economy, as employing a mechanism that is

available for little else, and leaving free for other purposes those

indispensable instruments, the hands. Then there is its superior

perceptibleness; its nice differences impress themselves upon the sense

at a distance at which visible motions become indistinct; they are not

hidden by intervening objects; they allow the eyes of the listeners as

well as the hands of the speaker to be employed in other useful work;

they are as plain in the dark as in the light; and they are able to

catch and command the attention of one who is not to be reached in any

other way.”[90]

 

To these advantages we may add that words, in being as we have seen

less essentially ideographic than gestures, must always have been

more available for purposes of abstract __EXPRESSION__. We must remember

how greatly gesture-language, as it now appears in its most elaborate

form, is indebted to the psychologically constructing influence of

spoken language; and, thus viewed, it is a significant fact that

even now gesture language is not able to convey ideas of any high

degree of abstraction. Still, I doubt not it would be possible to

construct a wholly conventional system of gestures which should answer

to, or correspond with, all the abstract words and inflections of

a spoken language; and that then the one sign-system might replace

the other—just as the sign-system of writing is able similarly to

replace that of speech. This, however, is a widely different thing from

supposing that such a perfect system of gesture-signs could have grown

by a process of natural development; and, looking to the essentially

ideographic character of such signs, I greatly question whether, even

under circumstances of the strongest necessity (such as would have arisen if man, or his progenitors, had been unable to articulate), the language of gesture could have been developed into anything approaching a substitute for the language of words.