Q Ships and Their Story 3
then, one may definitely assert, you have in you much that goes to the
making of an ideal Q-ship captain and a brave warrior. As such you
might make a first-class commanding officer of a destroyer, a light
cruiser, or even a battleship; but something more is required. The
enemy is artful; you must be super-artful. You must be able to look
across the tumbling sea into his mind behind the conning tower. What
are his intentions? What will be his next move? Take in by a quick
mental calculation the conditions of wind, wave, and sun. Pretend to
run away from him, so that you get these just right. Put your ship
head on to sea, so that the enemy with his sparse freeboard is being
badly washed down and his guns’ crews are thinking more of their
wet feet and legs than of accurate shooting. Then, when you see him
submerging, alter course quickly, reckon his probable position by the
time you have steadied your ship on her course, and drop a series of
depth-charges over his track. ‘If you can fill the unforgiving minute
with sixty seconds’ worth of distance, run’; if you have acted with
true seamanship and sound imagination, you will presently see bits of
broken wreckage, the boil of water, quantities of oil, perhaps a couple
of corpses; and yours is the U-boat below, my son, and a D.S.O.; and a
thousand pounds in cash to be divided amongst the crew; and you’re a
man, my son!
That, in a few phrases, is the kind of work, and shows the
circumstances of the Q-ship in her busiest period. As we set forth
her wonderful story, so gallant, so sad, so victorious, and yet so
nerve-trying, we shall see all manner of types engaged in this great
adventure; but we cannot appreciate either the successes or losses
until we have seen the birth and growth of the Q-ship idea. As this
volume is the first effort to present the subject historically, we
shall begin at the beginning by showing the causes which created
the Q-ship. We shall see the consecutive stages of development and
improvement, the evolution of new methods, and, indeed we may at once
say it, of a new type of super-seamen. How did it all begin?
[Illustration: AN EARLY Q-SHIP
Q-ship “Antwerp” entering Harwich harbour.]
[Illustration: Q-SHIP “ANTWERP”
Commander Herbert is on the port side of the bridge, the Mercantile
Chief Officer and Quartermaster being in the foreground.
To face p. 6]
Turn your attention back to the autumn of 1914. It was the sinking of
the three _Cressys_ on September 22 by U 9 that taught Germany what a
wonderful weapon of offence she had in the submarine. Five days later
the first German submarine penetrated the Dover Straits. This was
U 18, who actually attacked the light cruiser _Attentive_. But it
was not until October 20 that the first merchant ship, the British
S.S. _Glitra_ in the North Sea, was sunk by a submarine. Six days
later the French S.S. _Amiral Ganteaume_, with Belgian refugees, was
attacked by a German submarine. A month passed, and on November 23
the S.S. _Malachite_ was attacked by U 21, and after being on fire
sank. Three days later the S.S. _Primo_ was sunk also by U 21. It was
thus perfectly clear that we had before us a most difficult submarine
campaign to contend with, and that merchant ships would not be immune.
On the last day of October H.M.S. _Hermes_ was torpedoed off Calais,
and on November 11 H.M.S. _Niger_ had a similar fate near Deal.
[Illustration: COMMANDER S. C. DOUGLAS, R. N.
When serving in the Q-ship “Antwerp,” wearing a false moustache and
disguised as an English commercial traveller.]
[Illustration: COMMANDER G. HERBERT, D.S.O., R.N.
Taken on the bridge of the Q-ship “Antwerp,” disguised as a Dutch pilot
with a wig.
To face p. 8]
What was to be done? The creation of what eventually became known as
the Auxiliary Patrol, with its ever increasing force of armed yachts,
trawlers, drifters, and motor craft; the use of destroyers and our own
submarines formed part of the scheme. But even at this early stage
the Q-ship idea came into being, though not actually under that name.
Officially she was a special-service ship, whose goings and comings
were so mysterious that even among service men such craft were spoken
of in great secrecy as mystery ships. This first mystery ship was the
S.S. _Vittoria_, who was commissioned on November 29, 1914. She had
all the appearance of an ordinary merchant ship, but she was armed,
and went on patrol in the area where submarines had been reported. It
was an entirely novel idea, and very few people knew anything about
her. She never had any luck, and was paid off early in January, 1915,
without ever having so much as sighted a submarine. The idea of decoy
ships suggested itself to various naval officers during December,
1914, and their suggestions reached the Admiralty. The basic plan
was for the Admiralty to take up a number of merchantmen and fishing
craft, arm them with a few light quick-firing guns, and then send them
forth to cruise in likely submarine areas, flying neutral colours.
This was perfectly legitimate under International Law, provided that
before opening fire on the enemy the neutral colours were lowered and
the White Ensign was hoisted. Seeing that the enemy was determined
to sink merchantmen, the obvious reply was to send against them
armed merchantmen, properly commissioned and armed, but outwardly
resembling anything but a warship. Thus it came about that on January
27, 1915, the second decoy ship was commissioned. This was the Great
Eastern Railway S.S. _Antwerp_ (originally called _Vienna_), which
operated in the English Channel. She was placed under the command of
Lieut.-Commander Godfrey Herbert, R.N., one of the most experienced and
able officers of our submarine service. The choice was a happy one, for
a submarine officer would naturally in his stalking be able to realize
at once the limitations and possibilities of his opponent. It was a
most difficult task, for the U-boats at this time were still very shy,
and only took on certainties. Neither in boats nor in personnel had
Germany yet any to spare, and there were periods when the submarine
campaign fluctuated. Thus, day after day, week after week, went by,
and _Antwerp_ never had any chance. The enemy was now beginning to
operate further afield, and at the end of January, 1915, for the first
time, a U-boat made its way up the Irish Sea as far as off Liverpool,
and then, on February 18, was inaugurated the German Submarine
Blockade. Shipping began to be sunk in various places, but the western
end of the English Channel was now a favourite zone, especially in the
neighbourhood of the Scillies; and it was with the hope of being taken
for a merchant ship that _Antwerp_ had come out from Falmouth and made
her way westward. Thus, on March 12, we see her, about three o’clock
in the afternoon, twelve miles north of the Bishop Rock Lighthouse.
A submarine[1] was sighted steering in a northerly direction for a
steamer on the horizon. Here, at length, was a chance. Twenty minutes
later, _Antwerp_ came up to a sailing ship, and found she had on
board the officers and crew of the Ellerman liner _Andalusian_, which
had been captured and scuttled 25 miles W.N.W. of the Bishop Rock.
_Antwerp_ continued her chase, and got within four miles of the
_Andalusian_, still afloat, but then the submarine dived and was never
sighted again. So _Antwerp_ was never able to sink a submarine, and she
was paid off on April 5, 1915.
During the summer of 1915 there was a small steamer called the _Lyons_,
which one used to see in various naval ports, and under various
disguises. Her primary object was to carry naval stores from one port
to another, but it was always her hope to fall in with a submarine.
I remember seeing her one day alongside Pembroke Naval Dockyard,
painted a certain colour and with one funnel. A little later I saw
her elsewhere with a different coat of paint and a dummy funnel added
to her, so that she resembled an ocean-going tug. _Lyons_ also was
unable to entrap the enemy, and terminated her decoy-ship period at the
beginning of November of the same year.
Thus the war had gone on for several months, and an apparently sound
idea had failed to produce a single good result. All kinds of shipping
were being sunk, and yet the German submarines somehow could not be
persuaded to attack these disguised ships. How was it? Was there
something in the disguise which gave the steamers away? Was it purely
hard luck? We cannot say definitely, but the fact remained, and it
was rather disappointing. Of course the idea of disguise had been
employed almost from the very first days of the war; for, in August,
1914, Admiral Jellicoe had requested that the armed trawlers, though
commissioned, should not be painted grey like other warships, but
retain their fishing numbers and funnel markings just as in peace time.
In the early summer of 1915, a number of disguised armed trawlers
were also sent out to the Dogger Bank in the hope of catching an
unsuspecting submarine, who might think they were fishing. The idea had
been further developed by a clever scheme involving the co-operation of
a disguised armed trawler towing a submerged British submarine. This
began in May; on June 23 it was the means of sinking U 40, and on July
20 it brought about the loss of U 23; but a few months later this idea
was thought to be played out, and came to an end in October, 1915,
though it was eventually revived in the following summer.
Another variation of the decoy-ship principle at this time was that
employed by Admiral Startin, who was in charge of the naval base at
Granton. In view of enemy submarines having recently held up neutral
merchant steamers in the North Sea, he disguised two big trawlers so
as to resemble small neutral merchant ships. This was in July, 1915.
So successfully was this done that one of them actually deceived
British destroyers, who took her for a Danish cargo steamer. The
next development was further to disguise them by adding a false deck
cargo of timber, boats, and other details, so as to resemble closely
a Norwegian cargo ship, with Norwegian colours hoisted at the mizzen,
two derricks placed on the trawler’s foremast, and Norwegian colours
painted on prepared slips of canvas placed on each side of the hull
amidships. Those who were at sea in those days will recollect that
it was customary for neutral ships to have their national colours
painted on each side of the hull in the hope that the enemy would
not mistake the ships for Allies’. Thus cleverly disguised, the two
Granton trawlers _Quickly_ and _Gunner_ went into the North Sea, armed
with nothing more powerful than a 12-pounder, Admiral Startin being
himself aboard one of the ships. A large submarine was actually sighted
on July 20, and at 1,000 yards the enemy began the action. _Quickly_
thereupon lowered her Norwegian flag, ran up the White Ensign, removed
the painted canvas, replied with her 12-pounder, and then with her
6-pounder. A fine, lucky shot was seen to strike the submarine, and
much smoke was seen to issue. Although the enemy made off and was not
sunk, yet it showed that it was possible to fool German submarines by
this disguise. The decoy-ship idea was not merely sound in principle,
but it was practicable and was capable of being used as a valuable
offensive weapon. Most of a year had passed since the beginning of
war, and there were no decoy ship results to show except those which
had been obtained by British submarines working in conjunction with
disguised trawlers. However, just as the seaman often finds the dawn
preceded by a calm and followed by a breeze, so it was to be with
the decoy ships. The dawn of a new period was about to take place,
and this was followed by such a wind of events that if anyone had
dared to doubt the value of this specialized naval warfare it was not
long before such hesitation vanished. Disguised trawlers had in the
meantime been further successful, but there were obviously greater
possibilities for the disguised merchant ship, the collier and tramp
types especially. But this all depended on three things: First, the
right type of ship had to be selected very carefully and with regard to
the trade route on which she would normally in the present conditions
be likely to be found. For instance, it would have been utterly foolish
to have sent a P. and O. liner to cruise up and down the waters of the
Irish Channel or an Atlantic liner up and down the North Sea. Secondly,
having once selected the right ship, much depended on the dock-yard
authorities responsible for seeing that she was fitted out adequately
as to her fighting capabilities, yet externally never losing any of
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